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Historically public sector personnel policies and practices have been targets of reform.   
These reforms consisted of transferring private sector techniques to a public sector perceived to 
be more bureaucratic and less efficient.  Private sector research is replete with evidence of a 
connection between “superior” human resource management (HRM) practices and the 
performance outcome of profitability.  Public sector outcomes are more difficult to connect 
directly to management practices.  As a result, the focus of public sector reform has become one 
of improving the processes of management rather than improving the outcomes of government.  
The linkage between reform and outcome is assumed. 
This study attempts to add to the literature by tying local government HRM practices to 
the organization level performance outcome of un-enhanced general obligation municipal bond 
rating.  A database was obtained from the International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA) containing the results of an HRM survey in 2000 of all U.S. municipalities with a 
 xiv
 
population over 10,000.  The municipal bond rating was then used as a performance proxy and 
dependent variable; the greater the number of high performing HRM practices employed by a 
municipality, the higher the bond rating or the higher the performance. The study sample 
consisted of 366 municipalities both responding to the survey and with bond ratings meeting the 
criteria of the study.  The results of a binary logistic regression analysis showed intensive 
recruitment, family oriented work practices, job flexibility and open communication to be strong 
predictors of high performance.  Decentralized HRM decisions, pay for performance programs 
and incentives for group participation were not associated with high performance.   
These findings suggest municipalities are likely to improve their performance by 
implementing the practices found to be predictive of higher bond ratings.  However, differences 
between private and public sectors need to be considered when implementing change and a 
systems view helps minimize “deadly combinations” and maximize “powerful connections”.  
Also, organization culture and the structure of the HRM system need to be considered.  
Additional research is recommended to further develop and validate the use of the municipal 
bond rating as a measure of a government level performance outcome.    
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CHAPTER I 
OVERVIEW AND NATURE OF STUDY 
The management of human resources is viewed as requiring new approaches in order to 
meet the challenges for strategically managing globalization, diversity, teams and change 
(Jackson and Schuler, 2000).  Since 1883, with the passage of the Pendleton Act, the 
management of the public workforce in the U.S. has been the subject of ongoing reform at the 
federal, state and local levels.  These efforts have centered on the competing values of equity and 
representation, political neutrality and executive leadership, merit and employee protectionism, 
efficiency and political responsiveness (Ingraham and Thompson, 1995).   
The "anti-government" movement beginning in the 1970's and continuing through present 
day purports that smaller government is "better" government and has resulted in a number of 
methods for streamlining bureaucratic functions. Changes are being advocated and adopted to (1) 
improve the quality of service to the public, and at the same time, (2) do more with less (Cayer, 
1995).  Any argument to reduce the size of government must focus on the number of people 
employed by the government whether at the federal or local levels.   
In keeping with the idea of reducing the size of government, reforms emanating from the 
National Performance Review (NPR), and re-invention movements in the U.S. and abroad during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, advocate infusing management practices from the private sector into 
government administration to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in delivering public 
services.  Interestingly, reforms in many cases are not aimed at the products or outcomes of the 
public sector (e.g. education, health care), rather, they represent attempts to change the methods 
of managing, controlling and accounting for the production of these public services (Brunsson, 
2000) with the assumption that these efforts will result in superior products.  
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Civil service rules and regulations, designed over the years to prevent corruption 
associated with patronage, are viewed as inflexible and out of touch with methods for attracting 
high quality people to government, and retaining them once recruited.   Although the re-
invention focus in the U.S. began at the federal level with the NPR (headed by then Vice 
President Gore), practices assumed to be more effective, efficient and less bureaucratic have 
become commonly accepted at all levels of government.  The National Commission on the State 
and Local Public Service (Winter Commission) brought the need for reform in local government 
into focus where over 87,000 state and local governments in the U.S. engage most directly with 
citizens.  These governments are labor intensive devoting much larger percentages of their 
budgets to personnel costs when compared to the federal government (Thompson, 1993).  
Reforms are not limited to human resource management (HRM). However, in order to 
achieve organization change, the size, composition and management of the workforce are of 
prime concern among those advocating for a re-invented government.  Reforms from both the 
Winter and Gore initiatives focus on reinventing personnel practices (Thompson & Radin, 1997).  
Common HRM recommendations include (1) enhancing management discretion in personnel 
management; (2) increasing the flexibility and responsiveness of personnel systems; (3) 
improving performance; and (4) adopting private-sector staffing techniques (Hays and Kearney, 
2001). These practices, characterizing the public manager as a more risk-taking entrepreneur 
than risk-averting bureaucrat, are commonly advocated for in the Public Administration 
literature, accepted as desirable in practice and adopted as standards among those advocating for 
New Public Management (NPM). 
 3
Problem Statement 
 A review of the literature shows that HRM practices in the private sector seem to be 
directly linked to business outcomes, namely productivity, profit and market share and that those 
HRM practices associated with high performance, such as decentralized decision authority, 
produce better business results than practices associated with traditional practices found in 
centralized personnel systems (Tomer, 2001; Pfeffer, 1998).  Establishing linkages between 
management practices in government and policy outcomes seem more elusive than in the private 
sector where the outcomes of profit and market share are easier to measure. 
 The traditional centralized personnel system, commonly associated with the public sector 
bureaucracy, has come to be viewed by many as too cumbersome for line managers and an 
impediment to making effective and efficient personnel decisions.  Consequently, simplifying, 
decentralizing and streamlining personnel procedures to give more discretion for human resource 
management decisions to line managers in classifying positions, recruiting and hiring people, 
designing innovative compensation and reward systems (to include benefits) and terminating 
employees are popular themes in the reinvention literature.   These changes are linked to 
performance management - the establishment of clearly defined and measurable objectives, and 
emphasizing outcomes versus outputs as they relate to the resources (inputs) allocated to manage 
government programs (Popovich, 1998).   In addition, this managerial approach suggests that 
both resources and operations should be decentralized as much as is feasible to line managers.  
Although these reforms are generally accepted as desirable, the literature attempting to discern 
how many of these initiatives are actually implemented, particularly in state government, shows 
that while public managers generally agree with the concepts, few reforms are actually in place 
(Brudney et al., 1999).   The personnel intensive nature of local government combined with 
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pressure to streamline and reinvent government appears to create the opportunity to examine a 
possible link between HRM practices and policy outcomes.   
 
Study Purpose 
 This study explores the relationships between human resource management (HRM) 
practices and government level outcomes of selected municipalities nation-wide.  The intent is to 
address the overall research question:   
 
Are there differences in HRM practices among municipalities that contribute to high 
performance as measured by local government outcomes? 
 
Governments translate resources into services in response to policy decisions.  However, 
what measurable impact these services have on intended policy outcomes is lacking in the public 
administration literature (Donahue et al., 2000).  There are research initiatives such as the 
Government Performance Project (GPP) sponsored by Syracuse University and other studies that 
look at the relationship between HRM practices and HRM outcomes (such as the effectiveness of 
planning, turnover rates, average timeframes involved in filling vacant positions and terminating 
employees).  While useful, such efforts appear to assume that HRM outcomes make a difference 
in the outcomes of government. Few, if any studies in the public sector attempt to link HRM 
practices, or any management practices, with municipal bond ratings, education quality, poverty 
rates, crime rates, availability of recreational activities etc.  As long as there is an emphasis on 
managing for results, there is a need to measure the effects of a government's "management 
capacity" in achieving desired policy outcomes (Ingraham and Donahue, 1999, 2000). 
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A Focus on Local Government 
Given that public policy developed on the national and state levels is often intentionally 
lacking in specificity to allow for designing programs and services to match local needs, the 
closer government gets to the citizens, the more likely impacts can be identified and measured.   
The National Commission on the State and Local Public Service (commonly known as 
the Winter Commission) was created in 1991 to "…assess and improve the capacity and 
performance of state and local governments."  (Thompson, 1993, p. xiii).    Although somewhat 
overshadowed by the National Performance Review (NPR) reform initiatives at the federal level 
(Lynn, 2000), through a series of hearings with local officials as well as a number of research 
studies, the Winter Commission found a need for reform, and developed recommendations for 
achieving a high performance government (Hard truths/tough choices: An agenda for state and 
local reform, 1993).  Among the recommendations, local governments were encouraged to 
develop high-performance workforces by creating trust and leadership in the workplace versus 
micro-management (p. 39), and by creating a learning government.  Specifically local 
governments were to consider: restoring training and education budgets; creating new skill 
packages for all employees; basing pay increases on skills not position; insisting on a new 
problem-solving public manager; and encouraging a new style of labor-management 
communication (p. 40).   Drawing on the concept of human capitalism, local governments were 
asked to place the education, skills, organization, and management of the workforce at center 
stage.  Human capitalism stresses: (1) sustaining an adequate supply of high-quality human 
resources; (2) managerial strategies that emphasize quality and productivity; and (3) a pattern of 
work organization that fosters both of these goals (Marshall & Tucker, 1992, pp. 58-59; 
Thompson, 1993, pp. 22-23).  Winter (1993) suggests that:  "Making democracy work is what 
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the state and local public service must be about.  It is here that the actual delivery of the most 
basic and essential services takes place." (p. vii).  Further, he comments: 
…the quality of our lives…will depend on how well we come to grips with our concerns 
about the capacity of our political system to handle the issues of the moment.  That 
capacity will be determined in large measure by the commitment of the men and women 
who make up the state and local public service… (p. viii). 
 
Defining Human Resource Management Systems 
Human Resource Management (HRM) is a phrase commonly found in management 
theory and practice.  Before the 1980's the administrative activities associated with organizing, 
supporting and maintaining a workforce to achieve organizational goals were termed personnel 
management (Goss, 1994; Storey, 1989; Beaumont, 1993).  The influence of the human relations 
movement in the 20th Century, the quality movement in response to declining economic 
performance due to Japanese competition in the 1980's, and the emphasis high performance 
organizations placed on human resources (Beaumont, 1993), resulted in a “new style theory of 
personnel management termed HRM” (Goss, 1994).  A new, albeit idealistic, orientation 
emerged ascribing to HRM the characteristics of a focus on horizontal versus vertical authority, 
devolving HRM authority to line managers, integration of HRM with organization strategic 
planning, and viewing employees as subjects for growth and development (Krulis-Randa in 
Goss, 1994).   
 Any definition of HRM must consist of “content,” or the set of techniques, practices or 
functions developed specifically for managing people (Goss, 1994).   Klingner and Nalbaldian 
(1998) describe HRM functions as planning, acquisition (recruitment and selection), 
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development (training), and sanction (discipline and equity).  Jackson and Schuler (2000) 
categorize HRM functions as job and organizational analysis (planning), recruitment, selection 
and placement, socialization, training and development, total compensation, and performance 
management.  Tzafrir and Harel (2001) outline HRM activities as acquisition, development, 
motivation, probity (existence of formal grievance procedures) and involvement.  Essentially, 
HRM must contain most of these functions in order to recruit and retain quality employees.  
Limiting the management of people within the parameters of these techniques, however, is a 
characteristic of personnel management and associated with a traditional model of control (Goss, 
1994).  The issue for human resource management is not whether these functions are important, 
they are.  The question becomes how they can be best carried out by organizations to attract, 
develop and keep high quality people and achieve the highest organizational productivity 
possible.   
 
A Shift from Control to Commitment  
Storey (1989) and Goss (1994) identify two ends of a continuum in theorizing about 
human resource management.  Defining HRM appears to depend on one’s orientation on the 
instrumental/humanistic continuum.  On one end is the hard, or instrumental approach and on the 
other a soft, or humanistic approach.  These represent extreme positions and a realistic approach 
would probably combine elements of both.  The instrumental approach is top driven whereby 
human resources are directed toward achieving pre-defined strategic goals.  Generally, an 
instrumental approach is concerned mostly with efficiency.  The humanistic style is one of 
approaching HRM as a process for achieving strategic goals through people, but not at their 
expense.  The humanistic approach seems to comport with the quality movement whereby the 
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emphasis is on the employment relationship, with effectiveness rather than efficiency being the 
primary concern.   Here, the primary interest is in nurturing this relationship by emphasizing the 
“norm of reciprocity” that underlies all social exchanges (Gouldner, 1960).  This refers to the 
human tendency to respond to others in kind.  For example, when an individual gives another 
individual a resource it establishes an obligation for the receiving individual to reciprocate with a 
resource of comparable value at some future point in time. Recognizing the nature of this 
exchange in the employment relationship emphasizes the importance of striking a balance 
between the needs of an organization and the needs of employees.   
Brunsson (1985) similarly refers to this relationship where he emphasizes the importance 
of organization ideology, which he defines as those shared ideas, attitudes and knowledge among 
members such as perceptions about the organization, its environment, its history and future 
persisting over time.  He likens ideology with “…frames of reference, myths or strategies” (p. 
28).  He discusses ideology in terms of subjective or cognitive structure of individuals, perceived 
or what people think others think and objective or shared ideas among all organization members.  
The objective ideology provides a framework for discussion and action.  Action resulting from 
the shared objective ideology has the characteristics of collaboration and participation and 
consists of positive expectations, commitment and motivation.  He argues that only through the 
participation of those involved or affected by decisions can a desired action occur (p. 7).   
Wright et al. (2001) draw a distinction between human resources and human resource 
practices, where the former are all the knowledge, talents, skills and abilities possessed by the 
employees in an organization.  Human resource practices are all the tools for managing these 
resources.  As the employees, not the firm, own the human capital, management practices must 
successfully draw on the cumulative human capital pool (all human resource capabilities 
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available in an organization at any given time) to solicit the desired individual and collective 
efforts toward mutually shared goals and objectives.  This changes the landscape of 
consideration from one primarily concerned with independent HR practices to a consideration of 
an HR “architecture” or management practices throughout an organization capable of influencing 
the human capital pool.   
 In this view, a HRM perspective includes all forms of “people management” in an 
organization, whether practiced by the HR professional or line manager.  Such an approach 
broadens the definition of HRM and moves it away from a form of organizational control to one 
of mutual commitment – commitment to the needs of employees on the part of the organization 
and a reciprocal commitment to the needs of the organization on the part of the employee – 
where the goals of the organization and each employee are one in the same.  This wider 
definition is reflected by Beer et al. (1984) who argue that: 
 
Human resource management involves all management decisions and actions that affect 
the nature of the relationship between the organization and its employees – its human 
resources.  General management make important decisions daily that affect this 
relationship (p. 1).    
 
The degree of energy needed to bring about organizational change and the potential 
turmoil it can create requires a reasonable level of assurance through empirical evidence that an 
organization will ultimately realize improved or “better” results.  This is particularly true in the 
public sector where measurement of outcomes can be complex and where public officials must 
operate in a political environment.  To expect public managers to be entrepreneurial and risk-
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taking requires some evidence to support change efforts in a specific direction, particularly when 
built on investments in human capital and more concerned about effectiveness than efficiency.   
 
Role of HRM in Determining Organization Outcomes 
             In public administration there appears to be an untested assumption operating that 
management practices actually make a difference in performance outcomes.  However, there is 
little empirical research to support this assumption (Ingraham & Donahue, 1999, 2000).  There is 
a substantial body of research, however, which has emerged over the past two decades in the 
private sector, building on the earlier theoretical works of Beer et al. (1984), Story (1989), 
Beaumont (1993) and Goss (1994), and arguing for the superiority of high commitment (high 
performance) HR systems in achieving improved organizational level outcomes.    
 The arguments found in the private sector literature suggesting that HRM systems are 
strongly associated with organizational level outcomes are compelling and seem to support what 
intuitively makes sense, that “people are an organization’s most important resource.”  However, 
as in the public sector, Pfeffer and Veiga (1999) point out that the diffusion of what research, 
experience and common sense all increasingly support -- that the way people are managed 
determines organizational success – is not as widespread as would be expected in private sector 
management practices.   
With the convincing HRM research in the private sector, it is not surprising that many of 
the same changes are advocated for public sector personnel systems.  The traditional civil service 
system, associated with control and rule-bound, was a natural target for reinvention in a system 
with a propensity for continual reform, and the changes in HRM systems found in private 
industry have been embraced by many public sector scholars and practitioners.  The conclusion 
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that these changes, based on evidence from the private sector, are “better” in terms of a more 
effective government, however, is based primarily on untested assumptions. One empirical pay 
for performance study conducted in 1973 in Orange, California, made salary increases for law 
enforcement officers contingent on reduced crime rates.  Crime rates in four targeted areas were 
reduced as a result of this police performance incentive plan (Staudohar, 1975).  Studies of this 
type lend credence to a linkage existing between HRM practices and government level 
outcomes; yet are rare in the public administration literature. 
 Fiscal stress and the high costs associated with personnel at the local government levels 
(Ban & Riccucci, 1993), contribute significantly to the popularity in government of productivity 
improvements combined with reductions in personnel to meet the challenges of shrinking 
resources.  Public reform efforts in many cases involve transposing “desirable” private sector 
practices in total or imposing changes incrementally on an inflexible system with a “one size fits 
all” approach.  Due to fundamental differences between the sectors and less than desirable results 
of many reforms, some believe more comprehensive and fundamental systemic changes may be 
needed in the public sector in order to achieve success (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2006; Risher, 
1999; Coggburn, 2003; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Ingraham, 1993; Perry, 2003; Cooper, 1992).    
 
Theoretical Foundation for Linking HRM to Performance Outcomes 
Public choice theory, the resource-based theory of the firm and expectancy theory 
provide the foundation and framework for this study.  The reinvention movement, National 
Performance Review, Winter Commission and New Public Management find much in common 
with public choice theory in terms of a shared view of what the problems with government 
performance are and what reforms are needed.   A resource-based theory of the firm provides the 
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theoretical basis for using HRM as the unit of analysis and a universal perspective guides the 
view that certain practices are superior and can be generalized to organizations regardless of their 
heterogeneity.  Within this theoretical framework, expectancy theory then provides the basis for 
linking HRM practices considered superior, regardless of setting, to performance outcomes.   
Public choice theory has had a profound effect on public administration over the latter 
part of the 20th Century (Shughart & Razzolini, 2001; Farmer, 1998).  It forms the basis for the 
most recent reinvention and the NPM reform efforts advocating for decentralizing decisions 
regarding resource allocations and service delivery to local government levels.  Public choice 
theory argues that local governments provide a large natural laboratory where the evaluation of 
theories of performance can be best tested and it is here, where citizens or “customers” intersect 
directly with public managers, that the impact of policy decisions can be best evaluated (Boyne, 
1998).   This theory suggests that politicians, bureaucrats and citizens all act rationally and make 
decisions in their self-interest.  In terms of government officials, this self-interest replaces the 
public interest.  Government bureaucrats then, in acting on their own behalf, tend to increase 
budgets and staff as a basis for promotion and influence (Shughart & Razzolini, 2001; Tullock, 
Seldon & Brady, 2002) in the bureaucracy and as government agencies become larger the 
bureaucracy becomes more complex.  In addition, public choice theory argues that large 
government monopolies ultimately reduce the overall welfare of society.   
In response to the threat of reduced social welfare, public choice theory advocates for 
decentralizing government activity to the lowest levels and introducing competition by 
outsourcing to the private sector (which is seen as more efficient), creating competition among 
government agencies (Tullock, et al., 2002) and creating competition among public officials by 
basing rewards on performance versus seniority (Self, 1993).  It is this increased size, complexity 
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and lack of competition that public choice theorists view as problematic to government 
performance.  Only through reducing the size of government, simplifying the rules and 
introducing competition (along with decentralizing authority close to the public) and offering the 
public a “choice” among competing services, can performance be improved.   
This theory provides the backdrop for the reinvention movement and the New Public 
Management (NPM), which also advocate for less bureaucracy through decentralizing decision 
authority, simplifying rules and introducing competition in government.  The point of departure 
for reinvention and NPM occurs in the view of the role of the government official (Self, l993).  
Where public choice in its ideal form would argue for a weaker public official in favor of the 
superiority of market forces, reinvention and the NPM would argue for a more empowered and 
entrepreneurial public servant.  Even so, the reforms favored today for improving government 
performance are based in public choice theory.   
The resource-based theory of the firm (Barney & Hesterly, 1996) uses the resources 
available to, and controlled by, an organization as the unit of analysis.  Investments in these 
internal resources (financial, capital, human and organizational) are seen as the source of 
competitive advantage and performance.  By combining the intangible human (experience, 
intelligence, training, judgment and wisdom of individuals) and organizational resources 
(teamwork, trust, friendship and reputation of groups of individuals associated with a firm) one 
can view HRM in broad terms as an architecture of practices diffused throughout the 
organization affecting a “human capital pool” either positively or negatively.  Certain HR 
practices are thought to be superior over others in their ability to tap this resource pool positively 
in terms of eliciting the desired individual and collective behavior.  A universalistic perspective, 
(Tzafrir & Harel, 2000; Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994), posits that some HRM practices are 
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universally better than others, and can be generalized regardless of organizational heterogeneity.  
A universal approach provides the basis for identifying “best practices” and “benchmarking” 
common in the current private and public management literature, where performance outcomes 
are of prime concern.  An example of a universal resource-based theory approach in the public 
sector is reflected in the work of Ingraham and Donahue (1999, 2000) and others, who are 
concerned with defining the “management capacity” of public agencies, and analyzing how well 
this capacity is integrated and aligned internally for achieving desired policy outcomes.  In 
addition, the concepts of the high-performing organization and high performing work system 
partly evolve from this theoretical framework. 
Once established that there is sufficient evidence to focus on internal resources, 
specifically human resources, as sources of superior performance, expectancy theory can be used 
as a basis for linking together HRM practices and outcomes with behavior and performance 
outcomes.  Expectancy theory is a process theory of motivation where motivation is seen as a 
function of how a person perceives and reacts to their environment as opposed to attributing 
motivation to their internal attributes (content theory) (Fudge and Schlacter, 1999).  Expectancy 
theory suggests that three factors play a role in motivation (Vroom, 1964; Fudge and Schlacter, 
1999; Isaac, Zerbe and Pitt, 2001): (1) a person’s perception that a personal expenditure of effort 
will result in an acceptable level of performance; (2) a belief that rewards received are related to 
his/her performance; and (3) the rewards are valued.  Lawler (1970) adds the importance of 
training and experience to strengthen the relationship between performance and effort and 
providing the opportunity for a person to apply their skills, ability and expertise by giving them a 
role in problem solving.   An expectancy theory model proposes that at the individual level, high 
performance depends on high motivation, the possession of skills and abilities and an appropriate 
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role and understanding of that role (Guest, 1997).  Therefore, HRM practices that encourage high 
skill and ability levels, high motivation and an appropriate role structure and perception of that 
role among organization members through extensive communication and feedback, provide the 
linkage with processes that facilitate high performance.  
Gephart and Van Buren (1996) reinforce the important role human resource management 
plays in high performance work systems where practices such as hiring, training, performance 
management, compensation, and so forth are intended to enhance employee skills, knowledge, 
motivation and flexibility.  Where these practices may take on many forms, they are all grounded 
in the belief that people are a critical competitive asset (p. 22).  They also argue that these 
practices are integral to management approaches characterized by decentralized decision-
making, employee participation and involved communication.  This view comports well with 
expectancy theory and a systemic versus a functional view of human resource management, 
expanding the analysis from the formal human resource management practices to the ways 
people are managed throughout an organization.   Therefore, in their view “the synergy achieved 
through overlapping work and human resource practices is the heart of what makes a high 
performance system effective (p. 26).” 
These theoretical concepts provide the basis for comparing performance in relation to 
HRM practices across organizations in terms of outcomes.  An approach that judges portions of 
theories to be most relevant in analyzing public sector HRM is proposed for this study, rather 
than attempting to apply theories in their entirety.  This approach is supported by Jackson & 
Schuler (1995) in the search for empirical data to support theory building about high performing 
HRM systems.   
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Methodology 
 Using secondary resources, this study explores correlations between government level 
performance in selected municipalities and the nature of HRM practices used in those 
municipalities.    It is argued that a municipality’s general obligation bond rating can be used as a 
proxy for a government level outcome measure of performance.  Unlike a number of other 
outcomes (e.g. crime and poverty rates) where many confounding variables can be operating to 
influence outcomes, municipal bond rating can be more reasonably linked directly with the 
quality of municipal management.  Since the 1980’s secondary analysis of survey data has 
assumed a central position in social science research (Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985).  This approach is 
used to reanalyze data collected for another purpose to answer a current research question and 
has become one of the most common forms of research (Vogt, 1999).   
While primary data analysis requires the researcher to obtain information directly from 
research participants, secondary data analysis involves applying analytical techniques to data 
already collected. (Castle, 2003).  Kiecolt & Nathan (1985), Nicoll & Beyea (1999), Castle 
(2003) and others, point to some advantages of using secondary data over primary data 
including: (1) it is relatively inexpensive; (2) easier to obtain; (3) can be analyzed in less time.  It 
is common for studies today to use data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau Public Use 
Microdata Samples (PUMS), the National Election Study (NES) and other data sets of the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and the General Social Survey 
(GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) (Vogt, 1999). 
Although the advantages of secondary data analysis are thought to outweigh the 
disadvantages, there may be some limitations (Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985).  Most pertinent to this 
study was having sufficient data with responses in categories that could operationalize concepts 
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and variables as measures relevant to the notion of high performance HRM systems.  The 
instrument used, however, allowed for organizing data to meet this need.   
Other limitations include problems intrinsic to the survey method itself.  When using 
secondary data based on survey research, there are “inherited” errors where corrections or 
adjustments are out of the researcher’s control.  For example, Dillman (2000) outlines four 
sources of survey error (p. 11): (1) sampling error – occurring when only some, not all, elements 
of the survey population respond; (2) coverage error – not allowing all members of a population 
an equal chance of responding; (3) measurement error - poor question wording or presentation on 
a survey instrument so as to solicit inaccurate or ambiguous responses; and (4) non-response 
error - differences between people who do respond and those who do not respond in a way 
relevant to the study.  The original survey error(s) must be adopted when using secondary data. 
 
Pertinent Secondary Data Resources 
The International City/County Management Association (ICMA).  ICMA conducts 
research on a regular basis examining areas of interest in local government.  One ICMA survey 
entitled Local Government Human Resource Functions 2000 elicited responses from 1,312 of the 
2,885 human resource/personnel directors in municipalities surveyed with populations of 10,000 
and over (a 45.5% response rate).  This survey collected data on HRM functions that can be 
related to high performance such as the degree of decentralized decision-making, methods used 
for recruitment and selection, benefits offered including family-friendly programs, flexibility in 
work etc., dimensions of performance (appraisal, pay for performance, gainsharing) and training. 
Municipal Bond Ratings.  Municipal bond ratings are issued by a number of rating 
agencies, most prominently Standard and Poor’s, Mergent’s (Moody’s) and Fitch (Fabozzi, 
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2002).  Rating analyses among agencies are comparable and consider such factors as the 
economic base of the municipality, debt and administrative factors.  Also, such things as the 
character and capacity of local government and subjective evaluations of how well a 
municipality is managed have received increasing attention by rating agencies (Fabozzi, 2002; 
Temel, 2001) and are factored into the general obligation bond rating.   
This study argues that un-enhanced ratings of general obligation municipal bonds can be 
used as a measure of government level outcomes.  Municipalities issue bonds to finance capital 
expenditures.  A municipal bond is basically a loan, with an interest-bearing promise to pay the 
purchaser or investor a specified sum of money – the principal amount – due on a specific date.  
The issuer (municipality) is responsible for providing details as to their financial soundness and 
credit worthiness when issuing the bond.  General obligation bonds are backed by full-faith and 
credit taxing power of the municipality and typically are approved by voters, as opposed to 
revenue bonds, which are issued for specific projects and backed by non-tax revenues usually in 
the forms of tolls (users fees), charges or rents paid  (Mysak, 1998).    This different focus gives 
general obligation bonds a broader applicability to the overall financial condition and 
management of a municipality. 
Municipalities may seek ratings for their bonds from a number of rating agencies.  The 
most prominent are Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch ICBA  (Fabozzi, 
2002).  Mysak (1998) points out that approximately two-thirds of municipal bond issues are 
rated.   Ratings are seen as a way to attract investors. Municipalities initiate the fee-based rating 
process with one or more of the rating agencies.  It is not uncommon for municipalities to obtain 
ratings from more than one rating agency (Mysak, 1998).   Once the decision is made to seek a 
bond rating (s), the issuing municipality is responsible for providing details to the rating agencies 
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as to their financial soundness and credit worthiness.  Specialists in these agencies then evaluate 
new bond issues and perform surveillance on outstanding issues (Temel, 2001).  These ratings, 
and changes to them are published frequently by the rating agencies.  Annual ratings are 
published by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s ratings are published by Mergent.  Rating 
agencies consider a number of factors when rating municipal bonds: a municipality’s economic 
base (demographic characteristics and growth rate); financial analysis (tax and other revenues); 
debt factors (outstanding debt, limitations); and administrative/management factors (current 
operations) (Standard and Poor’s , Public Finance Criteria, 2000; Mergent Municipal and 
Government Manual, 1999, 2001).     
Among the administrative factors is the management of a municipality (Fabozzi, 2002).  
Rating agencies evaluate management in terms of the following factors: 
• Character of management – strategic direction; financial philosophy; conservation; track 
record; succession planning; and whether control systems are in place. 
• Management capacity – basic operations and competitive position; financial position; 
organization structure. 
• Collateral. 
• Covenants – restrictions on how management operates and conducts financial affairs. (p. 
265). 
 
In addition to the above, a number of more subjective factors are thought to influence 
bond ratings, which allude to municipality-wide management practices – where rating agencies 
are thought to use stringent, but more elusive standards, such as the quality of public education, 
health programs and reflections of how well the chief executive is managing city operations 
(Amagoh, 1999).  Increasingly, the rating agencies have come to examine these factors in 
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relation to how well a municipality is managed, how programs are documented and how 
imaginatively future programs are planned (Temel, 2001).   Temel (2001) points out analysts 
have come to consider in their ratings the view that better governments develop measurable 
performance objectives and report them as well as outcomes to their constituents.  Political 
structure has also become an important factor where analysts often see strong mayoral systems 
and council-manager forms of government more able to control finances than a weak mayor 
system (p. 180).  
Bond Rating Definitions.  Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s municipal bond ratings, 
which are based on their assessments of the investment grade of bonds, are comparable for 
analysis. Ratings below Baa3 (Moody’s as found in Mergent) and BBB (Standard and Poor’s) 
are considered to be “highly speculative.”   None of the municipal bond ratings in the sample fall 
below this level.  Therefore, definitions for these categories are excluded.  The definitions of 
ratings used in this study for each agency are as follows: 
 
1. Mergent (Source: Mergent Municipal and Government Manual, 1999, 2001). 
Mergent’s "investment grade" ratings (ratings higher than Baa in contrast to those rated 
lower that are considered speculative) are described below: 
 
Aaa - Bonds rated Aaa are judged to be of the best quality. They carry the smallest degree 
of investment risk. Interest payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable 
margin and principal is secure. While the various protective elements are likely to change, 
such changes as can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the fundamentally strong 
position of such issues. 
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Aa - Bonds rated Aa are judged to be of high quality by all standards. Together with the 
Aaa group they comprise what are generally known as high grade bonds. They are rated 
lower than the best bonds because margins of protection may not be as large as in Aaa 
securities or fluctuation of protective elements may be greater, or there may be other 
elements present which make the long-term risks appear somewhat larger than in Aaa 
securities. 
 
A - Bonds rated A possess many favorable investment attributes and are to be considered 
as upper medium grade obligations. Factors giving security to principal and interest are 
considered adequate, but elements may be present which suggest a susceptibility to 
impairment sometime in the future.  
 
Baa - Bonds rated Baa are considered as medium grade obligations; i.e., they are neither 
highly protected nor poorly secured. Interest payments and principal security appear 
adequate for the present but certain protective elements may be lacking or may be 
characteristically unreliable over any great length of time. Such bonds lack outstanding 
investment characteristics and in fact have speculative characteristics as well.    
 
Bonds in the Aa, A, and Baa are also assigned "1", "2" or "3" based on the strength of the 
issue within each category. Accordingly, "A1" would be the strongest group of A 
securities and "A3" would be the weakest A securities. 
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2. Standard and Poor’s (Source: Standard and Poor’s Rating Definitions, 1999). 
AAA - An obligation rated AAA has the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s. 
The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely 
strong. 
 
AA - An obligation rated AA differs from the highest-rated obligations only in small 
degree.  The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is very 
strong. 
 
A - An obligation rated A is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes 
in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. 
However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is still 
strong. 
 
BBB - An obligation rated BBB exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, 
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a 
weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. 
 
Plus (+) or minus (-) The ratings from AA to BBB may be modified by the addition of a 
plus or minus sign to show relative standing within the major rating categories. 
 
Municipal Bond Insurance.  Since the 1980’s, buying municipal bond insurance has 
become popular after a major default of $2.25 billion in revenue bonds in 1983 by Washington 
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Public Power Supply System (Amagoh, 1999).  Approximately 50 percent of municipal bonds 
were insured in 2002 (Fabozzi, 2002).  A number of commercial insurance companies such as 
the Financial Guarantee Insurance Company (FGIC), Municipal Bond Investors Assurance 
Corporation (MBIA), Financial Security Assurance, Inc. (FSA) and AMBAC Indemnity 
Corporation issue municipal bond insurance.  Insurance on a municipal bond is an agreement by 
an insurance company to pay the bondholder according to the original schedule of payments that 
the bond issuer has to make (Fabozzi, 2002) and ensures the timely payment of principle and 
interest to bondholders in the event of default (Amagoh, 1999).  Bond insurance, with few 
exceptions, increases the rating of the issue.  As Faerber (2001) points out, insured bonds are 
given the highest rating even though the rating would be lower without insurance; uninsured 
bonds with high ratings can be a stronger offering than an insured bond at the highest rating; and 
the quality of the insurance company can also affect the rating (p. 104).    The purchase of 
insurance buys the rating of the insurer and reflects the credit rating of the insurer rather than the 
municipality (Amagoh, 1999).  As a result, since the mid 1980’s Standard & Poor’s and Mergent 
have been rating insured municipal bonds at the highest levels (AAA and Aaa respectively), and 
most of the ratings would be lower without insurance (Faerber, 2001; Amagoh, 1999).   In 
response to these inflated ratings based on insurance, Standard and Poor’s developed a “Standard 
and Poor’s Underlying Rating” (SPUR) to give an “un-enhanced” or “stand alone rating” for 
municipal bonds (Standard and Poor’s, Public Finance Criteria, 2000, p. 156).  Mergent 
annotates each bond issue with the name of the insurance company; uninsured bonds are not 
annotated.  This study uses ratings of un-enhanced general obligation municipal bonds as the 
dependent variable.  The un-enhanced ratings are comprised of uninsured bond ratings published 
by both Standard & Poor’s and Mergent, and SPUR ratings (Fitch ratings are unavailable).  
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Importance of Study 
 Few studies seem to attempt to link HRM practices with government outcomes.  Unless 
such a linkage can be established much of the impetus for reform in terms of NPM and re-
invention seems fruitless.  If new or reformed practices cannot be linked to actual policy 
outcomes the movement to apply private sector practices to the public sector must remain 
questionable in terms of validating the effectiveness of one approach to HRM over another.  The 
movement toward a re-invented government using techniques considered superior to a more 
centralized and bureaucratic system is based on purely theoretical assumptions without 
validation.  This study attempts to establish a link between a “well managed” municipality in 
terms of its human capital, and the government level outcome as measured by the un-enhanced 
bond rating. 
 
Limitations of this Study 
 The limitations of this study fall within three areas.  First, as Ingraham & Donahue (1999, 
2000) and Gephart & Van Buren (1996) argue, attempts to measure the effectiveness of 
management need to include an evaluation of how well a number of management functions are 
integrated and mutually supportive, rather than isolating one, as this study does, and attempting 
to measure its effects on performance outcomes.  A possible result could be that a municipality 
may incorporate all elements of a high-performing HRM system yet fall short in other 
management functions or vice versa.   
Human capital, when viewed as an architecture and system of people management, has 
the capacity to permeate and influence all other functions of management.  The quality of 
personnel recruited and selected, how well they are compensated and rewarded, the benefits they 
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receive, their degree of job responsibility, the training they receive and the flexibility of the 
HRM system potentially affect the quality of all other operational decisions.  The management 
capacity model mentioned earlier appears to weigh the financial, HRM, capital and information 
management functions equally, and base performance evaluation on the quality of their 
integration.  However, an argument can be made that the quality of human capital management 
has the potential to affect all other management functions disproportionately and could probably 
be weighted more heavily in terms of overall management capacity.  This is exactly the 
contention of Maital (1994), Pfeffer and Veiga (1999) and Tomer (1987, 1998, 1999, 2001) and 
a number of other scholars. 
 Secondly, the ICMA survey was based on a census of municipalities over 10,000 in 
population in the U.S.  While their respondents appear representative of this population in terms 
of size and region, purposive selection of the study sample based on the criteria of un-enhanced 
bond ratings further reduces the sample and affects the study’s external validity, or the ability to 
confidently generalize the findings beyond the smaller sample.  Even so, the smaller study 
sample shows representative characteristics in terms of the larger population, which may allow 
for cautious generalizations to all municipalities.   
Finally, another potential weakness of this study lies in isolating a proxy for measuring 
government level outcomes, or performance.  While measuring the performance in private sector 
organizations is straightforward in terms of relating management practices to profit, market share 
and shareholder value, public sector outcomes are often affected by a myriad of conditions and 
variables making it more difficult to conclude that management practices contribute directly to 
measurable outcomes at the exclusion of other confounding variables.  For example, urban 
hardship is often measured by variables such as demographics, levels of unemployment, crowded 
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housing, poverty, historical development leading to static or elastic municipality boundaries, 
metropolitan population dispersion, residential racial segregation, aging housing and rising or 
decreasing crime rates (Monteil, L. et al., 2004), which are outside the direct control of local 
government managers in the short term. Although public managers struggle with problems 
contributing to hardships within municipality boundaries and may attempt to address them 
through long-term strategic planning and political processes, it is often difficult to attribute 
outcomes such as poverty rates, crime rates, and quality of life in general directly to government 
management practices.  On the other hand, agencies that rate municipal bonds consider the 
administrative structure and management practices of a municipality, along with economic and 
financial factors, to arrive at a rating.  According to Lamb & Rappaport (1987), two critical 
factors considered by rating agencies in their evaluation of a municipality are the political 
structure of the municipality and the willingness and ability of management to maintain a 
balanced budget.  Therefore, one assumption of this study is that a municipal bond rating, 
particularly an un-enhanced one, may be more clearly linked directly with management and 
considered a government level outcome that can be used as a proxy for performance.   
 
Outline of the Study 
 A review of the literature focuses on three streams of theory providing a framework for 
linking HRM practices with performance, and on the strength of the claim that the quality of 
management practices in municipalities largely determines their bond ratings.    
A review of public choice theory provides the backdrop for the reinvention rationale in 
the public sector the ensuing reforms either in place, or advocated for, to improve government 
performance.  Next, the resource-based theory of the firm and resultant universalistic perspective 
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of HRM is covered as well as the literature describing the role of mutual trust and commitment 
believed by many to be precursors for achieving high performance in organizations.  Expectancy 
theory is used to outline a model linking the practices and outcomes of HRM (commitment, 
quality and flexibility) with behavior outcomes (motivation, cooperation, involvement and 
organizational citizenship) and ultimately organization level performance outcomes.  Emerging 
from this review is a focus on high-performing HRM practices, and the empirical evidence 
supporting the critical role they may play in achieving desirable government level outcomes.  
Finally, the role of management practices in determining municipal bond rating, the significance 
of risk in the bond market and the role of bond insurance are discussed.  
Following the literature review, the methodology used to analyze the relationship 
between HRM and government outcomes is covered.  Next, the results of the analysis are 
presented.  The final section consists of a discussion of what conclusions can be drawn from the 
findings and what suggestions can be identified for further study. 
 
Definitions  
 
 Following are the definitions of keywords and concepts used throughout this study: 
• Decentralization:  the decision authority for personnel actions such as establishing 
qualifications for jobs, developing job descriptions, recruiting, selecting, determining 
compensation and promoting employees rest with line departments and managers versus 
a centralized personnel office.  
• Employee participation: the extent to which an organization encourages participation in 
activities designed to develop team work such as awards for group performance, one time 
bonuses for group accomplishments, gainsharing and other group incentive programs.  
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• Enhanced rating: a municipal bond’s insured rating; represents the credit worthiness of 
the firm insuring the bond. 
• High performance: based on the highest and high-grade investment quality un-enhanced 
municipal bond rating issued by Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s.  
Ratings include AAA, AA+, AA, & AA- for Standard and Poor’s and Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, 
Aa3 for Moody’s. 
• Human capital: all the knowledge, talents, skills and abilities possessed and owned by the 
employees in an organization. 
• Human capital pool: the availability of skills that exist within an organization at any 
given point in time. 
• Human resource management: techniques and practices employed by an organization to 
acquire, maintain and retain employees. 
• Human resource practices: the tools, or management practices, used for managing the 
human capital pool. 
• Human resources: (synonymous with human capital) - all the knowledge, talents, skills 
and abilities possessed by the employees in an organization. 
• Lower Performing: based on upper medium, lower medium and lowest medium 
investment quality un-enhanced municipal bond rating issued by Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s Investors Service.  Ratings include A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB- for Standard 
and Poor’s and A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 for Moody’s.  Bond ratings in this 
category are considered “lower” only in relation to the highest and high quality ratings, 
not in the degree of investment quality.  While considered lower for the basis of 
comparison in this study, these ratings are considered to be of investment quality by the 
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rating agencies.  Low ratings considered to be speculative with weak credit worthiness 
(such as BB, B, CCC, CC for Standard & Poor’s and Ba, B, Caa, Ca and C for Moody’s) 
were not represented in the sample used for this study. 
• Municipal bond: municipalities issue bonds to finance capital expenditures.  Municipal 
bonds are an interest-bearing promise to pay a specified sum of money (the principal 
amount) to the purchaser on a specific date.  
• Municipal bond rating: fee based evaluations and ratings issued by agencies intended to 
reflect the financial soundness and credit worthiness of a municipality.  Rating agencies 
evaluate the economic base; financial condition; debt factors; and the overall 
administrative operation of a municipality in arriving at a bond rating. 
• Municipality: local governments supporting populations of 10,000 or more based on U.S. 
Census data.  Municipalities include all U.S. incorporated places and independent cities; 
city-county consolidations that function as city governments; counties as defined by Census 
Bureau plus city-county consolidations that function as county governments. 
• Organization level performance outcome: a measure of an ultimate result or end outcome 
outside the organization activity but is attributable to aggregate organizational management 
activity (e.g. profit, municipal bond rating). 
• Performance outputs: a volume of activity or workload data over time (e.g. numbers of 
vacancies filled, lowered welfare caseload, numbers of arrests). 
• Rating Agencies: Private firms that issue a wide range credit ratings in the financial 
market.  These firms rate municipal bond issues for a fee.  Competitive firms such as 
Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch ICBA rate municipal bonds.  
Approximately two-thirds of municipal bond issues were rated in 2002.  Moody’s 
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Investors Service annual ratings are published in the Mergent Municipal and Government 
Manual.  Standard & Poor’s publishes annual ratings in Municipal Ratings Handbook 
and at Ratings Online http://www2.standardandpoors.com/   The annual ratings used in 
this study were those published by Mergent and Standard & Poor’s.   
• Rule of “n:” personnel offices determine eligibility of applicants for positions and 
provide the line department only a small number of referrals (normally three) determined 
to be the most qualified.  
• SPUR: Standard and Poor’s Underlying Rating.  A municipal bond rating issued upon 
request by the municipality, representing what Standard and Poor’s rating of municipal 
credit quality is without insurance or enhancements. 
• Un-enhanced bond rating:  rating issued by a rating agency for an uninsured bond 
combined with Standard & Poor’s SPUR rating issued as the underlying rating for an 
insured bond.  Together these ratings reflect the “stand alone” rating of a municipality’s 
credit quality as opposed to an insured or enhanced rating, which reflects the quality of 
the insurance firm. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three theoretical orientations provide the foundation and framework for this study.  First, 
public choice theory and its concern with the size and scope of government underpins the 
preponderance of ongoing governmental reforms since the 1980’s proposed by the reinvention 
movement and the emergent post-bureaucratic model of governance termed the New Public 
Management (NPM).     The public choice solutions to the problems of the size, complexity and 
non-competitive provision of public services can be applied to the structure of public human 
resource management practices as performance predictors in local government.  Second, the 
resource-based theory of the firm coupled with a universal application of best practices 
supported by empirical research in the private sector; provide a solid theoretical foundation for 
focusing on the management of human capital, in a broad sense, as a predictor of performance 
outcome.   Once the logic that human resource management practices can be the predominant 
predictors of performance in organizations is developed, expectancy theory can be used to 
establish a linkage between high performance and those human resource practices that promote 
quality, commitment and flexibility among the workforce.  This theoretical process allows for 
predicting which human resource management practices will more likely be associated with high 
or lower performance.  
Finally, in order to strengthen the argument for using the un-enhanced municipal bond 
rating as a dependent variable (or outcome measure of government performance), management 
practices as determinants of bond rating and the role of insurance in a seemingly low risk 
investment market will be examined. 
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Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory, which applies economic market theories to the provision of public 
services, has become a primary influence on government operations.  Loverich & Neiman (1984) 
point out that public choice theory is firmly rooted in the American tradition of contractarian 
political philosophy and constitutionalism, and adheres to the writings of Locke, Madison and 
Jefferson who were suspicious of government and politics (p. 6).  Its features consist of a 
mistrust of governmental power and a preoccupation with designing systems to fragment power 
in order to prevent the abuse of authority.   The necessary design is one that prevents the 
tendency for government to grow and repress the liberty of individuals.  Public choice theorists 
always suspect government as potentially destructive of individual liberty or as inherently 
incompetent and wasteful (p. 7).  With this philosophical orientation, public choice is concerned 
with maximizing the economic efficiency of government. 
Public choice has been defined as the: 
 
…economic study of non-market decision-making, or simply the application of 
economics to political science.  The subject matter of public choice is the same as that of 
political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voting behaviour, party politics, the 
bureaucracy and so on.  The methodology of public choice is that of economics, however.  
The basic behavioural postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an 
egoistic, rational utility maximiser.  (Mueller, 2003, p.1).  
 
James Buchanan, a noted advocate of public choice theory characterizes this behavioral 
dynamic as follows: 
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The critically important bridge between the behavior of persons who act in the 
marketplace and the behavior of persons who act in the political process must be 
analyzed.  The “theory of public choice” can be interpreted as the construction of such a 
bridge.  The approach requires only the simple assumption that the same individuals act 
in both relationships (quoted in Lovrich & Neiman, 1984, p. xxi). 
 
Public choice theory challenges the "public interest" theory of democratic government, 
which purports that public officials (governments) make decisions based on unselfish 
benevolence in the interests of the public who have delegated this authority to them (Shughart & 
Razzolini, 2001).  In contrast, public choice theorists assert that decisions are based on "rational 
self interest" where policies may be adopted that are privately beneficial to public officials and 
special interests, but which could in time, ultimately reduce society's overall welfare.  From the 
standpoint of public choice, this concept of the individual in economic theory applies to 
politician, public servant and citizen alike. 
 
The Influence of Public Choice Theory 
 
Public choice theory has had a widespread influence on a number of disciplines, to 
include public administration.  Although this influence was largely felt during the latter part of 
the 20th Century, the intellectual heritage of public choice theory can be traced back to the 18th 
Century works of Adam Smith and Wealth of Nations (Farmer, 1998).  Scholarly interest in 
public choice theory began in the 1940's, gaining impetus in the 1960's with the writings of 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (Shughart & Razzolini, 2001; Farmer 1998). 
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Its direct application to public administration thought can be attributed to Vincent Ostrom 
with the publication of The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration in 1973.  Here, 
Ostrom seeks to move away from public administration's preoccupation with bureaucratic 
structure - or limiting reform efforts to improving bureaucratic processes - toward a broader 
conception of collective action, or democratic administration (Denhardt, 2000).   Ostrom 
envisioned a democratic theory of administration, one concerned with diversity and variety, 
responsive to constituent preferences, and interested in opportunities individuals could pursue in 
multi-organizational environments.   He contrasted this vision with his view of the status quo 
where public administration was preoccupied with “simplicity, neatness and symmetry” and 
focused on the organization (Ostrom, 1973, p. 115).  
The recent influence of the public choice movement on the attitudes of scholars, public 
officials and reformers is unmistakable.  The tenets of public choice theory, largely refined by 
scholars in the U.S. and the U.K., are based on the perceived failure of government to 
economically and efficiently provide for the welfare of society (see Tullock, 2002).  The image 
of elected public officials making decisions, at least in part on the basis of self-interest, has 
become more acceptable among the pragmatic minded members of democratic society than the 
idea of appointed public bureaucrats operating in their own self interests when charged with 
carrying out the work of government according to law, and the ultimate will of the public.  The 
idea of a self-serving government bureaucracy gained momentum in the 1980’s with the election 
of President Ronald Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 
United Kingdom, and today permeates much of the thinking of those subscribing to an “anti-
government” position.  In this view, a strong, centrally managed and self-interested bureaucracy 
does not appear to comport well with the values of democracy.  Public choice theory attempts to 
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explain how government bureaucracy grows to levels of ineffectiveness and advocates for 
restructuring to refashion its operations along market lines.    
The reinvention movement and the initiatives set forth in the National Performance 
Review (NPR) in the 1990’s are closely allied with the New Public Management (NPM) and find 
common roots in public choice theory.  NPM emerged in the 1980’s as a “post-bureaucratic” 
model of governance associated with the major reforms occurring in the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and Australia, and on a lesser scale in the U.S.  NPM has been described as a more 
effective approach to the provision of public services than traditional methods.  NPM shares the 
preferences of public choice theory and reinvention for limiting the scope of governmental 
action, decentralizing authority, contracting out, privatization of public services and the 
evaluation of performance based on an assessment of outcomes (Heady, 2001, p. 4).  Whether a 
“new paradigm” of public management or not, the ideas represented in NPM are widespread and 
are seen by Heady (2001) as a response to the blurring of boundaries between public and private 
sectors in an environment subject to global forces and a shift from the concept of “governing” to 
“governance” (p. 428); from an emphasis primarily on roles of government to one where public 
and non-government entities share the responsibility for carrying out public policy and doing the 
work of governance.  Government’s role is to ensure public services are provided not necessarily 
to provide them directly. 
Interestingly, in the U.S. the main impetus for the most recent reforms associated with NPM 
can be found in the writings of Gaebler and Osborne’s Reinventing Government (1992), not from 
academia (Kettl, 2000).  The book provided the framework for the NPR reforms during the 
Clinton administration.  The reforms proposed that the federal government address the perceived 
problems associated with the more traditional approach, and reinvent government using a top-
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down approach of downsizing and mandating performance management as well as “bottom-up” 
reforms for empowering lower level managers to use wider discretion, pursue customer service 
initiatives and make government services more responsive to citizen needs (Kettl, p. 25).  The 
basic principles outlined by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) are summarized as: 
• Public management should shift its emphasis from controlling inputs to controlling 
outputs and achieving results. 
• Competition is desirable between service providers through privatization and contracting 
out as well as other market mechanisms. 
• Citizens should be redefined as customers to whom the public sector should be 
responsive. 
• Government ought to ensure public goods and services are provided, rather than 
producing those goods, or providing them directly. 
• Replace centralized, hierarchical bureaucratic control and monitoring of government 
operations with competition, customer service incentives, and accountability to 
customers. 
• Delegate and empower front line employees with decision-making authority to allow the 
exercise of creativity and innovation in the pursuit of more effective services to 
customers. 
• Public organizations should be as entrepreneurial, innovative and flexible as in the 
private sector. 
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Problems and Solutions 
 
 With a philosophical backdrop where the intentions of government are suspect, as are the 
motives of its agents, Lovrich and Neiman (1984) point out that public choice theorists argue for 
a restructured government to address three interrelated problems: its size and structure, the 
processes of implementing policy decisions or the “rules” of the bureaucracy, and its lack of 
competition, all seen as necessary to achieve efficiency.  Public choice theory argues that the 
economies of scale thought to be associated with large public organizations are seldom realized 
due to the heavily labor-intensive nature of public agencies; that natural coordination occurs 
among public service agencies, rendering formalized systems and structures unnecessary; and 
that large scale public entities do not perform as well as small-scale, autonomous government 
units.  Solutions offered to overcome these problems include the decentralization and 
fragmentation of hierarchical government agencies, flattened organization structures, introducing 
internal and external competition and decentralized decision-making.    The restructuring of 
government advocated by public choice theory in response to these basic problems, parallels the 
reinvention movement where public purposes are thought to be best achieved more effectively 
and efficiently by relaxing bureaucratic rules, decentralizing authority, introducing a measure of 
internal competition and addressing the needs of different publics versus offering uniform 
services (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  In addition, the public choice argument against formalized 
systems and for small-scale, autonomous units can be found in much of the high performance 
literature where self-directed work teams are thought to be more effective than the traditional 
manager/subordinate arrangement.    
Related to the public choice concern with the size of government, is the emphasis on the 
existence of waste in public sector activity (Farmer, 1998).  Niskanen (in Mitchell, 2001) 
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assumes that bureaucrats wish to maximize the sizes of their budgets for promotion and influence 
and that their relationship with the legislature is a "bilateral monopoly" as the bureau has a 
distinct informational advantage (Lovrich & Neiman, 1984).  Lovrich & Neiman (1984) point 
out that many public choice theorists suggest the utility maximizing bureaucrat and vote 
maximizing politician will conspire for self-serving ends to overproduce public goods.  Because 
of these behavioral dynamics, bureaucratic inefficiencies become norms, rather than exceptions, 
leading to a grossly oversized government and resulting in increased taxation, deficit financing, 
or both (Mitchell, 2001, p. 12).   The collapse of centrally planned economies in the former 
Soviet Bloc, the deregulation of major industries world-wide and the privatization of state owned 
services provides adherents of public choice theory evidence of the failure of regulatory 
government. (Shughart & Razzolini, 2001).   
Public choice theorists suggest the solution to this self-perpetuating growth, inefficiency 
and ultimate reduced societal welfare, is to restructure government and move it closer to the 
people (Tullock, 1979) through decentralization, and let the citizens (customers) become 
involved with public agencies directly.   In essence, the application of public choice economic 
theory for public managers suggests that government action and resources need to be "devolved" 
or decentralized to the lowest levels where a marketplace for government services can be 
created, and where competition and experimentation with the provision of services can occur.  
Citizens, or "customers" can theoretically choose among alternatives, or "vote with their feet," 
and public managers can respond by delivering public services based on consumer demand much 
like private enterprise.  Decentralized authority for providing government services also allows 
for internal competition among government agencies, as well as with the private sector.  This 
competitive feature theoretically helps determine the most efficient organization for providing 
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the highest quality services at the least cost to the taxpayer, whether directly using public 
agencies or through contracting out. The public choice emphasis is to design "…institutions 
which would lead self-seeking bureaucrats or politicians to generate public welfare in the same 
sense that the market leads some self-interested businessmen to produce a social surplus" 
(Tullock, 1979, p. 32). 
Peter Self (1993) examines what he terms this “new political entrepreneurship” in the 
U.S., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand beginning in the 1980’s.  He suggests that this 
restructuring can take a number of forms, some controversial others, not; yet all strive toward 
“slimming” the state to liberate market forces and import market concepts and incentives into the 
operation of government.  This approach is predicated on the belief that the economic incentives 
and competition that sustain the efficiency of firms and weed out poor performers in the market 
can be transposed on government. His analysis for restructuring government operations along 
market lines can be pursued in a number of ways (pp. 61, 62):   
 
1.  Public agencies should adopt practices to ensure their operations are cost effective; 
budgets should be transparent and based on outputs verses inputs.  Rational incentives to 
contain costs should be implemented and the benefits of public service should be 
measured.  Relatively non-controversial, initiatives in this area are widely accepted in the 
form of output budgeting and cost-benefit analysis.  The problem here emerges from 
differences of opinion on measuring the benefits of some public services. 
 
2.  Competition is highly desirable, ideally between public and private agencies, for the 
delivery of public services; failing that, an internal market should be established within 
 40
government for competition to occur between public service providers.  The ultimate goal 
is to both reduce costs and improve service to the ultimate consumers.  The emphasis on 
micro-institutions (individual schools, small agencies etc.) comports well with the 
emphasis on small firms in fully competitive markets.  At a minimum, competition is 
believed achievable by allocating public funds to the “revealed preferences” of 
consumers or to their “free choice” of service provider. 
 
3.  Bureaucratic efficiency should be promoted by economic incentives.  Perhaps most 
closely associated with HRM practices, these changes include less use of seniority rules, 
a wider spread of pay differential, and merit or performance pay for individual 
achievement.  Implementing methods to treat performance pay as a collective award for 
teamwork versus individual effort, and relating rewards for bureaucrats to competitive 
performance in satisfying consumers or increasing cost-effectiveness, would bring the 
government model closer to the methods of market firms. 
 
4.  The distribution of costs and benefits should be moved closer to a market model by 
user’s fees being assessed to recover part or all of the costs of services.  Full cost 
recovery suggests the desirability of privatizing services except when overruled by clear 
considerations of equity. 
 
The restructuring initiatives represented by the above, reveal a strong ideology whereby 
the introduction of a market-oriented agenda is designed to reduce the size, influence and power 
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of the public bureaucracy.  The government bureaucracy becomes a secondary support system to 
the market system (Self, 1993).   
While these restructuring efforts have been widely endorsed by those who support 
reinvention initiatives to improve public administration, it is this ideology that presents a point of 
departure for those advocating for the reinvention of government and NPM as well as the goals 
expressed by the objectives of the National Performance Review and the Winter Commission.  
While a more pure public choice ideology supports a weakened public bureaucrat, the 
reinvention movement as influenced by Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government (1992) 
supports restructuring to empower public managers to be more creative and responsive to 
consumer needs.  The focus remains on satisfying the consumer efficiently and effectively 
through a decentralized government operation similar to the public choice vision.  However, 
public purposes are viewed as being achieved more effectively and efficiently by decentralizing 
authority to empower the workforce, not weaken it.   
Emerging from a public choice perspective of government, then, is a normative approach, 
in many ways shared by supporters of government reinvention and NPM, which advocates 
restructuring government to address problems seen as impeding efficient and effective 
performance.   This restructuring approach has a direct effect on the way one views HRM 
practices and suggests the ability to achieve the overall organization restructure effectively is 
dependent on the changes made in the HRM system. How HRM is affected by and influences 
organizational restructuring from this viewpoint is depicted in the following figure: 
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    Figure 1:  Public Choice & A Normative Structural Framework 
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Big government with centralized 
authority results in a complex 
bureaucracy with too many rules that 
can ultimately reduce societal welfare. 
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economic incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delegate authority for and 
control of HRM functions to 
line managers and simplify 
rules. 
 
 
 
Pay for performance.  Base 
rewards on satisfying 
consumers or improving 
cost effectiveness.  
Introduce gainsharing.  
Outsource where feasible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The structural changes in HRM as depicted above are interrelated and are not mutually 
exclusive.  For example, a smaller number of HR professionals is a logical outcome when 
decentralizing HR decision authority to line managers and an emphasis placed on economic 
incentives could lead to cost savings.  In addition, deregulation and decentralization go hand in 
hand, whereby technical rules formerly administered by a centralized HRM, functions would 
likely be simplified when delegated to line managers   However, for the purposes of analysis, the 
two structural solutions above will be viewed separately and tied to specific HRM 
characteristics: 
Problems related to size and centralized HRM systems.  A large number of HR 
specialists, generally tied to HRM functions (e.g. classification/”classifiers,” 
recruitment/”recruiters,” sanction/”labor relations specialists”) and technical experts whose 
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functions are to oversee the actions of line managers are generally associated with more 
traditional, centralized HR systems.  A more recent vision of the HR professional is one who 
functions as more of a generalist or “consultant” to line managers in their administration of a 
decentralized HRM system.  Fundamental to any discussion of the impediments associated with 
centralized bureaucratic rules and controls for recruiting, selecting, compensating and rewarding 
employees is the degree to which line managers, theoretically more knowledgeable of what it 
takes to meet organization goals and objectives, are empowered to manage their workforce.  This 
would include decentralized authority to determine what knowledge, skills and abilities are 
needed for any given job, the ability to be involved in their recruitment and selection, and once 
hired, have the decision authority to reward, promote and sanction employees.  Decentralizing 
HRM authority implies a relaxation and simplification of the rules – or – deregulation as well.  
Much of the literature focuses on a decentralized HRM as one key ingredient to achieving high 
performance, and as one measure of employee participation.  
Problems associated with bureaucratic performance.  Traditional HRM systems are 
commonly associated with rewards being based on seniority in determining pay, bonuses, 
promotions and other non-monetary recognition and status symbols.  Introducing competition is 
viewed as one method for transcending the inertia often associated with bureaucracies built on 
seniority.  The idea of rewarding leaders and employees for performance, rather than seniority 
can take a number of forms – awards for cost saving initiatives, group awards (both monetary 
and non-monetary) for improved efficiency or effectiveness (e.g. gain sharing), bonuses based on 
achieving established performance objectives etc.  Closely tied to this idea is that competition 
leading to improved performance may also involve outsourcing certain HRM functions to 
another public or private agency if deemed more efficient and effective.  In addition, expectancy 
 44
theory, which will be discussed in another section of this chapter, while a theory of motivation, 
also is a theory about the link between motivation and performance (Guest, 1997).  Combined 
with other HR practices, this theory provides strong support for designing a system that rewards 
organization members for performance versus seniority.   
 
A Resource Based View of Human Resource Management 
A number of writers argue that an internal analysis of an organization’s resources is the 
most productive when attempting to enhance performance outcomes.   A prominent approach 
that identifies linkages between the ways a firm manages its internal resources and the outcomes 
of profitability and productivity is the resource-based theory of the firm advanced by Barney, 
(1986, 1996) and Barney & Hesterly (1996). Simply stated, this theory suggests that the sources 
of superior performance are primarily found internally.  How well a firm performs depends on 
how well it develops its resources and capabilities.   Resources and capabilities are defined as 
those attributes that enable a firm to conceive of and implement its strategies.  A resource-based 
view, while the focus is primarily an internal one, does not ignore the firm’s environment.  It 
addresses what a firm has the ability to do and what is has the opportunity to do (Russo & Fouts 
(1997).  
Barney & Hesterly (1996) divide resources and capabilities into four groups: financial, 
physical, human resources (e.g. experience, intelligence, training, judgment and wisdom of 
individuals associated with the firm) and organizational (e.g. teamwork, trust, friendship and 
reputation of groups of individuals associated with a firm) (p. 133).  In this model it is assumed 
the firm’s resources and capabilities may vary across industries (or strategic groups) and can be 
heterogeneous because of their essential attributes (pp. 133-134).  Grant (1991) views these 
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resources as tangible, intangible and personnel based.  The tangible include finances, and 
physical resources.  The intangible include culture, the training and expertise of the employees 
and their commitment and loyalty to the firm.  As these resources in and of themselves are not 
productive, the firm’s capabilities and ability to marshal, integrate and manage these resources in 
a positive direction are essential to performance.  In this view, it is through the development of, 
and investment in, these resources internally that performance is enhanced to sustain a 
competitive advantage externally.   
Since the early 1990’s, scholars have been using relevant concepts from resource-based 
theory and applying them to their areas of interest in terms of theory building and empirical 
research.  The influence of this theory on strategy, or “…the ability to gain an advantage,” 
(Aharoni, 1993) can be seen in a change in thinking from an outside-in to an inside-out approach 
(Paauwe & Boselie, 2002) where internal resources form the starting point in determining 
organization success; the emphasis being on the nature of the resources possessed, how they are 
deployed by the manager and how they are used and further developed by the organization 
(Schendel, 1994).  This viewpoint has evolved from the works of Lado and Camerer (1994), 
Lado and Wilson (1994), Grant (1991) and Boxall (1996).  Grant (1991), Conner (1991), 
Mosakowski (1993), Collis and Mongomery (1995), Koch and McGrath (1996) and Russo and 
Fouts (1997) specifically tie a resource-based approach to improved firm performance 
(profitability and productivity).  Hitt et al. (2001) and Wright et al. (2001) focus on the 
leveraging of human capital as the primary unit of analysis and tying it to improved performance.  
Also evolving from the resource-based theory is the emphasis on developing core competencies, 
or collective learning in an organization (Prahalad and Hammel, 1990), and benchmarking, or the 
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continuous process of measuring practices against competitors to identify areas for improvement 
(Ford, 1993; Hiltrop & Despres, 1995).   
 
A Resource Based View in the Public Sector 
An application of the resource-based theory in the public sector can be found in the 
works focusing on management capacity, defined as a government's ability to develop, direct, 
and control its resources to support the discharge of its policy and program responsibilities 
(Ingraham and Donahue 2000).  Ingraham and Donahue (1999, 2000) and Ingraham, Joyce and 
Donahue (2003) theorize that government performance can be analyzed by dissecting what they 
term the “black box” of government, or the management processes employed by any government 
in carrying out public policies.  They define these processes as “management capacity” -- the 
extent to which the commonly shared four management subsystems of (1) financial management, 
(2) HRM, (3) capital management and (4) information technology management are focused on 
performance and integrated and aligned with the desired policy outcomes of a government 
organization.  They point out three untested assumptions associated with attempts to measure 
management capacity in relation to performance:  
 
1.  Effective management is positively related to effective performance; 
2.  Effective management is the degree to which different functions of a management 
system are integrated; and  
3.  Sound leadership has a positive influence on effective management and on overall 
government performance (2000, p. 297-298).  
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They further point out that in the public administration literature there are few empirical 
links established between management capacity and government performance (2000, p. 297) or 
policy outcomes (2003).  Measuring government-level performance outcomes is a complex task 
for public managers.  Defining a “well managed” government in terms of outcomes, of which 
there may be many, is less clear than in the private sector.   Even so, this analysis is useful as it 
provides an analytical framework for evaluating management capacity in government in relation 
to performance, and acknowledges there are untested assumptions with regard to performance 
management.   
 
HRM as an Internal Source of Superior Performance 
This study takes a systemic versus a functional view of HRM.  The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines a system as a “harmonious arrangement or pattern; a regularly interacting or 
interdependent group of items forming a unified whole;” and “an organized set of doctrines, 
ideas, or principles usually intended to explain the arrangement or working of a systemic whole.”  
Viewing HRM as a system suggests not only considering traditional HRM functions, but looking 
at both structure and process in the way people are managed throughout an organization.  This is 
a dynamic approach, which allows an examination of the dimension where HRM outcomes 
associated with quality, reciprocal commitment and flexibility of the HR system translate into the 
behavioral outcomes of effort and motivation, cooperation, involvement and organizational 
citizenship (Guest, 1997).  These elements of people management extend beyond the HRM 
professional and include dynamics diffused throughout an organization such as the degree of 
decentralized decision-making, teamwork, simplicity versus complexity of rules and rewarding 
people for their performance and contributions.   In addition, innovative approaches to benefits 
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beyond the traditional, frequently termed “family friendly” are associated with high performance 
or high commitment work systems in the literature (see Kling, 1995). 
Becker, et al. (1997) argues a systems understanding is crucial to effective HRM.  They 
characterize the subtle interactions and unintended consequences of implementing HR practices 
as deadly combinations and powerful connections (p. 43).  They contend that deadly 
combinations occur when an HRM policy that makes sense in isolation is implemented without 
considering the larger context of HRM practices deployed throughout the firm. Examples of 
deadly combinations include an organization that encourages employees to work in teams, but 
provides raises and bonuses based on individual effort or, invests in sophisticated performance 
management systems yet makes no distinction between high and low performing employees.  
Alternatively, powerful connections reflect the presence of synergies and complementarities 
where the economic returns from the “whole” of the HRM system adds up to more than the sum 
of its parts.  They have found in an empirical study of over 1,500 firms that combining above 
market pay policies with comprehensive performance management systems has a 50 percent 
larger effect on firm performance than considering the effects of the two policies in isolation: 
 
This finding reflects the synergistic gains of a better applicant pool, more talented hires, 
and an HRM system that is able to recognize and reward these more talented employees 
for their superior performance (p.43). 
 
Gephart and Van Buren (1996) support a systemic view and suggest there is a synergy 
needed between HRM, management practices and the alignment of these practices with the goals 
of the organization.  As depicted in Figure 2, an organization must pursue alignment in a number 
of areas.   
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Figure 2: Organization Alignment – A Systemic View 
Environment
Vision & Mission                           Strategy   Beliefs & Values
Organization Goals
Goals Internal 
(Across levels, units, processes)
Management Practices
Human Resource Systems                                        Work Practices & Processes
Other systems Structure
Adapted from Gephart, M.A. & Van Buren, M.E.  (1996).  Building synergy: The 
power of high performance work systems.  Training and Development.  Vol. 50, pp. 
21-37.
AlignmentFigure 2:
 
They identify these areas as strategic, goal and internal alignment.  They argue the 
organization’s strategy must be consistent with the environment, its vision and mission and its 
beliefs and values.  Organization goals then, are consistent with this strategy and aligned 
vertically with it at all levels.  Internally, there is a need for both vertical alignment with goals, 
and horizontal alignment between HRM systems and work processes and practices.  In a high 
performance work system, management practices, often defined by HRM practices, are mutually 
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supportive and integrated with both the strategy and goals of the organization.  HRM policies 
and practices intended to enhance employee skills, knowledge, motivation and flexibility are 
supported by management practices, which value decentralized decision-making, employee 
participation and communication (p. 22).  They view this as a synergy achieved through 
overlapping work and human resource practices.  Consistent with linking expectancy theory to 
performance, they state “Training, job rotation, and participation in problem-solving groups give 
employees several ways to acquire skills.  Participation in decision making and goal setting can 
be an incentive for high performance” (p. 26) 
 
HRM Architecture  
Combining the definitions of human resources and organizational resources suggested by 
Barney (1986, 1996) and Barney & Hesterly (1996) provides a broad systemic perspective from 
which to view HRM.   Including the collective experience, intelligence, training, judgment, 
wisdom of individuals – with - teamwork, trust, friendship and reputation of groups of 
individuals associated with a firm, extends the possibility of analysis beyond a more traditional 
approach limited to a narrow view of those functions associated with acquiring, retaining, 
developing, evaluating and sanctioning employees.  Such a definition suggests HRM can be 
viewed as an “architecture” or system for managing people spread throughout an organization 
(Beer et al., 1984) and it can add the dimension of quality to the performance equation.   This is 
important in terms of the organization’s strategy for linking the HRM system to performance 
outcomes, as it includes all aspects of people management. 
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Human Capital Management 
 
Wright et al. (2001) distinguish between human resources and human resource practices.  
The former refers to the human capital pool of a firm (the availability of skills that exist within 
an organization at any given point in time) and the latter refers to the tools, or management 
practices, used for managing the human capital pool.  They point out the individual’s own their 
human capital, not the firm. Therefore, firms need to access the human capital pool by using 
management practices that result in individual and collective choices to engage in behavior that 
benefits the firm (p. 705).     This implies an important interaction between an organization’s 
training and development efforts, and the promotion of management practices that motivate 
employees to use their skills in the best interests of the organization.  To achieve this level of 
symmetry an organization needs to recognize individual free will and develop management 
systems that positively influence the human capital pool.  Pfeffer (1994) points out that the 
quality movement has contributed significantly to this endeavor by advocating for fundamentally 
sound ways of managing people and stimulating positive workplace change (p. 207). 
The effective management of this human capital, not physical capital, may be the 
ultimate determinant of organizational performance (Youndt, et al., 1996).  Maital (1994), 
Huselid (1994, 1995), Becker & Huselid (1997), DeVol & Wallace (2004) and Tomer (1998, 
1999, 2001) argue that of all resources and capabilities available to a firm, the main source for 
providing competitive advantage and high performance lies in people – their knowledge, skills 
and abilities – as they are the firm’s source and basis for using its other resources.  Youndt et al. 
(1996) point out that the people may be the ultimate source of competitive advantage as other 
sources such as markets and financial capital have been weakened by globalization.   Pfeffer 
(1994a,1999c) asserts that the culture and capabilities of an organization, as derived from the 
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way it manages its people, is the real source of competitive advantage and that for firms to 
survive in a global environment they must make appropriate investments in human resources to 
acquire and build people who possess higher skills and capabilities than their competitors.  Also, 
Guest (1997) suggests that there is an assumption that improved performance is primarily 
achieved through the people in the organization.   It would follow that one most important way to 
enhance performance, then, is through the management of human capital. 
 
Toward a Normative Theory of HRM 
In order to create a HRM system likely to positively tap the human capital pool, there 
needs to be a theoretical rationale for establishing a link between HRM practices and 
performance.  Guest (1997) categorizes HRM theories as: (1) strategic; (2) descriptive; and (3) 
normative.  As Youndt et al. (1997) points out, these theories are not mutually exclusive, yet 
Guest suggests there are differences in their primary focus.  He indicates strategic theories, 
primarily the strategic contingency model, emphasize the fit, or alignment, between HRM 
practices as dependent variables, and external contingencies as independent variables.  The 
implicit hypothesis (though he points out it is untested) is that an alignment between internal 
HRM practices and the external environment result in superior performance.  The primary 
emphasis is on how well HRM adapts to change rather than linking it with performance.  Even 
so, Huselid, Jackson & Schuler (1997) point out that a strategic approach is also concerned with 
designing and implementing internally consistent HRM policies and practices that ensure a 
firm’s human capital contributes to organizational goals and objectives.  Descriptive theories 
(see Beer et al., 1984) provide conceptual maps of the HRM field and are management-employee 
relation models that focus on how managers balance competing interests.  Being non-
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prescriptive, these theories provide little focus for testing relationships between HRM and 
performance (Guest 1997, p.  265). On the other hand, Guest suggests that normative theories, 
which are prescriptive, can be tested: 
 
The central hypothesis is that if an integrated set of HRM practices is applied with 
a view to achieving the normative goals of high commitment to the organization 
plus high quality and flexibility, then higher worker performance will result.  The 
assumption is that this will have a positive impact on organizational performance.  
Unlike other approaches, this normative perspective argues that specific practices 
and specific HRM goals will always be superior (p. 265). 
 
A Universal Perspective 
 
Both strategic and normative theories of HRM emerge from a resource-based theory of 
the firm in that they are internally focused within the context of broader strategic issues.  By 
advocating for a best set of practices, a normative approach suggests there is “one best way” to 
configure HRM practices to achieve high performance.  There are a number of empirical studies, 
primarily in the private sector (Huselid,1995; Youndt et al., 1996; Harel & Tzafrir, 2001; Becker 
& Gerhart, 1996; Guest, et al., 2003, unpublished manuscript) providing support for what is 
termed a universal perspective where “…certain HRM practices are better than 
others…irrespective of the characteristics of the organization” (Harel & Tzafrir, 2001, p. 318).   
Guest, et al. (2003) in an unpublished empirical study, examined employee attitudes and 
behavior associated with high commitment/performance and compared a universal approach with 
a strategic contingency model.  The aims of the study were to test the model that proposes HRM 
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and performance are linked by the impact of HRM on attitudes and behavior that in turn affect 
performance.   They then compared universal and strategic contingency models of HRM in three 
countries.  Their sample consisted of 239 companies in the U.K., 734 members of Australia’s 
and 114 of New Zealand’s professional personnel bodies.  They found some support for the 
mediating role of employee attitudes and behavior in terms of the HRM – performance 
relationship, which were consistent across the three countries.  Their results also gave more 
support to a universal than a strategic model of HRM in predicting performance.   
This universal perspective based on the resource-based theory of the firm suggests that a 
set of HRM “best practices” can be generalized to other organizations and used for comparative 
purposes.  This provides the rationale for this study, which is to use the practices identified in the 
literature that seem to be associated with high performance, and compare municipalities in terms 
of their outcomes to see if there is a relationship between the two. 
 
The High Performance Equation: Quality, Commitment & Flexibility 
The concept of the high performing organization (HPO) as it is applied to the public 
sector is a hybrid combining a number of innovative ideas included in the NPR, the re-invention 
and quality movements (largely emanating from the private sector) and the techniques of public 
management found in the NPM.    
Writing for the public sector audience Popovich (1998) defines a HPO as: “…groups of 
employees who produce desired goods or services at higher quality with the same or fewer 
resources.  Their productivity and quality improve continuously, from day to day, week to week, 
and year to year, leading to the achievement of their mission” (p. 11).   He further points out that 
HPOs are people-centered, may not encompass the entire organization, are not restricted to 
 55
traditional governmental boundaries.  They collaborate as necessary with the private sector to 
achieve desired results and are constantly evolving and changing (p 12).  He also distinguishes 
clearly between results or outcome measures and output measures. Outcome measures reflect 
improved conditions over time (e.g. municipal bond ratings, reduced rate for those living in 
poverty, reduced crime rate).   Output measures reflect a volume of activity over time (e.g. 
lowered welfare caseload, numbers of arrests) (p.95).    While outputs are important workload 
data, the concept of a HPO is oriented toward outcome measures. 
Definitions of HPOs in the literature are primarily descriptions of their attributes.  For the 
public sector, Popovich (1998) states HPOs: (1) are clear on their mission; (2) define outcomes 
and focus on results; (3) empower employees; (4) motivate and inspire; (5) are flexible and 
readily adjust to change; (6) are competitive in terms of performance; (7) change processes to 
meet customer needs; and (8) maintain communication with stakeholders.  From the private 
sector Pfeffer (1998) identifies the following dimensions of a high performance work system 
(HPWS): (1) employment security; (2) selective hiring; (3) decentralization of decision making 
and the use of self-managed teams; (4) comparatively high compensation contingent on 
organizational performance; (5) extensive training; (6) reduced use of status distinctions and 
barriers; and (7) extensive financial and performance information sharing.  Arthur (1994) found 
that those HR practices focusing on enhancing employee commitment, comprehensive training, 
salaried compensation and employee participation were related to higher performance.  Huselid 
(1995) found that HR practices impacting employee skill development and motivation such as 
incentive compensation, selective staffing techniques and employee participation resulted in 
lower turnover, greater productivity and increased organizational performance. 
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High Performing Human Resource Management Systems 
Scholars, in their attempts to emphasize the features of a HPO and HPWS, refer to this 
phenomenon variously as “high trust organizations” (Carnevale, 1995), “high commitment” 
organizations (Arthur, 1994), “high involvement” organizations (Lawler in Tomer, 2001) and 
“high performance” organizations (Tomer, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Thompson, 1993; Popovich, 
1998; Pfeffer, 1998).  Kling (1995) describes firms that choose to rely upon the creativity, 
ingenuity and problem solving abilities of their workers and have adopted “high performance 
work practices” to provide workers with “…the information, skills, incentives, and responsibility 
to make decisions essential for innovation, quality improvement, and rapid response to change.” 
(p. 29).   
  Whether using a definition found in the private or public sector, it seems clear for an 
organization to be characterized as “high performing,” the primary unit of analysis must be its 
HRM system. Tomer (2001) states that the main idea of a HPWS “…is to create an organization 
based on employee involvement, commitment and empowerment…” (p. 64).  In order to achieve 
this level of sophistication a high level of mutual trust between employee and organization needs 
to exist.  HRM practices would need to extend well beyond managerial functions and be diffused 
throughout the organization.  Carnevale (1995) argues that in order for trust and high 
performance to occur, an empowered, high caliber workforce is necessary.  In order to develop 
this workforce, conventional HRM methods must: (1) shift focus from individual jobs to 
organizational needs; (2) ensure operations are less regulatory; (3) promote labor-management 
cooperation; (4) promote employee involvement; and (5) trust authorities and line managers to 
have more control over personnel decisions.   
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Kling (1995), in a review of management literature, shares McDuffie’s (1995) conclusion 
that the benefits of employee involvement, skill training and other high performance work 
practices tend to be greater when new methods are adopted as a whole, rather than in isolation or 
piecemeal.  He found that specific practices such as (1) training; (2) alternative pay systems and 
(3) employee involvement were often correlated with high productivity when implemented 
together as systems.  Other high performance practices he identified but did not analyze were (4) 
family-oriented work practices, (5) healthy and safe workplaces, and (6) employment security. 
  It seems apparent that achieving high performance throughout an organization requires 
an HRM system, which in collaboration with the leadership, employees and labor unions, co-
creates and reinforces a humanistic organizational culture characterized by trust (decentralization 
of authority, participation in decisions), compensation policies based on performance (fairness 
based on standards), responding to workforce needs (benefits and family characteristics) within a 
“learning” environment of human capital investment (training and development).  All of the 
preceding conditions would appear to energize the recruitment of quality people.  It can also be 
concluded that achieving this level of organizational development requires mutually supportive 
policies and actions, which need to be integrated systemically.  In other words, the actions 
required to build toward this level are not mutually exclusive, rather, are interrelated.  Therefore, 
it follows that work practices thought to be high performing implemented together as a “whole,” 
as pointed out by Kling (1995), or as “bundles,” suggested by MacDuffie (1995), would be most 
effective in realizing a high performing organization. 
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Linkage Between HRM Practices and Performance Outcomes 
 The argument that a set of HRM practices alone can be used to suggest a linkage with 
performance is basic to the universal perspective, where it is posited that a human capital 
enhancing HR system is the key to higher organizational performance.  Here it is thought that a 
set of best HR practices, identified as enhancing human capital, can be generalized to other 
organizations while assuming that high performing organizations will have internal alignment 
among human, organizational, financial and physical resources.  In addition, a high 
commitment/performance model proposes that if a distinctive set of HR practices is in place they 
are likely to ensure that employees are competent, motivated, autonomous and committed and 
the outcome is likely to be a set of attitudes and behavior resulting in higher performance (Guest 
et al., 2003).  Based on empirical evidence, there appears to be a linkage between a set of HR 
practices and a firm’s performance outcomes, particularly when deployed in “bundles” or as a 
system versus applying individual HRM functions in isolation (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Kling, 1995).  An underlying theme in this research is that firms should create 
a high degree of internal consistency, or fit, among their HR activities (Youndt, et al., 1996). 
 A number of empirical studies examine both specific HRM practices, or a number of 
practices, and their effects on organizational level outcomes.   The findings of these studies 
suggest that HRM practices, particularly those defined as “high performance” practices, have 
positive effects on both short and long term measures of corporate level outcomes or financial 
performance (Huselid, 1994, 1995; Koch et al., 1996; Huselid & Becker, 1994; Delaney & 
Huselid, 1996) and that in order to solve business problems associated with diminished 
shareholder value, the HR focus should be on business level outcomes, not HR level inputs 
(Becker et al., 1997).  This argument forms the basis for a strategic HRM focus, which seems to 
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permeate the current HRM literature. Huselid’s (1994) results suggest that the strategic high 
performance work system was associated with 16 percent greater productivity, Arthur (1994) in 
his studies of the steel manufacturing, found that “commitment” HRM systems were associated 
with 12 percent higher productivity and McDuffie (1994) found “high commitment” HRM 
practices in the automobile industry were associated with significant increases in productivity. 
Becker and Gerhart (1996) suggest the research indicates that changes in HR systems can affect 
a firm’s market value by $15,000 to $60,000 per employee and the probability of survival for a 
new firm by as much as 22 percent (p. 797).  For a firm with 10,000 employees, this represents 
more than half a billion dollars in market share (Becker et al., 1997). 
The consulting firm Watson Wyatt Worldwide surveyed 1600 private companies 
worldwide applying their Human Capital Index (HCI) to measure the correlation between 
published financial performance of an organization and aspects of their human capital 
management. Their studies, replicated over a three-year period, purport to establish a clear 
relationship between the types of HRM practices employed by companies and their published 
financial performance (Watson Wyatt Worldwide web site, 2002).  Also, since 1990, Workforce 
Management has surveyed the top performing U.S. firms and lowest performing firms in terms 
of profit and market share to compare HR practices in each grouping.  These surveys also seem 
to show a clear relationship between HRM and financial outcomes (Workforce Management 
website, 2001).  
 
Evidence from the Public Sector 
 A public sector study of 61 acute hospitals in the U.K. National Health Service Trusts 
(West et al., 2003) sought to determine from a macro or strategic perspective if there were links 
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between people management practices and hospital performance as indicated by patient mortality 
data.  This study examined the three HRM practices; appraisal, training and team working and 
found strong associations between HR practices and patient mortality generally.  Six variables 
were chosen to represent HR practices: assessment of training needs; sophistication of training 
policy, degree of centralized decision making, percentage of staff working in teams; a measure of 
the sophistication and extensiveness of training; and the extensiveness and sophistication of the 
appraisal system.  Six measures of health outcomes were obtained: number of deaths following 
emergency surgery; number of deaths following non-emergency surgery; deaths following 
admission for hip fractures; deaths following admission for heart attacks; re-admission rates; and 
a mortality index.  The mortality index is a measure based on the ratio of actual deaths to 
expected deaths standardized in relation to patients’ ages, gender, primary diagnosis, length of 
stay and emergency admissions.  While cautious in their findings and conclusions about 
predicting causation, their regression analysis reported a negative relationship between more 
progressive HR practices and patient mortality rates in the hospitals studied.  Those hospitals 
reporting sophisticated appraisal systems, extensive training and more people working in teams 
had lower mortality rates.  The study also suggested that hospital staff perceived two HR 
initiatives, the introduction of team working and a sophisticated appraisal process, as leading to 
improved patient care.  In relation to Huselid (1995) where it is suggested that one standard 
deviation change in each HRM practice associated with good organizational performance is 
likely to produce an increase in sales of $27,044 per employee, the authors use this logic in their 
analysis as follows: 
 
 …if we take the strongest association, that between deaths following admissions  
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for hip fractures and appraisal, the data show that for hospitals of equal size and local 
population health needs, an improvement of one standard deviation in the 
extensiveness/sophistication of the appraisal system is associated with, on average, a drop 
of 0.494 standard deviations in deaths after hip fractures.  This is equivalent to 1090 
fewer deaths per 100,000 admissions…  Even with a much smaller relationship, that 
between team working and deaths following emergency surgery, we see that an increase 
of one standard deviation in team working – equivalent to approximately 25% more staff 
working in teams – is associated, on average, with 275 fewer deaths per 100,000 (pp. 21-
22). 
  
 That a direct linkage exists between HRM practices and performance outcomes is 
perhaps argued most strongly by Pfeffer (1994, 1998), Pfeffer and Veiga (1999) and Tomer 
(1987, 1998, 1999, 2001), where, in agreement with Maital (1994), they contend that of all 
resources available to a firm, the human resources are the most important for achieving greater 
competitive advantage and financial results. 
 
Expectancy Theory 
 Expectancy theory, a widely accepted and academically tested explanation for why 
people are motivated to work and perform (Lawler, 2003; Fudge and Schlacter, 1999) provides a 
basis for developing a rationale linking HRM practices with performance (Guest, 1997).  Of 
HRM, McDuffie (1995) alludes to the relevance of expectancy theory, where he states: 
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Innovative human resource practices are likely to contribute to improved economic 
performance only when three conditions are met: when employees possess knowledge 
and skills that managers lack; when employees are motivated to apply this skill and 
knowledge through discretionary effort; and when the firm’s business or production 
strategy can only be achieved when employees contribute such discretionary effort.  I will 
argue that all these conditions must be met for HR practices to contribute to performance 
(italics added) (McDuffie, 1995, p. 199).  
  
Motivational theories are commonly divided between those that focus on an individual’s 
internal attributes (content theories) and those, which focus on an individual’s interactions with 
the environment (process theories) (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999).  Expectancy theory is a process 
theory of motivation.  In this model, motivation is a function of how individuals perceive their 
environment and the expectations they form based on these perceptions.  Expectancy theory, first 
developed by Vroom (1964), identifies three factors that play an interactive role in motivation 
(Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Isaac, Zerbe & Pitt, 2001): (1) the effort-performance (E-P) 
expectancy; (2) the performance-outcome (P-O) expectancy; and (3) valence.   
The E-P expectancy concerns the individual’s perception that effort is positively 
correlated with a level of performance, or that the personal expenditure of effort will result in an 
acceptable level of performance.  A person who has confidence that s/he can increase their 
output by exerting greater effort would have a high E-P expectancy.  A person who perceives 
that no matter how much effort h/she expends their performance is fixed at a given level, would 
have a low E-P expectancy.  Expectancy theory would predict, with all other things being equal, 
that the person with the high E-P expectancy would be more highly motivated.   Therefore, the 
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E-P expectancy suggests that people will expend effort when they believe certain levels of 
performance are attainable (Isaac, Zerbe and Pitt, 2001).   
The second factor of expectancy theory, the P-O expectancy concerns a person’s 
expectations that the rewards received are tied to his/her level of performance.  Theoretically, a 
person paid on a straight commission will have a high P-O expectancy while a wage employee 
without prospect for a performance bonus no matter how good the performance would have a 
low P-O expectancy.  The perceived (not actual) correlation between performance and reward is 
relevant to motivation (Fudge and Schlacter, 1999).  Therefore, a person with a high P-O 
expectancy would believe the performance level achieved will result in a specific outcome or 
reward; the perception is that performance levels are related to rewards.   
The third factor of expectancy theory is valence or the degree to which an individual 
values a particular reward.  This suggests that the more a person values the reward s/he will 
receive, the more motivated s/he will be to exert the necessary effort to receive the reward.  
Based on these three factors of motivation, expectancy theory would suggest that an organization 
can increase the effort of employees in their jobs by increasing the expectation that greater effort 
will lead to high levels of performance and by strengthening performance incentives - the 
perceived link between results and rewards that are valued (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999). 
 Lawler (1970) modifies the basic expectancy model by adding two variables that affect 
E-P expectancy.  The first, ability, refers to the individual’s skill level performing a given task 
and introduces the importance of training and experience in strengthening the relationship 
between effort and performance; the more a person’s skills improve, the more likely s/he will 
perceive that relationship.  Lawler (2003) points out that highly motivated people will not 
necessarily perform well without the necessary skills, ability and expertise to do the job.  
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Likewise, people with the skills, abilities and expertise, unless motivated to do so, will not 
necessarily perform well.  Performance depends on these two factors (p. 38).  
The second variable is a person’s problem-solving approach.  A person must not only 
possess the skills but be allowed the opportunity to apply them and perceive they have a role in 
problem solving.   The more confidently a person can apply skills to solve new tasks, the higher 
the E-P expectancy will be (Fudge and Schlacter, 1999).  Basic expectancy theory relies on the 
importance of extrinsic rewards (pay, bonuses, promotions).  Lawler (1970) also adds the 
importance of intrinsic rewards in connection with performance.  Lawler’s final variable is 
satisfaction, or how well the rewards of performing a job satisfy individual needs and desires.  
As Fudge & Schlacter (1999) point out, however, research indicates satisfaction influences a 
person’s motivation to perform a job effectively only indirectly (p. 298).  Lawler (2003) 
indicates expectancy theory views motivation as being based on anticipated rewards and future 
satisfaction, not on present satisfaction.  Job satisfaction, then, may be a result of performance 
but does not directly cause motivation or performance (p. 51).   
 
HRM Model of Performance 
Although expectancy theory is primarily concerned with motivation, it is also a theory 
about the link between motivation and performance (Guest, 1997).  Guest (1997) explains that 
expectancy theory “…proposes that high performance, at the individual level, depends on high 
motivation plus possession of the necessary skills and abilities and an appropriate role and 
understanding of that role (p. 268).”  He suggests that HRM practices encouraging high 
motivation (e.g. employee involvement, pay for performance), contributing to high levels of 
skills and abilities (careful selection, high investment in training and development) and helping 
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develop an appropriate role structure and role perception (job design, communication and 
feedback), provide a theory linking these practices with processes that facilitate high 
performance.  These relationships are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Link Between HR Practices, Motivation & Performance 
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higher performance can be expected (p. 269).   
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Figure 4 contains a listing, by author, of those HRM “best practices,” associated with 
high performance, which seem to be supported by empirical research: 
 
 
Figure 4: Best Practices Identified in the Literature by Study Dimension 
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Using the above listing, models, by author, can be derived and tied to the available survey data 
for analysis.  Not all best practices listed above were covered by the study survey.  Those that 
were are extrapolated from the above listing and included in Figure 5.   
Figure 5: High Performing HRM System Models Linked to Survey Instrument 
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This is intended to illustrate how the HRM performance dimensions derived from 
expectancy theory and the practices addressed by the survey instrument are linked with high 
performance HRM models identified in the literature.  
 
Management as a Determinant of Municipal Bond Rating 
 Rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Services and Fitch ICBA) have 
long disclosed they consider four broad factors - debt, economic, financial and 
administrative/management - in arriving at a municipal bond rating.  How much of a role each of 
these factors play in the final determination – or how each factor is weighted in the analysis – has 
been a matter of conjecture.  This lack of transparency in the rating process led to attempts to 
replicate rating agency analyses and predict ratings using different variables (Loviscek & 
Crowley, 1990; Moon & Stotsky,1993a,b; Ammar et al., 2001a,b).  A heightened interest in bond 
ratings over the 1980’s and 1990’s corresponds with reduced federal funding for local 
government programs. This, coupled with an increasing number of federal mandates, has 
amplified the importance of securing local government debt to fund required and needed 
programs.  These developments have increased the importance of bond ratings for attracting 
investors and securing lower interest rates for borrowing by municipalities.  It has also increased 
the influence rating agencies have on local government operations (Hackworth, 2002).   
Controversies surrounding the use of qualitative factors by rating agencies along with 
quantitative measures reflecting debt and economic factors emerged in the early 1990’s.  In 
response, Tillman (1993) outlined Standard and Poor’s response to this charge defending the use 
of subjective factors in their analysis in order to provide a “context” for viewing the more 
measurable factors.  Crowell & Sokol (1993) of the International City/County Management 
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Association (ICMA) published guidelines in response to the view that the three major rating 
agencies were applying subjective factors by considering a municipality’s “quality of life” in 
arriving at a credit rating.  Interestingly, the ICMA guidelines focused exclusively on the 
municipality’s management practices.   
In an attempt to develop an empirical model to replicate the methodology used by 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, Moon & Stotsky (1993b) concluded that of the four broad 
areas acknowledged by rating agencies, “The final category, administrative factors, is perhaps 
the most important but also the most difficult to characterize with specific variables.” (p. 55).   
Hildreth & Zorn (2005) in their analysis of some of the most significant developments in the 
local government municipal debt market since 1980, indicate that management, as a part of credit 
analysis, involves a wide range of policies and practices difficult to measure, yet these actions 
taken by policy makers determine the decisions, methods and practices used in managing local 
government.  
 Perhaps the most important indications that management practices play an important role 
in determining municipal credit ratings come from the rating agencies themselves.  Responding 
to pressure to be more transparent in the rating process, rating firms acknowledge the importance 
of management in determining municipal bond ratings and its important relationship to 
downgrades and defaults.  They now define specific financial management practices used in the 
rating process and describe other less tangible management attributes acknowledged as important 
to the rating process.  Some of the more important articles and research addressing this issue 
follow: 
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Moody’s Investors Service 
Lipnick, Rattner & Ebrahim (1999), Moody’s Investors Service credit officers, outline a 
methodology for determining bond ratings, discuss the predominant factors used in rating 
assignments and clarify which factors determine rating upgrades and downgrades.  While 
emphasizing the importance of interrelationships between economic, debt, financial and 
administrative factors in determining ratings, management strategies are highlighted as 
important to the credit rating evaluation and can determine the strength of the other factors.  “ An 
evaluation of management is, however, crucial because ultimately it will be management’s 
responsibility to seize upon economic opportunities, adopt a budget, and take corrective action as 
may be necessary to realize targeted results” (p. 36).  In addition, the management strength of 
local government is viewed as important to evaluation.   The qualitative nature of evaluating 
management strategies is recognized, however, a number of observable elements are regarded as 
important indicators of a local government’s management strength such as how it is organized, 
how responsibilities are divided, the professional qualifications of its staff and whether it has 
sufficient power to perform its functions (p. 37).  Most important, the authors suggest that the 
strength of management determines, and is reflected in, the other evaluative factors (p. 37): 
1) A good management strategy helps ensure financial practices are appropriate and 
responsive to the municipality’s needs. 
2) Debt practices will be thoughtfully structured and in line with statutory and voter 
prescribed debt limits. 
3) Good economic development policies will be adopted and government officials 
will be balanced in response to the demands for services relative to the needs of 
business and residential taxpayer. 
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4) Strong management strategies include institutionalized means of coordinating and 
cooperating with other government agencies in providing services to a common 
group of citizens. 
In addition to rating assignments, changes in administrative/management strategies are viewed as 
important in determining rating changes.  Implementing new strategies expected to augment or 
detract from operating flexibility and changes in the political environment affecting the ability to 
react to unanticipated events are both viewed as important (along with economic, financial and 
debt factors) to changes in credit ratings.  A municipality’s ability to manage and limit fiscal 
vulnerability (e.g. gain greater expenditure control through eliminating expensive/unproductive 
services), and ability to increase future financial flexibility (e.g. garner additional fiscal resources 
through referendum, fees and taxes) both influence rating upgrades or downgrades (p. 38). 
Management also plays a role in determining the relative strengths or weaknesses of financial 
and debt factors.  The only factor out of management’s control (although even here there can be 
influence) is the economic factor, however, it is noted, “Careful, institutionalized budgeting 
policies contribute to an issuer’s ability to withstand economic downturns…(p. 38).” 
 
Standard & Poor’s 
Tillman (1993) responds to controversies regarding a rating agency considering quality of 
life factors in a municipal credit rating. This managing director of Standard and Poor’s 
Municipal Finance Department argues that a thorough credit evaluation must go beyond financial 
and economic considerations as it must be interpreted within the complexities of community 
needs, desires and social policies.  This requires a thorough understanding of the policies and 
goals of the municipality in relation to its constituents, and an administrative assessment, 
 72
including its form of local government, and its ability to “implement plans and fulfill legal 
requirements.”  This is viewed as an essential part of the evaluation because the needs of the 
community affect the financial demands and economic choices of government.  Tillman argues 
that more measurable financial and economic factors important in arriving at a credit rating must 
be viewed within the larger context of societal needs, which largely determine the administrative 
policies of, and management practices employed by, local government.   
  
Standard & Poor’s (2006).  Public finance criteria: Financial management assessment.  
This Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct article is forthright in describing the link between 
management practices and credit rating: 
 
Managerial decisions, policies, and practices apply directly to the government’s financial 
position and operations, debt burden, and other key credit factors.  A government’s 
ability to implement timely and sound financial and operational decisions in response to 
economic and fiscal demands is a primary determinant of near-term changes in credit 
quality…If a government is unable or unwilling to employ its authority in a timely 
manner to address events that impact its budget and financial condition, its credit rating 
can be adversely affected. 
 
The focus of this article is on financial management including economic analysis, 
revenue forecasting, and risk management, accounting practices, financial strategies, cash and 
liquidity administration and debt management.  It also points out that municipalities ranking well 
against financial management criteria will have policies that help reduce the likelihood of credit 
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deterioration and enable them to benefit from changing conditions whether economic, budgetary, 
statutory or personnel related.  All of the criteria are management related and within the control 
of public officials: 
• Are the organization’s financial assumptions and projections realistic and well grounded 
from both long-term and recent trend perspectives? 
• Are there procedures for reviewing and amending the budget based on updated 
information and actual to performance to ensure fiscal targets are met? 
• Does management have a long-term financial plan that allows them to identify future 
revenues and expenditures as well as address upcoming issues that might affect these? 
• Has the organization created a long-term capital improvement program? 
• Has the organization established policies pertaining to investments, such as the selection 
of financial institutions for services and transactions; risk assessment; investment 
objectives; investment maturities and volatility; portfolio diversification; safekeeping and 
custody; and investment performance reporting, benchmarking and disclosure? 
• Has the organization established policies pertaining to the issuance of debt, such as 
projects that may or may not be funded with debt (including economic development 
projects); maturity and debt service structure; use of security and pledges, credit 
enhancement, and derivatives; and debt refunding guidelines? 
• Has the organization established a formalized operating reserve policy, which takes into 
account the government’s cash flow/operating requirements and the historic volatility of 
revenues and expenditures through economic cycles? 
This evaluation by Standard & Poor’s relies on documentation provided by the government and 
discussions with the organization’s management officials. 
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Standard & Poor’s (2006).  GO ratings are at a crossroad as downgrades increase.  This 
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct research report examines the reasons for an increase in general 
obligation bond downgrades between 2000 and 2005 concluding that management has a large 
degree of control over changes in credit quality over time.  They note that 60 percent of the 
downgrades at the municipal level occurred on average in one to two years after downgrades at 
the state level.  In addition, the overwhelming majority of financially related downgrades 
stemmed from sustained or extreme financial deterioration.  These financial conditions truly 
threaten credit quality when a “…government has failed to correct a structural imbalance over a 
sustained period.”  With the lag time mentioned above, they suggest that managers have time to 
react to fiscal pressure through structural corrections to budget shortfalls before credit quality 
declines even with political or bureaucratic delays.  Noting that only seven percent of 
downgrades during this period resulted from economic factors alone, a local government failing 
to take action in anticipation of economic recovery often increases the likelihood of credit 
deterioration. 
 
Fitch ICBA 
Larkin (2001) the Managing Director of Public Finance for Fitch ICBA, purports that 
management has always been viewed as a crucial component of credit analysis and examines the 
management practices contributing to strong creditworthiness and those detrimental to financial 
stability.   
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…management practices and policies can add stability to weak credits, maximizing their 
credit rating potential.  Conversely…weak financial management can negatively impact 
even the strongest economies and local government structures.  In the extreme, poor 
management can cause rating downgrades to below investment grade, and, on rare 
occasions, bankruptcy or missed debt service payments (p. 23) 
 
Using historical case studies of New York City, the Washington Public Power Supply 
System and Orange County, California, the author shows that poor ratings are often precipitated 
by excessive short-term debt, poor management decisions, a lack of internal controls, 
overspending, poor record keeping, unrealistic projections and inappropriate speculative 
investment strategies; all reflective of conditions within the control of administration and 
management.  On the other hand, municipalities with fiscal discipline, strong management 
practices and balanced budgets remain on the upper end of the credit rating categories (p. 23).  
Recognizing that assessing management practices is a subjective exercise, the author offers 
tangible financial management practices as best practices, which can be used in the rating 
analysis.   
 
Fitch Ratings (2002).  The 12 habits of successful finance officers: Management’s and 
disclosure’s impact on municipal credit ratings.  This report is an outgrowth of a 1999 Fitch 
Ratings study of defaults of municipal debt.  Its findings resulted in a revision to Fitch’s rating 
criteria for public finance directed primarily at local governments’ tax-backed operations.  Most 
important, the study reveals that management practices were vital in predicting favorable credit 
performance in municipalities.  Fitch identifies a number of preferred management practices, 
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which if incorporated by a municipality could account for elevating credit ratings one to three 
categories higher than if not incorporated.  Fitch estimates that nearly three-quarters of their 
rating changes in 2000 as a result of this review were due to municipal management practices.  
Fitch concludes that the recognition of management practices helps provide an objective means 
for credit analysis in the public sector. 
 
Fitch Ratings (2004).  Local government general obligation rating guidelines.  Fitch 
outlines the four elements they use in determining a municipality credit rating: debt; financial 
performance; management, administrative and legal factors; and local tax base and economy.  
While these factors are viewed as interactive, management and administration were given equal 
footing with the other elements.  Key to their assessment is the efficiency with which an elected 
government can make service and spending decisions, and the ability of appointed officials to 
adjust and react to changing economic and financial conditions.  Also, evidence of cooperation 
between executive and legislative branches of government is seen as needed for a positive credit 
evaluation.  Fitch also looks at the appropriateness of allowable investment practices managed by 
full-time trained personnel.  Management practices associated with economic development are 
reviewed and plans with measurable results are considered important as well as the extent to 
which a municipality uses tax incentives to attract new business.   
 
ICMA 
Crowell, A., Sokol, S. (1993), staff members of the International City/County Managers 
Association (ICMA), responded in this article to the controversy regarding major rating agencies 
using criteria to judge a municipality’s quality of life in determining a municipality’s credit 
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rating.  The primary concerns at the time focused on using the condition of a local government’s 
infrastructure, crime rate, health and unemployment statistics, environmental challenges and 
ability to provide services to the homeless in determining a bond rating.  Given that these criteria 
were important to the ultimate bond rating, the authors suggested a number of actions by local 
government managers were needed to protect or obtain higher credit ratings.  These 
recommendations focused exclusively on administration and management practices: 
• Manage municipal finances well. 
• Plan and set goals regarding financial capabilities early on. 
• Use resources effectively. 
• Listen to, understand and work with neighborhood, industrial, and service sector 
constituencies. 
• Provide excellent leadership: confront crises well and gain the approval and trust of your 
constituents. 
• Introduce programs to reduce crime, serve the homeless, train the unemployed and obtain 
cooperation for environmental challenges by forging partnerships with citizens, 
businesses, nonprofits, universities and religious organizations.  This collective effort 
may ultimately reduce municipal expenditures, increase the tax base and improve quality 
of life. 
• Know the condition of the community’s infrastructure and make affordable repairs when 
needed. 
• Plan for economic development and be knowledgeable about alternative financing 
mechanisms. 
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Other Pertinent Research 
 
Moon & Stotsky (1993b) investigated the determinants of municipal general obligation 
bond ratings.  The authors point out that both Moody’s and S&P criteria for assessing 
administrative factors include the type of structure employed by a municipality, the nature of 
public officials’ administrative responsibilities and the perceived quality of administrators.  They 
indicate a municipal bond rating is a qualitative variable measuring credit risk and suggest the 
administrative factors determining bond ratings are perhaps the most important, but also the most 
difficult to characterize with specific variables.  Their empirical analysis found Moody’s Investor 
Services appeared to favor council manager forms of government instead of mayor council forms 
of government in assigning ratings.  Also, they found this variable appeared to be more 
important than fiscal and debt variables in determining the rating.  
 
Ammar, S.; Duncombe, W.; Hou, Y.; Jump, B.;Wright, R. (2001a) develop a 
methodology for evaluating financial performance and credit worthiness of governments.  Due to 
vague information at the time about the prime determinants of credit ratings used by rating 
agencies, or how variables were weighted, the methodology was designed to predict credit 
ratings using economic, debt and other financial factors and by introducing a measure of 
financial management (of particular interest to the authors).  They then compare the results with 
actual bond ratings for 30 large cities.  Moody’s Investor Services ratings are used for 
comparison.  The results of the authors’ methodology and Moody’s ratings without the 
management variable are highly correlated (0.85), however, adding management to the analysis 
increases the correlation of their ratings with those of Moody’s (0.92).  Although this study uses 
a small sample of large cities, their results are consistent with the broad range of factors 
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described by Moody’s as determinants of bond ratings, and appear to confirm that the quality of 
management in government does influence ratings. 
 
Hackworth, (2002) contends that a number of interrelated developments since the 1980’s 
have increased the influence of rating agencies on the management of local government. There is 
a direct correlation between increased municipal debt, the decrease in federal funding for 
programs and a specific increase in unfunded federal mandates to deal with social problems.  
This has left local governments to fund requirements by incurring debt.  As a consequence the 
bond market, to include rating agencies, has become more influential.  A corresponding 
development has been the expectation that local governments become more entrepreneurial and 
behave like businesses.  Hackworth suggests that bond ratings are based on a municipality’s 
financial history, economic outlook and administrative structure and history (whether there is a 
history of mismanagement).  Therefore, city managers are compelled to keep expenses low and 
revenues high to maintain a positive bond rating.  Also, because credit reports are based on 
overall patterns of fiscal decision-making and economic health, even services not funded through 
municipal bonds, such as payroll, are affected by the decision of bond rating agencies.  Using the 
examples of New York City, Philadelphia and Detroit, the author convincingly demonstrates 
how the rating agencies exert pressure on local governments, associating higher bond ratings 
with cutbacks in the government workforce, budget cuts, wage freezes, restructuring and 
reducing the influence of labor unions.  In a short time these cities were disciplined into 
becoming more entrepreneurial and their bond ratings improved.  This article suggests that not 
only is management an important determinant of bond ratings, but the rating may determine the 
overall scope of local government, to include its management practices. 
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Zhao, & Yan, (2006) explore the possible relationship between managerial factors and 
Standard and Poor’s ratings of school district bonds.  Using the data of 465 Texas independent 
school districts that received ratings on their GO bonds, the study examines whether and how 
personnel turnover, and education performance, as proxies for management quality, have been 
incorporated by Standard and Poor’s in evaluating school districts’ credit quality.  After 
controlling for socio-demographic, debt, and financial factors that are typically used in credit 
analysis, the study finds that personnel turnover and education performance have significant 
effects on school district bond ratings.   
 
Risk and the Municipal Bond Market 
Overall, municipal bonds, relative to other securities, have come to be regarded as safe 
investments with limited risk for default (Lamb & Rappaport, 1987).  Woodell et al. (2004) 
tracked the behavior of Standard & Poor’s based on un-enhanced rated debt obligations from 
1986 through 2003 and concluded that “…The U.S. public finance market has traditionally 
possessed significant stability and sound credit characteristics.” (p.49).  They found defaults to 
be nearly negligible during this period.  The analysis of rating changes was limited to whole 
rating categories (AAA, AA, A, BBB etc.), comparing ratings at the beginning of the year with 
ratings at the end, without numerical and symbolic descriptors (e.g. 1, 2, 3 or +/-) or fluctuations 
between these descriptors throughout the year.  Their figures show movement among whole 
ratings each year however they are relatively stable.  For example, of the 84 bonds receiving 
AAA initial ratings (beginning of the year) in 2000, 87 percent (or 73 bonds) ended the year with 
AAA ratings with the others being downgraded to AA or A (or were not rated by the end of the 
year); of the 4,078 bonds receiving A ratings in 2000, 92 percent (or 3,752 bonds) retained the 
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rating at the end of the year with 5 percent (or 203 bonds) upgraded to AA, .04 percent (or 167 
bond) downgraded to BBB and 2 percent (or 82 bonds) not rated.   Viewing the ratings in this 
manner shows an apparent stability over time.  This along with the seemingly low risk of default 
would represent a fairly stable environment.    
However, Lamb & Rappaport (1987) point out that the bond market fluctuates 
considerably in response to a range of factors and that investing in municipal bonds is not 
without risk.   In a market with over 1 million issues compared to 13,450 corporate issues (US 
Security and Exchange Commission, 2004), municipal bond ratings are important in a number of 
ways.  Ratings act as signals of credit quality (as opposed to unrated bonds) in a crowded market 
and determine the net interest borrowing costs for the issuer.  Small changes in credit ratings 
(moving up or down as whole ratings or by adding numbers or symbols) jolt the market as they 
determine the price of the bonds (Lamb & Rappaport 1987).    Ratings may also determine the 
market for a bond issue, as institutional investors may be limited to buying bonds of a specified 
quality (Lamb & Rappaport, 1987).   
In the municipal bond market, the power of the rating agencies cannot be overestimated.  
Their ratings reflect the element of risk associated with investing in the municipal bond market.  
In addition, they rate the insurance firms that insure municipal bonds.  The increasing reliance on 
local debt to fund essential programs and services with fewer federal dollars available to 
municipalities results in the assumption of a level of risk by both local governments and 
investors.  Following is a discussion of the emergence of bond insurance as an enhancement of 
municipal bonds designed to reduce risk for investors, while generating revenue for 
municipalities. 
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Municipal Bond Insurance  
The most prevalent credit enhancement for municipal bonds is private bond insurance 
(Justice & Simon, 2002).  Insurance policies on municipal bonds are irrevocable agreements by 
insurance companies for the life of a bond issue.  In return for a one-time premium paid on the 
issue date of the bond, the insurer guarantees to pay the individual bondholder (or investor) 
according to the original schedule of payments that the bond issuer (municipality) has to make, 
and ensures the timely payment of principal and interest to bondholders in the event of a default 
or until the debt is retired (Amagoh, 1999; Fabozzi, 2002; Justice & Simon, 2002; Quigley & 
Rubinfeld, 1991; Kidwell et al., 1987).  
Since its inception in 1971, the trend for purchasing private municipal bond insurance 
coverage has steadily increased.  Approximately 50 percent of municipal bonds were insured in 
2002 and 2005 (Fabozzi, 2002; Hildreth & Zorn, 2005).  The growth in popularity of bond 
insurance is attributed to increased investor risk aversion following the 1975 default of New 
York City, the default of $2.25 billion in revenue bonds in 1983 by Washington Public Power 
Supply System, and the decision by Moody’s Investor Services in 1984 to join Standard & 
Poor’s in assigning ratings to bonds based on the insurance company credit worthiness as 
opposed to the “underlying,” or un-enhanced municipality credit worthiness (Justice & Simon, 
2002; Amagoh, 1999).  The four major municipal bond insurers - the Financial Guarantee 
Insurance Company (FGIC), Municipal Bond Investors Assurance Corporation (MBIA), 
Financial Security Assurance, Inc. (FSA) and AMBAC Indemnity Corporation - are all rated 
AAA by Standard & Poor’s and Aaa by Moody’s (Hallacy, 2005).  Therefore, these are the 
ratings assigned to the bond issues once insured regardless of their “underlying” rating.  Bond 
insurance, with few exceptions, increases the rating of the issue.  As Faerber (2001) points out, 
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insured bonds are given the highest rating even though the rating may be lower without 
insurance; uninsured bonds with high ratings can be stronger offerings than insured bonds at the 
highest rating; and the quality of the insurance company directly affects the rating (p. 104).     
Private bond insurance substitutes the insurance firm’s ability to pay for the 
municipality’s or issuer’s ability to pay, therefore, the purchase of insurance from one of the four 
largest firms buys the bond the firm’s high rating (AAA/Aaa).  Essentially, the bond insurer 
“rents” the AAA rating to the bond issuer in exchange for a premium.  This represents the most 
obvious benefit for a municipality to purchase private insurance, as there is a disproportionate 
demand by investors for AAA rated bonds (Hildreth & Zorn, 2005).    
The insured bond with an AAA/Aaa rated insurance firm responds to most risk 
considerations on the part of potential investors as the insurance firm assesses a municipality’s 
ability and willingness to pay in much the same manner as the rating agencies arrive at a 
municipality’s un-enhanced rating (e.g. uninsured or underlying rating). Based on this 
evaluation, the insurer charges the municipality an appropriate premium. Independent rating 
agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch) subject bond insurers to a stringent depression 
scenario test before awarded them an AAA rating (Hildreth & Zorn, 2005).  Therefore, the high 
ratings assigned to insurance companies testify to the confidence of rating agencies that investor 
risk is limited (Justice & Simon, 2002).  Given that approximately half of municipal bonds 
issued are insured, the credit worthiness of the insurance firm and its rating are important 
influences on the bond market.  Therefore, the loss of an AAA rating for a bond insurance firm 
would be a major calamity for the bond market (Quigley & Rubinfeld, 1991). 
 
 84
Reasons to Purchase Private Insurance 
 There are a number of benefits and motivations for buying bond insurance, aside from the 
obvious risk reduction benefit of the irrevocable guarantee to pay investors according to the 
issuer’s original debt agreement.  One indirect and internal benefit is the improved investor and 
rating agency perceptions of a municipality’s financial conditions and management practices 
resulting from an insurance firm’s evaluation of credit worthiness (Justice & Simon, 2002).  In 
addition, there are thought to be a number of other possible factors contributing to decisions to 
buy bond insurance (Hildreth & Zorn, 2005; Justice & Simon, 2002; Peng, 2002; Thau, 2000; 
Quigley & Rubinfeld, 1991; Kidwell et al., 1987; Lamb & Rappaport, 1987; Thakor, 1982): 
1. There is increased visibility and more guaranteed access to the credit market for 
municipalities with sub-AAA un-enhanced ratings and for small issuers unfamiliar to 
investors.  Also, the high rated insurance guaranteed bond is more easily marketed to 
investors. 
2. The higher insured credit rating translates into a lower interest cost for borrowing.   
This is considered by many to be one of the most important incentives for insuring 
municipal bonds.  The purchase of the insurer’s AAA rating by a municipality for a 
bond issue can lower borrowing costs to a level that outweighs the cost of the 
insurance premium.  This rational approach to purchasing bond insurance contrasts 
with the motivations associated with the “stewardship ethic,” which Justice & Simon 
(2002) point out is a prevailing norm among public managers.  This norm results in 
the tendency to purchase insurance regardless of whether the benefits from lower 
interest rates justify the premium cost of the insurance.  They point out that this norm 
reflects an aversion to risk among many public managers, particularly those in highly 
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rated municipalities where the relative certainty of acceptable interest costs and 
secure marketability of their bonds are valued more highly than the benefits of lower 
borrowing costs. 
3. Bond insurance enhances the “risk-reward” characteristics for the investor. The 
insurer, in the event of a default, assumes the risk, and payments to the investor are 
guaranteed throughout the life of the debt issue.    
4. Bond insurance provides an informational function by signaling the market about the 
credit analysis of a bond issue.  All participants in the bond market do not have the 
same information about issuer credit worthiness or the resources to conduct such 
research about each bond issue.  It can be assumed only the issuers know the most 
about their capacities to repay debt obligations.  Insurance companies can conduct a 
credit analysis of an issuer to obtain this information more effectively and at a lower 
cost than most potential investors.  An insured bond provides information by 
signaling the market that a credit analysis has been completed and those with the 
lowest insurance premium signal they have the lowest default risk.  Either way, the 
insured issuer likely has the capacity to fulfill it obligations.  For some issuers the 
informational function of bond insurance serves as a method for marketing the bond 
to investors. 
 
Significance of the “Underlying Rating” 
Peng (2002) points out that while bond insurance addresses the information asymmetry 
problems by improving investors’ awareness of the true credit quality of issuers, the fact that so 
many bonds are being insured creates an information problem of its own, namely the “lemons 
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problem.”  Akerlof’s (1970) classic example of a lemons problem addressed the used car market.  
In this case, buyers don’t know the actual quality of a car but sellers do.  To protect themselves, 
buyers assume the cars are not of good quality, which affects prices in terms of what they are 
willing to pay based on the perception that the cars are of poor quality or “lemons.”   With more 
municipal bonds being insured, investors may become more concerned about the long-term 
probability of default on the part of both bond insurer and issuer in the event of a severe 
economic downturn or resulting from a natural disaster as was the case following Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992 (Baron, 1998). There is a fear that insurance firms may not be able to assume 
the debt when a large number of issuers default at the same time.  Since in many cases investors 
do not know the underlying ratings of insured bonds, it may be logical for them to assume the 
worst underlying ratings exist for these bonds.  According to Justice & Simon (2002) there is 
considerable evidence that the benefits of insurance to an issuer increase as the underlying credit 
quality of a bond issue decreases (p. 125).  Therefore, this situation creates incentive for issuers, 
especially issuers with non-speculative underlying ratings of BBB or higher, to have their 
underlying ratings conveyed to investors who can then more accurately assess the default risk 
(Peng, 2002).   
The issuance of a Standard & Poor’s “underlying rating” of a municipality, or SPUR, 
represents a self correction in the municipal bond market to address this asymmetrical 
information problem.  Although a bond may be insured and be rated AAA, the SPUR provides 
information to potential investors on the underlying credit quality of the municipality as opposed 
to the insurance company.  Investors can then decide whether to settle for a lower yield (or rate 
of return [Lamb & Rappaport, 1987]), on a bond with less risk, or higher yield with greater risk. 
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This is especially significant in the municipal bond market where one-third of the bonds are 
purchased directly by individual investors (Peng, 2002). 
This information problem began to grow as bond insurance became more common and 
when Moody’s Investor Services joined Standard & Poor’s in 1984 and began issuing insured 
ratings based on the evaluation of the insurance companies.  Standard & Poor’s now releases 
SPUR ratings only on the request of the issuer, which puts the decision to enhance information 
about credit quality on the issuer or municipality.  Although Moody’s Investor Services also 
assigns unsolicited underlying ratings to some insured bonds, it is Standard & Poor’s who 
provides this service on a systematic basis with concurrence from the issuer (Peng, 2002).   
There can be a number of reasons for a decision to not request a SPUR rating from 
Standard & Poor’s.  A number of municipalities may request bond ratings only from Moody’s 
Investor Services or a highly rated and well known municipality operating on a “stewardship 
ethic” (see above) may not be as concerned with this information problem as less well known 
municipalities.  Another possibility is those municipalities with unacknowledged poor or 
deteriorating credit quality and poor management practices can still receive AAA insured ratings 
on their bonds (or “lemons”).  However, the possibility that a municipality can obtain insurance 
on a “lemon” seems remote for two reasons: (1) the level of scrutiny by the insurance company 
involved in a decision to insure or not to insure a bond; and (2) the level of scrutiny in rating 
agency evaluations of insurance companies to determine their AAA ratings.   
The relative stability of the U.S. municipal bond market and the unlikely event of default, 
particularly among tax based or general obligation bond issues, are well documented (Woodell, 
et al., 2004).  However, this market is not without risk or bonds would not be insured and rating 
agencies would not assign ratings to municipalities and insurance firms.  Economic downturns 
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associated with catastrophic events that can negatively impact insurance companies cannot 
always be controlled.  Poor management practices, either concealed or internal controls bypassed 
for entrepreneurial reasons as occurred in the bankruptcy of Orange County, California in 1994 
(Kearns, 1995; Larkin, 2001), can be missed or misinterpreted by both rating agencies and 
insurance firms.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study proposes using secondary resources to explore relationships between HRM 
practices focused on quality, commitment and flexibility identified in the literature, and the 
performance of municipalities based on the governmental level outcome of municipal bond 
rating.  Using secondary data has a number of advantages, as opposed to using primary data 
where survey responses are directly obtained from participants,.  According to Castle (2003) 
secondary analysis of survey data originally conducted by others for different purposes can often 
be analyzed from another perspective, and has the advantages of being relatively inexpensive, 
easy to obtain and analyzed in less time.  Also, the large samples often available from secondary 
sources can be advantageous.  Obtaining samples of comparable size directly from respondents 
can be cost prohibitive.   
 While the advantages of using secondary data provide an attractive research option, there 
are a number of limitations.  The survey instrument and response categories are inherited.  
Therefore, sufficient and appropriate questions and responses are needed in order to allow for an 
analysis of the data to answer the research question in the proposed study.  In addition, Dillman 
(2000) points out a number of errors inherent in survey research, which can be carried over into 
the secondary analysis:  
 
1.  Sampling error.  Sampling error occurs when only some, not all, elements of the 
survey population respond.  When a low number of survey subjects respond (low 
response rate) the external validity of the study is affected as it makes it more difficult for 
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the researcher(s) to generalize the results to a greater population.  Babbie (1973) suggests 
a 50 percent response rate, as a rough guide, is acceptable.   
 
2.  Coverage error.  Coverage error occurs as a result of not allowing all members of a 
survey population an equal chance of responding.  A telephone sample, where a 
significant percentage of the survey population (e.g. a city) has unlisted numbers, or uses 
cell phones would not be given an equal chance of responding.  A coverage error would 
affect the external validity of a study. 
 
3.  Measurement error.  Measurement error is the result of poor question wording on a 
survey instrument or questions being presented in such a way as to solicit inaccurate or 
ambiguous responses.  Nearly all survey instruments and studies have a degree of 
measurement error, as instruments are never perfect (Vogt, 1999).  However, through 
careful design and implementation, measurement errors can be reduced to an acceptable 
level for analysis. 
 
4. Non-response error.  A non-response error refers to the differences among people 
who do respond to a survey and those, within the sampled group, who do not respond in a 
way relevant to the study.  Those not responding may have significantly different 
characteristics from those who do respond.  This potentially introduces a bias in the 
survey, which needs to be acknowledged. 
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Research Question 
 
Are there differences in HRM practices among municipalities that contribute to high 
performance as measured by local government outcomes? 
 
Hypotheses 
To address this question management practices identified in the literature as relating to 
high performance are grouped under the three HRM outcome dimensions identified by Guest 
(1997) in applying expectancy theory to the development of a high performing workforce: 
quality, commitment and flexibility.  These practices are viewed as holding promise for being 
effective in accessing the human capital pool of an organization, and generating individual and 
collective action toward mutually shared goals and objectives.  Specific practices under these 
dimensions are limited to those where measurements can be developed using the secondary data 
available for this study.  This forms the basis for predicting their presence or absence in 
municipalities to be identified as high and low performing based on the performance outcome of 
uninsured municipal general obligation bond rating.  Twelve hypotheses are developed and listed 
below under each HRM outcome dimension.  In all cases performance is the dependent variable 
and independent variables are italicized: 
 
Quality 
 Quality can be defined as “Having a high degree of excellence” (Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary; American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language).  In terms of HRM it 
can refer to those actions taken by an organization initially to acquire people with high levels of 
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skills and abilities and to continue to develop them once selected.  Intensive recruiting that 
provides a large pool of qualified applicants (Huselid, 1995; McDuffie, 1995; Popovich, 1998), 
careful selection with a reliable and valid regimen (Huselid, 1995; McDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997; 
Popovich, 1998), streamlining selection methods (MacDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997; Popovich, 
1998), high investments in training and development (Arthur, 1992; Pfeffer, 1994; Huselid, 
1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Kling, 1995; Guest, 1997; Popovich, 1998) are viewed as HRM 
practices that help acquire and maintain a high quality staff.  The quality dimension of HRM is 
the source for the following hypotheses: 
 
1. Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the 
applicant pool are more likely to be high performing than those using fewer methods.  
2. Municipalities using a greater number of selection criteria are more likely to be high 
performing than those using fewer. 
3. Municipalities using a streamlined selection process are more likely to be high 
performing than those without a streamlined process. 
4. Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house training 
programs are more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer.   
 
Commitment 
 Commitment is defined as “…an agreement or pledge to do something in the future… the 
state or an instance of being obligated or emotionally impelled” (Merriam-Webster Online, 
retrieved December 18, 2004), or “…loyal and willing to give your time and energy to 
something that you believe in” (Cambridge International Dictionary of English, retrieved on 
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December 18, 2004).  Guest (1997) defines commitment as the identification with, and a desire 
to belong to an organization.  It follows that those HRM practices associated with engendering 
loyalty, contributing to high motivation and increased effort would be most associated with high 
performance.  Practices of this kind would include providing high levels of benefits (Arthur, 
1992) and high levels of benefits often termed “work-family benefits” (Kling, 1995).   
As suggested by public choice theory and others, a solution to the problem of 
bureaucratic performance and a lack of competition in government would be to link pay with 
performance (Self, 1993; Pfeffer, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997; 
Popovich, 1998, Kling, 1995).  Also, involving people in appraising their performance based on 
standards (Huselid, 1995; West et al., 2003) promoting from within (Pfeffer, 1994; Guest, 1997) 
and encouraging a high degree of employee participation (Arthur, 1992; Pfeffer, 1994; Huselid, 
1995; MacDuffie, 1995, Kling, 1995; Guest, 1997) are thought to contribute to commitment. The 
dimension of commitment clearly points to actions reflecting its reciprocal nature; both on the 
part of employee and organization, and form the basis for the following hypotheses: 
 
5. Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees are more likely to 
be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
6. Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits to employees are 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer. 
7. Municipalities with pay for performance programs are more likely to be high      
performing than those without these programs.   
8. Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance standards 
are more likely to be high performing than those where employees are not involved.  
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Flexibility 
 Flexibility is characterized by a ready capability to adapt to new, different, or changing 
requirements (Merriam-Webster).  Management characteristics associated with flexibility would 
include those that offer people wide latitude for expanding their role in the workplace thereby 
creating opportunities for discretionary action in applying their problem solving skills.   
Opportunities for expanding roles in the workplace involve high levels of communication, 
information sharing and involvement (Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Arthur, 1992: MacDuffie, 
1995; Popovich, 1998; Guest, 1997).  Public choice theory and others suggest that one solution 
to problems associated with bureaucratic size and complexity is decentralized decision-making 
(Pfeffer, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997; Popovich, 1998).  Applying problem-solving 
skills are made possible through team working and group participation (Arthur, 1992; Pfeffer, 
1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Popovich, 1998; West et al., 2003; Guest, 1997; 
Ichniowski et al., 1997) and through flexible job design and work practices (Guest, 1997) 
including job sharing (Pfeffer, 1994, Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995), and telecommuting 
(Arthur, 1992; Kling, 1995).  The flexibility dimension of HRM forms the basis for the following 
hypotheses: 
 
9. Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices are more likely to 
be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
10. Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices are more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
11. Municipalities with a greater number of established communication processes for 
employees are more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
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12. Municipalities providing incentives for group participation are more likely to be high 
performing than those that do not. 
 
Description of the Data Set 
In 1999, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) mailed a cross-
sectional human resources functions survey entitled Local Government Human Resource 
Functions 2000 to a sampling frame of all 2,885 local governments in the U.S. supporting 
populations of 10,000 or more.  A cross-sectional study is designed to examine characteristics of 
a portion of a population at a given point in time (Babbie, 1973, 1998; Vogt, 1999).   The units of 
analysis in this survey were: (1) local governments supporting populations of 10,000 or more; 
and (2) human resource functions deployed.  U.S. Census 1990 data were used to identify the 
local governments.1  Local governments included in this mailing were defined as: 
 
• All U.S. municipalities/incorporated places and independent cities;   
• City-county consolidations that function as city governments; and  
• Counties as defined by Census Bureau plus city-county consolidations that function 
as county governments   
 
Of those surveyed, 1,312 (45.5 percent) local governments responded to the survey.  Survey 
results in terms of population, regions and response rates are depicted below: 
 
 
                                                 
1 In this study all municipality population figures were updated using US Census 2000 for the data analysis. 
 96
Table 1: ICMA Survey Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A response rate for this survey of 45.5 percent may be considered relatively high, as 
access to organizations (in contrast with individuals) is more difficult to gain (West et al., 2002).  
Regardless, the data is certainly useful as there is evidence to suggest that surveys with low 
response rates, in some cases, may be more accurate than those with high response rates 
(Krosnick, 1999).   Though it can be argued that this is a respectable response rate, due to a level 
of sampling error the external validity of the study findings may be somewhat limited.  
 
No. of  
municipalities 
surveyed 
     
No.  
responding  
                      % 
Total 
                
2,885  
       
1,312  45.5% 
    
Population group    
   Over 1,000,000 
                     
10  
              
4  40.0% 
   500,000-1,000,000 
                     
17  
              
8  47.1% 
   250,000-499,999 
                     
38  
            
26  68.4% 
   100,000-249,999 
                   
139  
            
69  49.6% 
   50,000-99,999 
                   
352  
          
189  53.7% 
   25,000-49,999 
                   
682  
          
345  50.6% 
   10,000-24,999 
                
1,647  
          
671  40.7% 
     
 
 
Geographic region    
   Northeast 
                   
800  
          
231  28.9% 
   North-Central 
                   
811  
          
380  46.9% 
   South 
                   
736  
          
394  53.5% 
   West 
                   
538  
          
307  57.1% 
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Representation 
 Babbie (1998) suggests a sample can be considered representative of the population from 
which it is selected if the aggregate characteristics of the sample closely approximate those same 
aggregate characteristics in the population.  He also points out that a sample need not be 
representative in all respects.  Probability, or random, sampling provides the greatest possibility 
for representation as all members of the population have an equal chance of selection.  The 
ICMA sample was a non-random sample drawn from a census of all cities in the U.S. with 
populations over 10,000.  In addition to sampling and non-response errors inherent in the survey 
methodology, being non-random its external validity (whether its findings can be generalized to 
the larger population with a high level of confidence) is weakened.  In this case, being able to 
generalize survey findings to the larger population in the census depends partially on how 
representative the sample is of the population.  The demographic representation of the ICMA 
sample in terms of population groups and regions is displayed below: 
Table 2: Level of Representation in ICMA Survey 
*NE: CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT.  NC: IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI.   
S: AL, AR, DE, DC,  FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WVA.   
W: AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY.    
 
The above comparison suggests the ICMA sample is fairly representative in terms of population 
group and region.  The largest variance is a nearly six-percentage point under-representation for 
Population Group Percentage of Total Surveyed  Percentage Responding Difference 
(+/-) 
Over 1,000,000 0.35 0.30 -0.05 
500,000 – 1,000,000 0.58 0.60 +0.20 
250,000 – 499,999 1.32 1.98 +0.66 
100,000 – 249,999 4.81 5.25 +0.44 
  50,000 –   99,000 12.20 14.40 +2.20 
  25,000 –   49,000 23.63 26.29 +2.66 
  10,000 –   24,999 57.08 51.14 -5.94 
Region*    
Northeast (NE) 27.72 17.61 -10.11 
North – Central (NC) 28.11 28.96 +0.85 
South (S) 25.51 30.03 +4.52 
West (W) 18.65 23.34 +4.69 
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the population group 10,000 – 24,999 and a 10-percentage point under-representation for 
respondents in the Northeast region.   
 
 
The ICMA survey instrument consists of 32 questions.  The Executive Director signed 
the transmittal memorandum addressed to local government Human Resource Directors.  The 
time frame for completion was three weeks and there was one follow up request to non-
respondents.  The questionnaire focuses on human resource functions in non-specialized areas.  
Specialized areas that often have unique human resource practices were excluded from the 
survey with the following statement positioned at the beginning of the questionnaire: 
 
When answering this questionnaire, please exclude any programs, policies, or procedures 
that apply solely to police, fire, education, or court personnel. 
 
Questions in the survey instrument are a mixture of close-ended categorical questions 
(yes/no), partially close-ended questions with unordered response categories (Dillman, 2000), 
contingency questions (Babbie, 1973) and open-ended questions.  The number of each type of 
question and samples are illustrated below: 
 
Figure 6: Sample Questions by Type 
Close-ended categorical: (seven questions). Does your local government include both supervisors 
and employees in the development of 
performance standards?  
 
a. Yes       b. No  
 
Partially close-ended with unordered response 
categories: (13 questions) 
Does your local government offer any of the 
following nonmonetary performance incentives?  
  Survey Instrument 
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a. Lunch with the manager/CAO  
b. Certificates of appreciation/employee awards  
c. Recognition in a newsletter  
d. Other (Please 
specify.)____________________________________ 
Contingency: (8 questions) Does your local government have a formal 
performance appraisal system?  
 
a. No (If “no,” go to question 21.   b. Yes.  
 
If “yes,” please indicate which of the following 
techniques are used as part of the system. (Check all 
applicable.)  
a. Forced-choice forms   
b. Performance in critical events 
c. Interviews  
d. Special management appraisals  
e. Appraisal by objectives  
f. Self-appraisal  
g. Written performance standards consistent with 
duties and responsibilities covered in employees’ job 
descriptions  
h. Interim appraisal of job performance  
i. Peer review  
j. Review of supervisor by staff (upward appraisal)  
k. Other (Please 
specify.)___________________________________ 
 
Open-ended: (four questions) What are the major human resources issues facing 
your local government 
today?___________________________________ 
     
 
Linking HRM Dimension, Independent Variables and Survey Questions 
Based on a review of the literature, the human resource management performance 
dimensions and hypotheses developed earlier for establishing relationships between practices and 
performance are listed below with the corresponding independent variables and measures in the 
ICMA survey.  The structure of the questions and response options limit the analysis to those 
used in the original survey.  This represents a limitation found in the use of secondary data 
analysis, which is shared in this study. 
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Hypothesis 1: Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the 
applicant pool are more likely to be high performing than those using fewer methods.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Municipalities using a greater number of selection criteria are more likely to be 
high performing than those using fewer. 
    
Selection 
Criteria 
 
The greatest 
number of 
criteria & 
tests used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HRM Performance Dimension:  Quality 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Measure 
 
Question 
Recruitment 
Intensity 
 
The greater 
the number 
of sources 
and methods 
used. 
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Hypothesis 3: Municipalities using streamlined selection process are more likely to be high 
performing than those without a streamlined process. 
 
Streamlined 
Selection 
Absence 
of the 
“rule of 
n.” 
 
Line 
Manager 
Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house training 
programs are more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
Training Training 
offered 
Mandatory
/in-house 
 
 
 
 
HRM Performance Dimension: Commitment 
 
Hypothesis 5: Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees are more likely 
to be high performing than those offering fewer benefits.  
Hypothesis 6: Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits to employees are 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer work-family benefits. 
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Extensive 
Benefits 
Number 
of 
benefits 
offered. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 7: Municipalities with pay for performance programs are more likely to be high 
performing than those without these programs.  
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Hypothesis 8: Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance 
standards are more likely to be high performing than those where employees are not involved. 
Employee 
involvement  
Establishing 
performance 
standards  
 
 
 
HRM Performance Dimension: Flexibility 
 
Hypothesis 9: Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices are more likely 
to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
Flexible 
work  
practices 
Flexible work 
hours 
 
Job sharing 
 
Telecommuting 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 10: Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices are more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
Pay for 
performance 
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Hypothesis 11: Municipalities with a greater number of established communication processes for 
employees are more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
Communication 
 
Number 
of 
processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decentralization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Functions 
decentralized to 
line 
departments. 
Selection 
of 1b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection 
of 3Ac. 
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Hypothesis 12: Municipalities providing incentives for group participation are more likely to be 
high performing than those that do not. 
Group 
participation 
Number 
of 
incentives 
 
 
 
Study Sample 
 As the purpose of this study is to explore possible relationships between human resource 
management practices and organization level performance, a purposive sample was drawn from 
the ICMA respondents based on the criterion of municipal bond rating as a measure of 
performance.  A purposive sample is a form of non-probability sampling and can be based on the 
study of a subset of a larger population using a specific criterion (Babbie, 1998).  For the 
following reasons, a purposive sample of ICMA respondents based on the criteria of uninsured 
municipal bond rating and SPUR was necessary in order to analyze the relationship between 
municipal bond ratings as a measure of performance, and the types of human resource 
management practices deployed by local governments: 
 
1. Few local government level performance outcomes can be directly attributed to 
management action and are difficult to isolate due to confounding variables. 
2. Municipal bond ratings are directly related to administration and management 
actions, and do represent a government level outcome (Hackworth, 2002; Tillman 
1993; Moon & Stotsky,1993b; Hildreth & Zorn, 2005; Lipnick, Rattner & 
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Ebrahim,1999; Standard & Poor’s, 2006; Larkin, 2001; Fitch Ratings, 2002; Fitch 
Ratings, 2004). 
3. Approximately two thirds of local government bond issues were rated by rating 
agencies in 1998 and 2002.  This reduced the size of the sample available for 
analysis. 
4. Of those bond issues rated, only un-enhanced ratings represent an assessment of 
the local government’s administration, as insured ratings are inflated to reflect the 
reliability of the insurer, not the local government. Approximately 50 percent of 
bond ratings are insured, and not all municipalities request SPUR’s, further 
reducing the size of the sample. 
5. Rating agencies incorporate economic development influences in their rating 
process making it unnecessary to control for regional/local economic factors. 
 
To arrive at a meaningful measure of local government-wide performance the sample of 
municipalities for this study was limited to ratings of un-enhanced general obligation bonds.  Un-
enhanced general obligation municipal bond ratings can be used as indicators of government 
level performance because: (1) general obligation bonds have a broader applicability to the 
overall administration and management of municipalities; and (2) being uninsured or SPUR, they 
provide a more accurate assessment by the rating agency of administrative performance 
(Fabozzi, 2002; Faerber 2001; Temel, 2001).  A sample was derived from the ICMA survey by 
examining the uninsured bond ratings and SPURs for the municipalities in the annual 
publications of Standard and Poor’s Municipal Ratings Handbook and Ratings Online, and 
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Mergent Municipal and Government Manual (Fitch is unavailable except by purchase).  By 
examining two rating agencies, the number of municipalities available for analysis was greater.   
Given that not all municipal bond issues are rated and as the search was limited to un-
enhanced ratings, this approach resulted in a sample less than the original 1,312 municipalities 
included in the ICMA survey.  Insured ratings were included in order to ascertain whether there 
were differences in HRM practices among this group in relation to SPURs and uninsured ratings, 
to assess the likelihood of a “lemons problem” (Peng, 2002).   
Initially, to insure an adequate number of municipalities were obtained for analysis, the 
search was widened beyond those issued in 1999.  The search for insured ratings, uninsured 
ratings and SPURs, included those issued two years prior (1997, 1998) and two years after 
(2000, 2001).  This yielded a total of 608 municipalities.  The assumption for examining this 
range of years was municipalities in the sample would have their reported 1999 HRM practices 
in place for those time periods.  The decision was made to eliminate ratings for years 1997 and 
1998 from the analysis to coincide with the administration and analysis of the ICMA Survey. 
 
Protocol Used for Selecting Sample Bond Ratings 
The search for general obligation bond ratings included all 1,312 municipalities 
responding to the ICMA survey.  The following documented listings were reviewed: 
 
• Standard and Poor’s Municipal Ratings Handbook, December 1999. 
• Mergent Municipal and Government Manual, 1999, 2001. 
• Standard & Poor’s Ratings Online http://www2.standardandpoors.com/ 
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Municipal bond issue ratings were recorded as follows: 
1.  Standard & Poor’s: Resources consulted – S&P Municipal Ratings Handbook, 1999 
& S&P Ratings Online.   
a. Ratings recorded:  
1) “Current” or insured.   
2) “SPUR” or Standard and Poor’s Underlying Rating.  Not all listings 
receive both categories of ratings, as the municipalities must request 
a SPUR rating (Standard and Poor’s Rating Definitions, 2002).  A 
“SPUR” rating is defined by Standard and Poor’s as:  
“…a rating of a stand-alone capacity of an issue to pay debt service on a credit-enhanced 
debt issue, without giving effect to the enhancement that applies to it. These ratings are 
published only at the request of the debt issuer/obligor with the designation SPUR to 
distinguish them from the credit-enhanced rating that applies to the debt issue. As long as 
the SPUR rating is outstanding, Standard & Poor's will maintain surveillance of the 
issue” (p. 64).  Further, a “stand alone rating” is defined as: “… the rating that would 
likely be achieved in the absence of constraint or enhancement by a third party (parent, 
subsidiary, guarantor, or government entity)” (p. 64). 
b. Initially, all ratings (current insured, uninsured and SPUR) were recorded.    
There were a total of 409 municipalities in the ICMA sample rated by 
Standard and Poor’s.  Of these, 91 were listed with insured rating only, 224 
received a SPUR rating and 94 received an uninsured “current” rating. 
c. Where only insured general obligation bonds were rated, municipalities were 
coded I (insured). 
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2. Second, Mergent Municipal and Government Manual ratings for 1999 and 2001 were 
consulted. 
a. Insured general obligation bonds are annotated by Mergent with the insurance 
company name.  These bonds were rated Aaa.  Ratings without annotation 
were uninsured. 
b. There were a total of 199 municipalities listed by Mergent in all categories 
(insured, general obligation bonds not rated and uninsured).  Of these, there 
were 52 insured and 147 uninsured ratings.  
c. Where only insured general obligation bonds were rated, municipalities were 
coded I (insured). 
3. For those municipalities rated by both agencies any differences in ratings were 
resolved as follows: 
a. For those rated with different years, the rating closest to 1999 was selected. 
b. For those with differing ratings for the same year, the highest rating was 
selected. 
c. For those where one agency listed only an insured rating and the other listed 
an uninsured rating (or SPUR), the uninsured rating (or SPUR) was selected 
for the sample. 
d. If one or both agencies listed an insured rating, without a corresponding 
SPUR or uninsured rating, the insured rating was included in the sample. 
 
  For bond ratings issued from 1997 – 2001, 608 usable ratings were found.  The results are 
summarized in the following table: 
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Table 3: Municipal Bond Rating Review Results 
1997-2001 Insured & Un-enhanced 
 
Rating Agency 
 
Insured Ratings 
Un-enhanced Ratings 
Uninsured       SPUR 
 
Total 
Agency 
Ratings 
 
Standard & Poor’s 
 
91 
 
94 
 
 
224 
 
 
409 
 
Mergent’s 
 
52 
 
147 
 
-- 
 
199 
 
 
Total Ratings 
 
143 
 
241 
 
224 
 
608 
 
 Limiting the sample further to include bond ratings issued for only 1999-2001 better 
corresponds with the administration of the ICMA survey.  Including 2001 in the analysis 
assumes that practices reported in 1999 and 2000 were still in place.  This is a stronger argument 
than including ratings issued three years prior to the survey.  Limiting the sample to 1999-2001 
strengthens possible relationships between HRM practices and bond rating by eliminating the 
assumption that practices in place the prior two - three years would still be in place during the 
survey and evaluation years.  This represented a weakness for this study.  Limiting the sample to 
1999-2001 results in the following: 
Table 4: Municipal Bond Rating Review Results 
1999-2001 
 
Rating Agency 
 
Insured Ratings 
Un-enhanced Ratings 
Uninsured       SPUR 
 
Total Agency Ratings 
 
Standard & Poor’s 
 
28 
 
79 
 
 
210 
 
 
317  
 
Mergent’s 
 
26 
 
77 
 
-- 
 
103   
 
 
Total Ratings 
 
54 
 
 156 
 
210 
 
420  
 
Considering that insured ratings are not a good indicator of municipality credit 
worthiness the sample needs to be limited to un-enhanced ratings.  This further reduces the 
sample to 366 cases: 
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Table 5: Municipal Bond Ratings Sample 
Un-enhanced 1999-2001 
 
Rating Agency 
Un-enhanced Ratings 
Uninsured       SPUR 
 
Total Agency Ratings 
 
Standard & Poor’s 
 
79 
 
 
210 
 
 
289  
 
Mergent’s 
 
77 
 
-- 
 
77   
 
 
Total Ratings 
 
 156 
 
210 
 
366  
  
A summary of reductions in the sample are depicted below: 
 
 
Table 6: Summary Sample Reduction 
 
N 
 
Bond Rating Group 
 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
608 
 
Insured & Un-enhanced 
 
(%  Total) 
 
 
67 
 
(11.0%) 
 
121 
 
(19.9%) 
 
204 
 
(33.6%) 
 
155 
 
(25.5%) 
 
61 
 
(10.0%) 
 
420 
 
Insured & Un-enhanced Sample 
 
(%  Total) 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
203 
 
(48.3%) 
 
156 
 
(37.1%) 
 
61 
 
(14.5%) 
 
366 
 
Un-enhanced 
 
(%  Total) 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
180 
 
(49.2%) 
 
132 
 
(36.1%) 
 
54 
 
(14.8%) 
 
For comparison, Standard and Poor’s and Mergent ratings of municipalities were grouped 
using Fabozzi’s (2002) table of the agencies’ equivalent ratings based on the assessment of high, 
medium and low investment quality.  Municipalities were then rank ordered.    
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Table 7: Rank Ordering of Municipality Un-enhanced Bond Ratings  
Based on Investment Quality 1999-2001 (N = 366)2 
 
Rank 
Order 
 
Mergent’s 
Rating    Uninsured  
 
Standard & Poor’s 
Rating   Uninsured      SPUR 
 
 
Definition 
 
 
N 
 
1 
 
 
Aaa 
 
17 
 
AAA 
 
9 
 
1 
 
Highest quality 
 
27 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
 
Aa1 
 
Aa2 
 
Aa3 
 
7 
 
19 
 
21 
 
AA+ 
 
 AA 
 
 AA- 
 
13 
 
25 
 
16 
 
3 
 
15 
 
36 
 
 
High grade, high 
quality 
 
23 
 
59 
 
73 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       N= 182 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
A1 
 
A2 
 
A3 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
A+ 
 
   A 
 
A- 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
59 
 
54 
 
33 
 
 
Upper medium 
quality 
 
70 
 
63 
 
39 
 
8 
 
9 
 
Baa1 
 
Baa2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
BBB+ 
 
BBB 
 
1 
 
0 
 
5 
 
3 
 
Lower medium 
quality 
 
6 
 
3 
 
 
10 
 
 
Baa3 
 
2 
 
BBB- 
 
0 
 
1 
Lowest medium 
quality 
 
3 
                                                                                                                              N=184 
Totals - 77 - 79 210 - 366 
Rating equivalents adapted from Fabozzi, F.J.  (2002).  The handbook of financial instruments.  John Wiley 
& Sons: N.J.    
 
 
For the purposes of analyzing performance based upon bond ratings the municipalities 
can be grouped as follows: 
 
                                                 
2 No municipalities in the sample were rated below rank order #10. 
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Table 8: Grouping of Sample by High and Lower Performance  
Based on Investment Quality 
Performance Category  
Rankings 
 
N = 366 
 
Percentage of Sample 
High 1-4 182 49.7 
Lower 5-10 184 50.3 
 
The breakpoint between the two groups is the difference in the quality of the bond issue as 
reflected in the Mergent definitions above where Aaa and Aa (and Standard and Poor’s 
corresponding AAA and AA ratings) are considered high quality and ratings A and lower are 
considered medium quality.  There is a nearly even distribution between these two groups.    
 
Representation 
Drawing a sub-set of the ICMA respondents based on published uninsured municipal bond 
ratings results in a sample of 366 municipalities.  Representation of this smaller sample 
compared to the original ICMA population outlined above is shown in the following table: 
Table 9: Representation of Study Sample Compared to Survey Population (N=366) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population Group 
 
% of Total 
Surveyed 
 
% 
Study 
Sample 
(N=366 
 
Difference 
(+/-) 
Over 1,000,000 0.4 0.8 +0.4 
500,000 – 1,000,000 0.6 3.6 +3.0 
250,000 – 499,999 1.3 3.8 +2.5 
100,000 – 249,999 4.8 12.8 +8.0 
50,000 –   99,000 12.2 25.1 +12.9 
25,000 –   49,000 23.6 30.1 +6.5 
10,000 –   24,999 57.1 16.9 -40.2 
Region    
Northeast (NE) 27.7 16.1 -11.6 
North – Central (NC) 28.1 25.7 -2.4 
South (S) 25.5 36.9 +11.4 
West (W) 18.7 12.3 -6.4 
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The above figures show that the study sample is significantly under-represented in local 
governments with populations between 10,000 and 24,999 (40%) and slightly over-represented 
in those with populations between 50,000 and 99,000 (13%).  Overall, the study sample is fairly 
representative of the population but due to some response error, biased toward local governments 
supporting populations larger than 25,000.  Regionally, the study sample under represents by 
about 12% municipalities in the Northeast and over represents municipalities in the South by 
nearly the same margin. 
 
Data Analysis 
 This study is designed to determine whether one or more independent variables (HRM 
practices associated with quality, commitment and flexibility) are associated with the dependent 
variable of high or lower performance.  The research question addresses the prediction of 
municipality membership (using the set of HRM practices deployed) in either the high 
performance or lower performance group.  As the dependent variable of performance is 
dichotomized, or divided into the two categories of “high” or “low” based on municipal bond 
ratings, and most of the independent variables are categorical, logistic regression is the most 
appropriate strategy for analyzing this data set (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Hair et al., 1998; 
Vogt, 1999).   In order to build a logit model a dummy variable for performance is created.  The 
presence of high performance is coded 1 and its absence coded 0.  As appropriate, indexes are 
created for practices associated with the independent variables.   Using logistic regression 
statistical significance for each independent variable index, or categorical variable, in relation to 
the dependent variable is determined using the Wald test.  This test uses the chi-square 
distribution to determine if the coefficient on a particular variable is statistically significant.   
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Initially, municipalities with only insured ratings were compared to uninsured and SPUR 
using a global index of HRM practices to assess the likelihood of a “lemons problem.”  As these 
triple A ratings automatically fell within the high performing category based on insurance only, 
the quality of their management practices may or may not be associated with high performance.  
As explained by Peng (2002), municipalities with only insured bond ratings contribute to an 
information problem in the bond market, where the lack of an “un-enhanced” rating on an 
insured bond leaves the credit worthiness of the municipality in question.  This lack of 
information on the “true” credit quality of the municipality, coupled with the evidence that the 
benefits of insurance to an issuer increase as the underlying credit quality of a bond issue 
decreases (Justice & Simon, 2002) can lead to a “lemons” problem for insured bonds without 
underlying ratings.  The market correction to this information asymmetry has been the SPUR 
rating.  This rating, an “un-enhanced” or “uninsured” rating and a more accurate measure of 
credit quality of a municipality, is issued by Standard & Poor’s but must be initiated and made 
public by the municipality.  A municipality with only an insured rating may be assumed by 
investors to be a “lemon,” or relying solely on the triple A rating the insurance brings can imply 
the municipality may be of a lesser credit quality.   
To address this possibility, a global index of all HRM indexes, or all HRM practices, was 
constructed and an independent T test compared those municipalities in the insured group issuing 
a SPUR with those that did not.  A significant difference in the numbers of HRM practices 
between these groups suggested a lemon problem. A second independent T test examined 
differences between the un-enhanced group (SPUR and uninsured combined) and the insured 
Testing Differences Between Enhanced and Un-enhanced Ratings  
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only group.  This test justified dropping the insured only municipalities from the analysis as their 
insured triple A rating, defined in this study as high performing, was demonstrated to differ 
significantly in the direction of lower performance when compared to the un-enhanced group.   
 
Testing for Predictors of High Performance  
Two models were developed for initial testing and a six private sector models found in 
the literature were tested as well for comparison.  First, the logistic regression equation for the 
full model, or Model 1, can be depicted as follows: 
 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β3R + β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T + β8B + β9Fw + β10PP + β11I + β12D + β13C + β14G   
 
where the values of the dependent variable, performance (Per), are associated with the values of 
the independent variable regression coefficients (β) and with the constant represented as β0.   The 
control variables of population and form of government are represented as β1P and β2F.  The 
independent variables representative of the HRM dimensions are: Quality - β3R, β4E1 + β5E2, 
β6S and β7T, or recruitment intensity, expansive selection, streamlined selection and training; 
Commitment - β8B, β9Fw, β10PP and β11I, or benefits, family-work benefits, pay for performance 
and employee involvement; and Flexibility - β12D, β13C , β14G or decentralization, 
communication and group participation.   
 Model 2 substituted a job flexibility index in place of the family-work index 
included in Model 1.  These two indices were not mutually exclusive. The family-work index 
included ten variables: paid maternity leave and paternity leave (both distinct from other leave), 
funeral leave, relocation expenses, spending account for medical/child care, on site daycare, 
subsidized daycare, flexible work hours, job sharing and telecommuting. The job flexibility 
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index included: flexible work hours, job sharing and telecommuting.  The intent was to 
determine whether there was a relationship between job flexibility taken alone, and performance.  
Since the job flexibility index is a subset of the family-work index, both could not be included in 
the same model.  The equation for Model 2 is: 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β3R + β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T + β8B + β9PP + β10I + β11J + β12D + β13C+ β14G 
 
where the values of the dependent variable, performance (Per), are associated with the values of 
the independent variable regression coefficients (β) and with the constant represented as β0.   The 
control variables of population and form of government are represented as β1P and β2F.  The 
independent variables representative of the HRM dimensions are: Quality - β3R, β4E1 + β5E2  , 
β6S and β7T, or recruitment intensity, expansive selection, streamlined selection and training; 
Commitment - β8B,  β9PP and β10I, or benefits, pay for performance and employee involvement; 
and Flexibility -  β11J, β12D,  β13C and β14G or job flexibility, decentralization, group 
participation and communication.   
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 The hypotheses for this study are based on the three dimensions of HRM performance as 
reflected in the literature:  
Table 10: Hypotheses by HRM Performance Dimensions 
 
Performance 
Dimension 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
Quality 
1.    Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the    
applicant pool are more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods.  
2.    Municipalities using a greater number of selection tests/ criteria are more likely to 
be   high performing than those using fewer. 
3.    Municipalities using a streamlined selection process are more likely to be high   
performing than those without a streamlined process. 
4.    Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house   training   
programs are more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer.   
 
 
 
Commitment 
5.    Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees are more likely to 
be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
6.    Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits are more likely to 
be high performing than those offering fewer.  
7.    Municipalities with pay for performance programs are more likely to    be high 
performing than those without these programs.   
8.    Municipalities where employees are involved in developing  performance standards 
are more likely to be high performing than those where employees are not involved. 
 
 
 
 
Flexibility 
9.     Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practice are more likely 
to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
10.   Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices are more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
11.   Municipalities with a greater number of established communication processes for 
employees are more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
12.  Municipalities providing incentives for group participation are more likely to be 
high performing than those that do not. 
 
 Binary logistic regression models were used to test these hypotheses.  A dummy 
dependent variable was developed as a measure of performance based on municipal bond ratings, 
and used as the dependent variable.  Form of government and 2000 population figures were used 
as controls, and 13 indices were derived from selected questions in the ICMA survey and used as 
independent variables.    
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Table 11: Variable Definitions 
Variables Abbr. Definitions/Survey Questions 
Dependent Variable 
      Performance 
 
 
Per 
 
 
 
Dummy Variable Based on Municipal Bond Rating: 
  
• 1999/2000/2001insured/SPUR/uninsured ratings N = 420; 1 = 
High performance (n = 234); 0 = Lower performance (n = 186)  
 
• 1999/2000/2001un-enhanced ratings (SPUR/uninsured ratings) 
N=366; 1=High performance (n = 182); 0 = Lower performance 
(n=184) 
Control Variables 
     Population  
 
 
     Form of Government 
 
 
P 
 
 
F 
 
 
US Census 2000 population figures 
 
 
Dummy variable: N = 366; 1 = Council-manager (n = 257) 0 = all others 
(n = 109). 
 
 Independent Variables 
     (Quality) 
Recruitment intensity 
index. 
 
 
Selection Tests 
  
 
Selection Criteria 
      
     
     
 
 Selection/streamlining  
 
      
 Training index. 
 
     
    
(Commitment) 
Extensive benefits index. 
 
      
       
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 
 
 
 
E1 
 
 
E2 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
 
T 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey Questions: 
 
Recruitment techniques - 12a-q 
(Total: 17) 
 
 
Selection tests 13a-j (Sub-total: 10) 
(Total: 10)   
 
Selection criteria & screening methods 14a-j  
(Total: 10) 
 
 
 
Rule of “n;” 15 
(Total: 1) 
 
Diversity, ethics, in house & mandatory 30, 30a, 31, 32 
(Total: 4)  
 
 
 
Benefits - less family-work & job flexibility benefits  
17a,b, c 
17f 
17h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u 
17bb, cc 
(Total: 19) 
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Family index 
     
      
        
       
 
 
 
 
Pay for Performance 
 
 
       
Employee Involvement 
 
 
     
 
 
  (Flexibility) 
Job Flexibility 
 
     
      
 
 
       
Decentralized HR 
 
      
       
 
 
 
 
 
Communication 
 
     
        
 
Group participation 
FW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PP 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
 
 
 
 
G 
 
Benefits oriented toward balancing family-work (To be used exclusive of 
job flexibility index) 
17d, e 
17g 
17j 
17v, w, x, y, z, aa 
(Total: 10) 
. 
Linking pay with performance and offering incentives 18, 21, 23 
(Total: 3) 
 
 
 Involvement in preparing performance standards 19 
(Total: 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Flexible work hours; job sharing; telecommuting (To be used exclusive 
of Family-work index) 
17y 
17z 
17aa 
(Total: 3) 
 
Functions performed by HR vs. line managers. 
1b 
3a_c 
8a,b, c, d 
8f, g  
8i,j, k  
8o 
(Total: 12) 
 
Attitude surveys, suggestion program & labor/management committee. 
20  
29 f, h, j 
(Total: 4)  
 
Rewards for group performance, gainsharing & incentives  
24, 25, 26 
(Total: 3)  
 
 
Analysis  
 Municipalities with only insured ratings, or the “enhanced only” group were examined in 
relation to those with un-enhanced ratings (SPUR or uninsured) to determine if there were 
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significant differences between these two groups.  The research suggesting bond insurance 
creates an asymmetric information problem for the bond market without the availability of an un-
enhanced rating (Peng, 2002), and that the benefits of insurance increase as the underlying credit 
quality of a bond issue decreases (Justice & Simon, 2002) creates a potential problem for 
including municipalities with only insured bond ratings in the analysis.  As these ratings reflect 
the credit quality of the insurance company versus the municipality, to include them in the 
analysis would require their triple A ratings (high performing) be reflective of having a greater 
number, or at least as many, HRM practices in place as the un-enhanced group.  A lower number 
of practices among the enhanced only group, as compared to the un-enhanced group, would 
suggest the possibility of a “lemons” problem and would justify dropping the enhanced group 
from the analysis.  In order to test the hypothesis that the enhanced only group was in reality 
lower performing, as defined by having a lower number of HRM practices in place when 
compared to the un-enhanced group, a global index of all 94 HRM practices included in this 
analysis was created in order to compare these two groups.   
 
Testing Differences Between Enhanced and Un-enhanced Ratings 
 First, to discern whether there were differences between SPUR municipalities and the 
enhanced only group (insured) addressed the possibility, as explained by Peng (2002), that 
municipalities requesting and authorizing release of a SPUR rating are more willing to inform 
investors of the true credit quality of the municipality (and bond) than are those municipalities 
who do not.  This raised the possibility of a “lemons” problem among the enhanced only group.  
Therefore, the hypothesis tested was “municipalities obtaining and releasing a SPUR, when 
compared to municipalities with only an insured rating, will report employing a greater number 
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of HRM practices.”  An independent-samples t-test was used to determine if there was a 
significant difference between these two groups.  The global index (globind) was the test 
variable. A dummy variable coded as SPUR=1 and insured only=0 was the grouping variable. 
Table 12: Independent Samples t-test Results Comparing Insured & SPUR 
Group Statistics
54 37.5926 11.23424 1.52879
210 44.8571 11.56999 .79841
spur to insured
insured
spur
globind
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test
.220 .640 -4.139 262 .000 -7.26455 1.75510 -10.72044 -3.80866
-4.212 84.264 .000 -7.26455 1.72471 -10.69418 -3.83492
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
globind
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
 
 
The above test compares the HRM global index scores for insured-only municipalities to those 
with a SPUR for years 1999 - 2001.  There is a significant difference (7.26) in the mean global 
index values for insured (M = 37.59, SD  = 11.23) and SPUR [M  = 44.86, SD  = 11.57; t (84.26)  
=  -4.21, p  = 0.000].  It was concluded that in this sample, municipalities with SPUR employ a 
significantly greater number of HRM practices than insured-only municipalities.  This raised the 
possibility of a lemons problem among the insured-only group when compared to the SPUR 
group. 
 Second, to determine if these differences occur when comparing the insured-only (or 
enhanced) with the un-enhanced (SPUR and uninsured combined) tested the hypothesis that 
“municipalities with un-enhanced ratings, when compared to municipalities with only insured 
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ratings, will employ a greater number of HRM practices.”  An independent-samples t-test was 
used to determine if there was a significant difference between these two groups.  The global 
index (globind) is the test variable. A dummy variable coded as un-enhanced=1 and insured 
only=0 is the grouping variable. 
Table 13: Independent Samples t-test Comparing Insured & Unenhanced 
Group Statistics
54 37.5926 11.23424 1.52879
366 45.5273 11.12239 .58138
unenhanced to insured
insured
spur+uninsured
globind
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test
.047 .829 -4.888 418 .000 -7.93473 1.62346 -11.12589 -4.74357
-4.851 69.228 .000 -7.93473 1.63560 -11.19747 -4.67199
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
globind
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
 
The above test compares the HRM global index scores for insured-only municipalities and un-
enhanced municipalities for the years 1999-2001.  There is a significant difference (7.93) 
between the mean global index values for insured (M = 37.59, SD  = 11.23) and un-enhanced [M  
= 45.53, SD  = 11.12; t (69.23)  = -4.85, p = 0.000].  It was concluded that in this sample, the 
municipalities with un-enhanced bond ratings employ a significantly greater number of HRM 
practices than insured-only municipalities.  This reinforced the possibility of a lemons problem 
among the insured-only group when compared to the un-enhanced group. 
 Although the insured only municipal bonds employed significantly fewer HRM practices 
than the un-enhanced (uninsured + SPUR), and SPUR group taken independently, the findings 
were inconclusive in terms of quality or if the insured only bonds were lemons.  Pursuing this 
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analysis seemed interesting but beyond the scope of this study.  The insured only bonds were 
dropped from the analysis, as their underlying credit quality was unknown. This reduced the 
sample size from 420 to 366 municipalities.   
 
Testing for Predictors of High Performance 
 As described in Chapter II, a number of research studies in the private sector suggest a 
relationship exists between human resource management practices and organizational outcomes 
such as profitability, stakeholder value and market share.  Empirical studies such as those 
conducted by Arthur (1992), Pfeffer (1994), Huselid (1995), MacDuffie (1995) Kling (1995) and 
Guest (1997) propose there are sets of HRM practices that are universally superior and contribute 
to higher organizational performance (see Figure 5).  While empirical studies in the public sector 
attempting to make this connection are few, findings from private sector research are often 
applied to public organizations as reforms, under the assumption they will contribute to high 
performance in the public sector as well.  As an example, Popovich (1998) along with re-
inventionists and others advocate for change in the public sector based on these private sector 
findings.   
Binary logistic regression allows the prediction of a discrete outcome, such as group 
membership, from a set of variables that may be continuous, dichotomous or a mix of these 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Menard, 2002; Miles & Shevlin, 2001; Vogt, 1999; Hair et al., 
1998).  The dependent variable is dichotomous (such as the presence or absence of high 
performance) and can take the value of 1 (presence of high performance) or 0 (absence of high 
performance).  In binary logistic regression the probability of membership over non-membership 
is computed.  To accomplish this, models are created including variables thought to be useful in 
predicting the dependent variable.  The results of the analysis are in the form of an odds ratio for 
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each predictor or independent variable.  The binary logistic regression analysis provides an 
expression of the strengths (or weaknesses) among variables by calculating the estimated odds 
for improving the likelihood of membership in a group (e.g. high performance) for each one-unit 
change in an independent variable, holding all other independent variables constant.  In this 
study, for those independent variables found to be statistically significant, a positive odds ratio 
(Expβ > 1.0) means the independent variable (HRM practice) has the effect of increasing the 
estimated odds of membership in the high performing group (the dependent variable), while a 
negative odds ratio (Expβ < 1.0) means the independent variable has the effect of decreasing the 
estimated odds of membership in the high performing group.  
An initial test of all indices in a full model revealed that the original selection index (E) 
was statistically significant but negatively correlated with performance.  On closer examination it 
was found that based upon the original questions in the survey instrument and mixed results in 
the literature concerning selection tests (Gore, 1993; Klingner & Nabaldian, 1998; Berman et al., 
2006), the original index could be neatly separated into two indices: one for selection tests (E1) 
and one for other selection criteria (E2). In subsequent testing of models including selection as an 
independent variable, the testing index (E1) was consistently negatively correlated with 
performance and the selection criteria index (E2) statistically not significant.  These results were 
consistent with the literature reporting some questioning of the value of testing in the public 
sector (Gore, 1993; Berman et al., 2006) and the likelihood that most municipalities consider 
many of the same criteria (e.g. training and experience, education level etc.) in making 
selections.  
In an effort to determine if a relationship exists in public organizations between HRM 
practices and performance initially two models were tested using logistic regression.  Model 1 is 
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a full model including the comprehensive benefits and family-work indices.  Testing the full 
model provides a baseline for comparing test results of subsequent models found in the literature. 
Model 2 substitutes the family-work index with a job flexibility index.  The family-work index 
includes ten variables: paid maternity leave and paternity leave (both distinct from other leave), 
funeral leave, relocation expenses, spending account for medical/child care, on site daycare, 
subsidized daycare, flexible work hours, job sharing and telecommuting.  The job flexibility 
index includes: flexible work hours, job sharing and telecommuting.  Since the job flexibility 
index is a subset of the family-work index, both cannot be included in the same model. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
 Initially, performance is regressed only on a constant to provide a baseline classification 
table and –2 log likelihood (-2LL) to which other models can be compared.  
Table 14: Baseline Classification Table 
Classification Tablea,b
184 0 100.0
182 0 .0
50.3
Observed
Low performing
High performing
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 0
Low
performing
High
performing
perf
Percentage
Correct
Predicted
Constant is included in the model.a. 
The cut value is .500b. 
 
 
The baseline classification table simply shows that when performance is regressed only as a 
constant, it predicts all 366 municipalities to be low performing and it is correct 50.3 percent of 
the time. 
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Table 15: Baseline –2 Log Likelihood 
Iteration Historya,b,c
507.373 -.011
507.373 -.011
Iteration
1
2
Step
0
-2 Log
likelihood Constant
Coefficients
Constant is included in the model.a. 
Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 507.373b. 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 2 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
c. 
 
 The baseline –2LL is 507.373.  Any model resulting in a lower –2LL would be an 
improvement in the prediction of performance of municipalities. 
The -2LL and chi-square test can be used to assess each model’s “goodness of fit” with 
the data and relative predictive strength in relation to the baseline –2LL.   
Table 16: Goodness of Fit Reporting Template 
Model Goodness of Fit 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
The test measures if the introduction of independent variables in a model will reduce the –2LL 
(the greater the reduction the better) in relation to the initial –2LL of 507.373.  This reduction is 
reflected in a model’s chi-square, which is a joint test that coefficients of the independent 
variables are different from 0 at the 95 percent confidence level.   
Along with the classification table, the test to determine “goodness of fit” will be 
reported for each model.   
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Model 1: 
 The logistic regression equation for Model 1 is: 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β3R + β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T + β8B + β9Fw + β10PP + β11I + β12D + β13G + β14C 
 
Table 17: Model 1 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
134 50 72.8
68 114 62.6
67.8
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
 
The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts performance in 
approximately 68 percent of the cases overall, 72.8 percent of the low performing and 62.6 
percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 17.5 percent over the 50.3 
percent predicted performance of the baseline model).   
 
Table 18: Goodness of Fit – Model 1 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
 
427.913 
 
79.460 
 
14 
 
.000 
 
The addition of the 14 variables in this model reduces the –2LL to 427.913 from the  
 –2LL of 507.373 in the initial baseline model.  The model chi-square is 79.460, which is 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level (0.000).    
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Table 19: Logistic Regression Test Summary - Model 1 
Per =   β0 + β1P +   β2F +   β3R +  β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S +   β7T    + β8B    + β9Fw   +  β10PP    +   β11I  + β12D + β13G + β14C 
 
 β 1.740    .000  -.455    .153  -.134  -.015  -.030    .114    .013    .280   .017   -.411   .040  -.081    .368 
 Expβ    .176  1.000    .634  1.166    .874   .950   .970  1.121  1.014  1.323 1.017     .663 1.041    .922  1.445 
 S.E.    .634    .000    .283    .053    .061    .072    .265    .105     053    .093   .164     .279   .055    .333    .125 
 Wald  7.538  2.174  2.590  8.285  4.934    .507    .013  1.176    .064  9.055   .010   2.168   .526    .060  8.623 
 Sig.  0.006  0.140  0.108  0.004  0.026  0.476  0.908  0.278  0.800  0.003 0.919   0.141 0.468  0.807  0.003 
The summary for Model 1 indicates the recruitment index, with an odds ratio of 1.166, is statistically significant [p = 0.004] and for 
each additional practice added to the recruitment index (R) the estimated odds for achieving high performance improves by nearly 17 
percent.  The selection index (E1) is significant [p=0.026], however, it is negatively associated with performance, suggesting that for 
each additional test added to the selection test index, the estimated odds for high performance decreases by 0.126 [1.0 - 0.874] or 13 
percent.  The family-work index (Fw) with an odds ratio of 1.323 is also statistically significant in this model [p=0.003] and for each 
practice added to this index the estimated odds for high performance increase by approximately 32 percent.  Communication, with an 
odds ratio of 1.445, is statistically significant [p=0.003] indicating that for each communication practice added to this index, the 
estimated odds for high performance increases by about 44.5 percent.  The selection criteria index (E2), the streamlined selection 
methods index (S), the training index (T), the benefits index (B), the pay for performance index (PP), the involvement in performance 
standards index (I), the HRM decentralization index (D) and the group involvement index (G) are not statistically significant in Model 
1.   
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Model 1 tests 11 hypotheses (excluding job flexibility).  Three of the 11 
hypotheses are supported.    
Hypothesis 1  
H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the 
applicant pool ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those using 
fewer methods. 
HA – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase 
the applicant pool ARE more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
• Hypothesis 1 is supported with the recruitment methods index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.004].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 2  
 H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of selection tests/criteria ARE NOT 
more likely to be high performing than those using fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a greater number of selection tests/ criteria ARE more 
likely to be high performing than those using fewer. 
• Hypothesis 2 is not supported, with the selection tests index (E1) 
statistically significant [p = 0.026] in a negative direction and the selection 
criteria index (E2) not statistically significant [p = 0.476].  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 3  
 131
H0 – Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE NOT more likely 
to be high performing than those without a streamlined process. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without a streamlined process.   
• Hypothesis 3 is not supported. The streamlined selection index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.908].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 4  
H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
• Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The training index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.278].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED.   
Hypothesis 5  
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees ARE NOT 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
 HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees ARE 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
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• Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  The benefits index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.800].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED. 
 
Hypothesis 6  
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits to 
employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits to 
employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer. 
• Hypothesis 6 is supported with family-work benefits statistically 
significant [p = 0.003].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is REJECTED 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 7    
H0 – Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those without these programs. 
 HA  - Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without these programs. 
• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The pay for performance index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.919].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 8  
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H0 – Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance 
standards ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those where employees are 
not involved.  
 HA  - Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance 
standards ARE more likely to be high performing than those where employees are not 
involved. 
• Hypothesis 8 is not supported.  The involvement in developing 
performance standards index is not statistically significant [p = 0.141].  
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 9  (NOT TESTED IN MODEL 1)  
Hypothesis 10  
H0 – Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those with centralized HRM practices.  
 HA  - Municipalities decentralized HRM practices ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
• Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  The HRM decentralization index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.468].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 11  
H0 – Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those with 
fewer. 
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 HA  - Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
• Hypothesis 11 is supported with the communication processes index 
statistically significant [p = 0.003].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those that do not.  
 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely 
to be high performing than those that do not. 
• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.807].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
 
Model 1 Results 
Overall this model shows some support for the three performance dimensions of 
HRM. The most important test results are: 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM:  
a. Using a number of methods as part of a recruitment strategy in order to 
increase the qualified applicant pool appears to be strongly associated with 
high performance.  Going beyond the traditional public announcements 
using local media, the recruitment index includes such methods as: 
requests made to special interest and/or professional organizations; use of 
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both public and private employment/referral agencies; use of the internet; 
using internships in local government; internal recruitment and taking 
referrals from local employees; use of local cable TV channels; querying 
university career placement centers; and hiring placement agencies and 
search firms.  This index, relative to other independent variables in Model 
1, is a strong predictor of high performance.  For each additional 
recruitment practice added to this index, the estimated odds for a 
municipality to be a member of the high performing group increases by 17 
percent.  
b. Conversely, testing applicants as part of a selection process in areas 
such as job knowledge, intelligence, aptitude, performance skills, 
computer skills and cognitive thinking skills appears to be negatively 
associated with high performance.  Relative to other independent variables 
in this model, for each additional test added to this index the estimated 
odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing group 
decreases by approximately 13 percent.  Possible reasons for this finding 
will be discussed later in this chapter however; research seems to indicate 
that while testing can be expensive in time and money, the reliability and 
validity of many tests for predicting success in a job is only moderate at 
best (Klingner & Nalbandian, 1998).  
2.  The Commitment Dimension of HRM: Offering employees family 
work benefits appears to be strongly associated with high performance.  
Historically all levels of government have consistently offered a package 
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of standard benefits for employees such as life insurance, health insurance, 
paid annual and sick leave etc. (Roberts, 2004).  However, demographic 
projections developed by the Department of Labor, publications by the 
Hudson Institute and others have pointed out the rapid changes in the U.S. 
population are having a significant impact on organizations, both public 
and private, in their efforts to attract and retain quality employees.  Many 
of these changes focus on the increasing numbers of workers with 
demands for child care which impact on the more traditional work 
arrangements made between organizations and its employees.  Many of 
the best candidates for positions may be members of the increasing 
number of women with school age children entering the workforce, or 
recruited from out-of-state or region.  Recruiting and retaining high 
quality workers requires organizations to acknowledge and address 
employees’ needs to balance family and work demands.  Responses to 
these demands have resulted in offering benefits such as paid maternity 
and paternity leave, assistance with relocation and child care expenses, 
commuting subsidies and flexible work arrangements such as job sharing, 
telecommuting and flexible work hours.   The family work index, relative 
to other independent variables in Model 1, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional benefit added to this index, the 
estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing 
group increases by 32 percent.  
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3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM: Communication processes appear 
to be strongly associated with high performance. Processes include 
formally evaluating the effectiveness of a municipality’s performance 
appraisal system, conducting employee attitude surveys, having an 
established suggestion program and a labor-management committee.  The 
communication index, relative to other independent variables in Model 1, 
is a strong predictor of high performance.  For each additional process 
added to this index, the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member 
of the high performing group increases by 44.5 percent.  
 
Model 2: 
Model 2 substitutes the family-work index with the job flexibility index as these 
indices are not mutually exclusive.  Job flexibility (job sharing, telecommuting, flexible 
work hours) is considered part of the flexibility dimension of HRM, while family-work 
benefits is a sub-index of benefits and is included in the commitment dimension of HRM.  
The three components of the job flexibility index are all contained in the family-work 
index, therefore, both cannot be included in the same regression.  The intent is to 
determine whether there is a relationship between job flexibility taken alone, and 
performance. 
 
The equation for Model 2 is: 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β3R + β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T + β8B + β9PP + β10I + β11J + β12D + β13G + β14C 
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Table 20: Model 2 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
139 45 75.5
65 117 64.3
69.9
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
 
The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts performance in 
approximately 70 percent of the cases overall, 75.5 percent of the low performing and 
64.3 percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 19.6 percent over 
the 50.3 percent predicted performance of the baseline model).   
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Table 21: Goodness of Fit - Model 2 
 
 
 
 
The addition of the 14 variables in this model reduces the initial log likelihood to 430.163.  The model chi-square is 77.209, which is 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Table 22: Logistic Regression Test Summary - Model 2 
Per =   β0 + β1P +   β2F +   β3R +  β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T      + β8B   +  β9PP    +     β10I     + β11J + β12D + β13G + β14C 
 
 β -1.560    .000  -.419    .160  -.134  -.061  -.066    .095  .044    .047    -.444   .400    .033  -.154    .391 
 Expβ   .210  1.000    .658  1.173    .875   .941    .936  1.100  1.045  1.048      .641  1.492  1.034   .857  1.478 
 S.E.   .633    .000    .281    .053    .060   .071    .264    .106   .050    .161      .279    .151    .055   .332    .125 
 Wald 6.081  2.154  2.226  9.001  4.943   .737    .062    .808   .755    .086    2.529  7.030    .371   .216  9.745 
 Sig. 0.014  0.142  0.136  0.003  0.026  0.391  0.804  0.369  0.385  0.769   0.112  0.008  0.543  0.642  0.002 
 
The summary for Model 2 indicates that the recruitment index, with an odds ratio of 1.173, is statistically significant [p = 
0.003] and for each additional practice added to the recruitment index (R) the estimated odds for achieving high performance 
improves by 17 percent.  
 
-2 Log likelihood 
 
Chi-square  
 
df 
 
Sig. 
430.163 77.209 14 .000 
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As in Model 1, the selection index (E1) is significant [p=0.026], however, it is negatively 
associated with performance, suggesting that, in this sample, for each additional test 
added to this selection index, the estimated odds for high performance decrease by 0.125  
[1.0 - 0.875] or approximately 12 percent.  The job flexibility index (J), with an odds 
ratio of 1.492 is significant [p=0.008] indicating that for each practice added to this 
index, the estimated odds for high performance increase by 49 percent.  The 
communication index (C), with an odds ratio of 1.478, is also statistically significant 
[p=0.002] indicating that for each communication practice added to this index, the 
estimated odds for high performance increases by about 48 percent.  In Model 2 the 
selection criteria index (E2), the streamlined selection methods index (S), the training 
index (T), the benefits index (B), the pay for performance index (PP), the involvement in 
performance standards index (I), the HRM decentralization index (D) and the group 
involvement index (G) are not statistically significant. 
Model 2 tests 11 hypotheses (excluding the family-work index).  Three of the 11 
hypotheses are supported.    
Hypothesis 1  
H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the 
applicant pool ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
HA – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase 
the applicant pool ARE more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
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• Hypothesis 1 is supported with the recruitment methods index statistically 
significant [p = 0.003].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is REJECTED 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 2  
 H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of selection tests/criteria ARE NOT 
more likely to be high performing than those using fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a greater number of tests/selection criteria ARE more 
likely to be high performing than those using fewer. 
• Hypothesis 2 is not supported, with selection index statistically significant 
[p = 0.026] in a negative direction and the selection criteria index (E2) not 
statistically significant [p = 0.391).  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 3  
H0 – Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE NOT more likely 
to be high performing than those without a streamlined process. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without a streamlined process.   
• Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  The streamlined selection index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.804].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 4  
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H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
• Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The training index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.369].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED.   
Hypothesis 5  
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees ARE NOT 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
 HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees ARE 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The benefits index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.385].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 6  (NOT TESTED IN MODEL 2) 
Hypothesis 7    
H0 – Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those without these programs. 
 HA  - Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without these programs. 
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• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The pay for performance index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.769].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED.  
Hypothesis 8  
H0 – Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance 
standards ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those where employees are 
not involved.  
 HA  - Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance 
standards ARE more likely to be high performing than those where employees are not 
involved. 
• Hypothesis 8 is not supported.  The involvement in developing 
performance standards index is not statistically significant [p = 0.112].  
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 9 
 
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE 
NOT more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices. 
HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE             
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
• Hypothesis 9 is supported with the flexible work practices index 
statistically significant [p = 0.008].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 10  
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H0 – Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those with centralized HRM practices.  
 HA  - Municipalities decentralized HRM practices ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
• Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  The HRM decentralization indix is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.543].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 11  
H0 – Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those with 
fewer. 
 HA - Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
• Hypothesis 11 is supported with communication processes index 
statistically significant [p = 0.002].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those that do not.  
 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely 
to be high performing than those that do not. 
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• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.642] in relation to performance.  Therefore, 
the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED.  
 
Model 2 Results 
 
Overall, Model 2 shows some support for two of the performance dimensions of 
HRM.  The most important results are: 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM:  
a. As found in Model 1, using a number of methods as part of a 
recruitment strategy in order to increase the qualified applicant pool appears to be 
strongly associated with high performance. This index, relative to other 
independent variables in Model 2, is a strong predictor of high performance.  For 
each additional recruitment practice added to this index, the estimated odds for a 
municipality to be a member of the high performing group increases by 17 
percent.  
b. Testing applicants as part of a selection process appears to be negatively 
associated with high performance as was found in Model 1.  Relative to other 
independent variables in Model 2, for each additional test added to this index the 
estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing group 
decreases by approximately 12 percent.  
2.  The Commitment Dimension of HRM:  Model 2 did not support this HRM 
dimension. 
3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM:  
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a. Focusing specifically on job flexibility (as opposed to benefits) there 
appears to be a strong relationship between this index (job sharing, 
telecommuting, and flexible work hours) and high performance.  As discussed 
earlier, these measures are an attempt by organizations to accommodate employee 
needs by recognizing the reciprocal nature of the performance contract. Relative 
to other independent variables in Model 2, for each additional work practice 
added to this index the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the 
high performing group increases by approximately 49 percent.  
b. Communication processes appear to be strongly associated with high 
performance. The communication index, relative to other independent variables in 
Model 2, is a strong predictor of high performance.  For each additional process 
added to this index, the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the 
high performing group increases by 48 percent. 
 
Models 3 through 8  
Empirical studies in the private sector such as Arthur (1992), Pfeffer (1994), 
Huselid (1995), MacDuffie (1995) Kling (1995) and Guest (1997) identify sets of HRM 
practices that appear universally superior and are thought to contribute to higher 
organizational performance (see Figure 5).  These six models are used to explore 
potential relationships between these HRM practices and high performance in 
municipalities. 
Model 3 (Arthur) 
The logistic regression equation for Model 3 is:  
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Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β7T + β8B + β11J + β13G+ β14C  
 
Table 23: Model 3 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
134 50 72.8
75 107 58.8
65.8
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
 
The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts performance in 
approximately 65.8 percent of the cases overall, 72.8 percent of the low performing and 
58.8 percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 15.5 percent over 
the 50.3 percent predicted performance of the baseline model).   
Table 24: Goodness of Fit – Model 3 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
 
446.124 
 
61.248 
 
7 
 
.000 
 
The addition of the 7 variables in this model reduces the –2LL to 446.124 from 
the –2LL of 507.373 in the initial baseline model.  The model chi-square is 61.248, which 
is significant at the 95 percent confidence level (0.000). 
Table 25: Logistic Regression Test Summary - Model 3 
 
Per 
 
= 
 
β0 
 
+ 
 
  β1P 
 
+ 
 
β2F 
 
+ 
 
β7T 
 
+ 
 
β8B 
 
+ 
 
β11J 
 
+ 
 
β12G 
 
+ 
 
β13C 
 
β  -1.413      .000  - .325    .160    .043    .362  -.035    .306  
Expβ     .243    1.000    .722  1.174  1.044  1.436   .966  1.358 
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S.E. 
Wald 
    .506 
 7.785 
     .000 
  4.679 
   .256 
1.610 
   .100 
2.550 
   .045 
  .888 
   .140 
6.663 
  .321 
 .012 
   .118 
6.768 
 
Sig.  0 .005    0 .031  0.205  0.110  0.346  0.010  0.913  0.009 
 
 The summary for Model 3 indicates the job flexibility index, with an odds ratio of 
1.436, is statistically significant [p = 0.010] and for each additional practice added to the 
job flexibility index (J) the estimated odds for achieving high performance improves by 
nearly 44 percent.  The communication index, with an odds ratio of 1.358, is statistically 
significant [p = 0.009] indicating that for each communication practice added to this 
index (C), the estimated odds for high performance increases by about 36 percent.  It is 
also noted that training index (T) is approaching statistical significance [p = 0.110] at the 
p < 0.10 level.  All other indices in Model 3 are not statistically significant. 
Model 3 tests 5 hypotheses.  Two of the 5 hypotheses are supported.    
Hypothesis 4  
H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
• Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The training index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.110].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED.   
Hypothesis 5  
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees ARE NOT 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
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 HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees ARE 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
• Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  The benefits index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.346].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 9 
 
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE 
NOT more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices. 
HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE             
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
• Hypothesis 9 is supported with the flexible work practices index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.010].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 11  
H0 – Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those with 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
• Hypothesis 11 is supported with the communication processes index 
statistically significant [p = 0.009].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
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Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those with a lower level of participation.  
 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely 
to be high performing than those with a lower level of participation. 
• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.913].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Model 3 Results 
Overall, Model 3 shows support for one performance dimension of HRM.  The 
most important results are: 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM.  Model 3 did not show strong support 
for this dimension of HRM performance.  However, the training index 
(mandatory and in house training, training in diversity & ethics) is 
approaching statistical significance at the p = < 0.10 level in this model.   
2.  The Commitment Dimension of HRM.  Model 3 did not show support 
for this dimension of HRM performance. 
3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM.   
a. There appears to be a strong relationship between the job 
flexibility index (job sharing, telecommuting, and flexible work hours) 
and high performance.  Relative to other independent variables in Model 
3, for each additional work practice added to this index the estimated odds 
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for a municipality to be a member of the high performing group increases 
by approximately 44 percent.  
b. Communication processes appear to be strongly associated with 
high performance. The communication index, relative to other 
independent variables in Model 3, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional process added to this index, the 
estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing 
group increases by 36 percent. 
  
Model 4 (Pfeffer) 
 The logistic regression equation for Model 4 is:  
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β3R + β7T + β9PP + β11J + β12 D + β13G + β14C  
 
 
Table 26: Model 4 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
134 50 72.8
71 111 61.0
66.9
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts performance in 
approximately 66.9 percent of the cases overall, 72.8 percent of the low performing and 
61.0 percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 16.6 percent over 
the 50.3 percent predicted performance of the baseline model).   
 152
 
Table 27: Goodness of Fit – Model 4 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
441.223 66.149 9 0.000 
 
The addition of the 9 variables in this model reduces the –2LL to 441.223 from 
the –2LL of 507.373 in the initial baseline model.  The model chi-square is 66.140, which 
is significant at the 95 percent confidence level (p = 0.000). 
 
 
Table 28 Logistic Regression Test Summary - Model 4 
 
Per 
 
= 
 
β0 
 
+ 
 
β1P 
 
+ 
 
β2F 
 
+ 
 
β3R 
 
+ 
 
β7T 
 
+
 
β9PP 
 
+ 
 
β11J 
 
+ 
 
β12D 
 
+ 
 
β13G 
 
+
 
β14C 
β  -1.652    .000  -.420    .103    .115  -.013    .346    .017  -.060    .316 
Expβ 
S.E. 
    .192 
    .491 
 1.000  
  .000   
   .657 
  .272   
 1.109 
 .045      
 1.122  
.102      
  .987 
 .150 
 1.414  
  .141 
 1.017 
  .052     
  .942 
 .323 
 1.372 
  .117 
 
Wald 
Sig. 
11.317    
  0.001 
 2.975  
0.085 
 2.382   
0.123 
 5.221 
0.022 
 1.275  
0.259 
  .008 
0.929 
 6.052 
0.014 
   .100 
0.752     
  .034 
0.853 
 7.306 
0.007 
 
 
The summary for Model 4 indicates the recruitment index (R), with an odds ratio of 
1.109, is statistically significant [p = 0.022] and for each additional recruitment practice 
added to this index, the estimated odds for achieving high performance improves by 
nearly 11 percent.  The job flexibility index, with an odds ratio of 1.414, is statistically 
significant [p = 0.014] and for each additional practice added to this index (J) the 
estimated odds for achieving high performance increases by nearly 41 percent.  The 
communication index (C), with an odds ratio of 1.372, is statistically significant [p = 
0.007] indicating that for each communication practice added to this index (C), the 
estimated odds for high performance increases by about 37 percent.  All other indices in 
Model 3 are not statistically significant. 
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Model 4 tests 7 hypotheses. Three of the 7 hypotheses are supported.    
Hypothesis 1  
H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the 
applicant pool ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
HA – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase 
the applicant pool ARE more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
• Hypothesis 1 is supported with the recruitment methods index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.022].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 4  
H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
• Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The training index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.259].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED.   
Hypothesis 7    
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H0 – Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those without these programs. 
 HA  - Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without these programs. 
• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The pay for performance index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.929].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 9 
 
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE 
NOT more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices. 
HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE             
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
• Hypothesis 9 is supported with the flexible work practices index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.014].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 10  
H0 – Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those with centralized HRM practices.  
 HA  - Municipalities decentralized HRM practices ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
• Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  The HRM decentralization index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.752].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
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Hypothesis 11  
H0 – Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those with 
fewer. 
 HA - Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
• Hypothesis 11 is supported with the communication processes index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.007].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those that do not.  
 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely 
to be high performing than those that do not. 
• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.853].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
 
 
 Model 4 Results 
 
Overall, Model 4 shows support for two performance dimensions of HRM.  The 
most important results are: 
 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM.  Using a number of methods as part 
of a recruitment strategy in order to increase the qualified applicant pool 
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appears to be strongly associated with high performance in Model 4. This 
index, relative to other independent variables, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional recruitment practice added to this index, 
the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high 
performing group increases by 11 percent.  
 
2. The Commitment Dimension of HRM.  Model 4 does not support this 
HRM performance dimension. 
3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM. 
a. As in Model 3, there appears to be a strong relationship between 
the job flexibility index (job sharing, telecommuting, and flexible work 
hours) and high performance.  Relative to other independent variables in 
Model 4, for each additional work practice added to this index the 
estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing 
group increases by approximately 41 percent.  
b. Communication processes also seem strongly associated with 
high performance. The communication index, relative to other 
independent variables in Model 4, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional process added to this index, the 
estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing 
group increases by 37 percent. 
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 Model 5 (Huselid) 
 The logistic regression equation for Model 5 is: 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β3R + β4E1 + β5E2+ β7T + β8PP + β10I + β11J + β13G + β14C 
 
 
Table 29: Model 5 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
139 45 75.5
68 114 62.6
69.1
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
 The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts 
performance in approximately 69.1 percent of the cases overall, 75.5 percent of the low 
performing and 62.6 percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 
18.8 percent over the 50.3 percent predicted performance of the baseline model).  
 
Table 30: Goodness of Fit - Model 5 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
431.375 75.998 11 0.000 
  
The addition of the 11 variables in this model reduces the –2LL to 431.375 from 
the –2LL of 507.373 in the initial baseline model.  The model chi-square is 75.998, which 
is significant at the 95 percent confidence level (p = 0.000). 
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Table 31: Logistic Regression Test Summary - Model 5 
 
 
Per 
 
= 
 
  β0 
 
+ 
 
 β1P 
 
+ 
 
 β2F 
 
+ 
 
 β3R 
 
+ 
 
 β4E1 
 
+ 
 
β4EE2 
 
+ 
 
β6T 
 
+ 
 
β8PP 
 
+ 
 
β9I 
 
+ 
 
β11J 
 
+ 
 
β12G 
 
+ 
 
β13C 
 
β -1.092    .000  -.407      .170  -.123  -.055    .099   .045  -.442    .423    -.130    .410 
Expβ   .336  1.000   .666    1.186    .884    .947  1.104  1.046    .643  1.527   .878  1.506 
S.E.   .448    .000   .277      .052    .059    .070    .104    .161    .277    .148   .331    .123 
Wald 5.936    2.045  2.152  10.622  4.436    .611    .898    .078  2.551  8.201  .155  11.046 
 
Sig. 0.015  0.153  0.142    0.001  0.035  0.434  0.343  0.780  0.110  0.004  0.694   0.001 
 
The summary for Model 4 indicates the recruitment index (R), with an odds ratio 
of 1.186, is statistically significant [p = 0.001] and for each additional recruitment 
practice added to the recruitment index, the estimated odds for achieving high 
performance improves by about 19 percent.  The selection index (E1) is significant 
[p=0.035], however, it is negatively associated with performance, suggesting that, in this 
sample, for each additional test added to this selection index, the estimated odds for high 
performance decrease by 0.116  [1.0 - 0.884] or approximately 12 percent.  The job 
flexibility index (J), with an odds ratio of 1.527, is statistically significant [p = 0.004] and 
for each additional practice added to this index the estimated odds for achieving high 
performance increases by nearly 53 percent.  The communication index (C), with an odds 
ratio of 1.506, is statistically significant [p = 0.001] indicating that for each 
communication practice added to this index (C), the estimated odds for high performance 
increases by about 51 percent.  All other indices in Model 5 are not statistically 
significant. 
Model 5 tests 8 hypotheses (excluding job flexibility).  Three of the 8 hypotheses 
are supported.    
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Hypothesis 1  
H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the 
applicant pool ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
HA – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase 
the applicant pool ARE more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
• Hypothesis 1 is supported with the recruitment methods index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.001].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 2  
 H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of selection tests/ criteria ARE NOT 
more likely to be high performing than those using fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a greater number of selection tests/ criteria ARE more 
likely to be high performing than those using fewer. 
• Hypothesis 2 is not supported, with the selection tests index (E1) 
statistically significant [p = 0.035] in a negative direction and the selection 
criteria index (E2) not statistically significant [p = 0.434].  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 4  
H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting 
fewer. 
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 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The training index is not statistically significant [p = 
0.343].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED.  
Hypothesis 7    
H0 – Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those without these programs. 
 HA  - Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without these programs. 
• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The pay for performance index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.780].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 8  
H0 – Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance 
standards ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those where employees are 
not involved.  
 HA  - Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance 
standards ARE more likely to be high performing than those where employees are not 
involved. 
• Hypothesis 8 is not supported.  The involvement in developing 
performance standards index is not statistically significant [p = 0.110].  
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 9 
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H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE 
NOT more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices. 
HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE             
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
• Hypothesis 9 is supported with the flexible work practices index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.004].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 11  
H0 – Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those with 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
• Hypothesis 11 is supported with the communication processes index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.001].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those that do not. 
 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely 
to be high performing than those that do not. 
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• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.694].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
 
 
Model 5 Results 
 
Overall, Model 5 shows support for two performance dimensions of HRM.  The 
most important results are: 
 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM.  Using a number of methods as part 
of a recruitment strategy in order to increase the qualified applicant pool 
appears to be strongly associated with high performance in Model 5. This 
index, relative to other independent variables, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional recruitment practice added to this index, 
the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high 
performing group increases by 19 percent.  
 
2. The Commitment Dimension of HRM.  Model 5 does not support this 
HRM performance dimension. 
3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM. 
a. There appears to be a strong relationship between the job 
flexibility index (job sharing, telecommuting, and flexible work hours) 
and high performance.  Relative to other independent variables in Model 
5, for each additional work practice added to this index the estimated odds 
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for a municipality to be a member of the high performing group increases 
by approximately 53 percent.  
b. Communication processes also seem strongly associated with 
high performance. The communication index, relative to other 
independent variables in Model 5, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional process added to this index, the 
estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing 
group increases by 51 percent. 
  
Model 6 (MacDuffie) 
 The logistic regression equation for Model 6 is: 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β3R + β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T + β8PP + β11J + β12D + β13G + β14C 
 
Table 32: Model 6 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
135 49 73.4
70 112 61.5
67.5
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts performance in 
approximately 67.5 percent of the cases overall, 73.4 percent of the low performing and 
61.5 percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 17.2 percent over 
the 50.3 percent predicted performance of the baseline model).  
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Table 33: Goodness of Fit – Model 6 
 
 
The addition of the 12 variables in this model reduces the –2LL to 433.268 from the –2LL of 507.373 in the initial baseline 
model.  The model chi-square is 74.105, which is significant at the 95 percent confidence level (p = 0.000). 
 
 
Table 34: Logistic Regression Test Summary – Model 6 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
433.268 74.105 12 0.000 
Per =   β0 + β1P +   β2F +   β3R +  β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T      +  β9PP    + β11J + β12D + β13G + β14C 
 
 β -1.309    .000  -.432    .167  -.125  -.064  -.055    .075  -.030   .404    .044  -.158    .369 
 Expβ   .270  1.000    .649  1.181    .882   .938    .947  1.078   .970   1.498  1.045   .854  1.447 
 S.E.   .526    .000    .280    .052    .060   .070    .262    .105    .154    .146    .054   .329    .121 
 Wald 6.187  2.184  2.385  10.203  4.427   .822    .044    .519    .038  7.634    .664   .231  9.341 
 Sig. 0.013  0.139  0.122    0.001  0.035  0.365  0.834  0.471  0.845  0.006  0.415  0.631  0.002 
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The summary for Model 6 indicates the recruitment index (R), with an odds ratio 
of 1.181, is statistically significant [p = 0.001] and for each additional recruitment 
practice added to the recruitment index, the estimated odds for achieving high 
performance improves by 18 percent.  The selection index (E1) is significant [p=0.035], 
however, it is negatively associated with performance, suggesting that, in this sample, for 
each additional test added to this selection index, the estimated odds for high 
performance decrease by 0.118  [1.0 - 0.882] or nearly 12 percent.  The job flexibility (J), 
with an odds ratio of 1.498, is statistically significant [p = 0.006] and for each additional 
practice added to the job flexibility index (J) the estimated odds for achieving high 
performance increases by nearly 50 percent.  The communication index (C), with an odds 
ratio of 1.447, is statistically significant [p = 0.002] indicating that for each 
communication practice added to this index, the estimated odds for high performance 
increases by about 45 percent.  All other indices in Model 5 are not statistically 
significant. 
Model 6 tests 9 hypotheses.  Three of the 9 hypotheses are supported.   
Hypothesis 1  
H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the 
applicant pool ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
HA – Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase 
the applicant pool ARE more likely to be high performing than those using fewer 
methods. 
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• Hypothesis 1 is supported with the recruitment methods index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.001].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 2  
 H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of selection criteria ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those using fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a greater number of selection criteria ARE more likely 
to be high performing than those using fewer. 
• Hypothesis 2 is not supported, with the selection tests index (E1) being 
statistically significant [p = 0.035] in a negative direction and the selection 
criteria index (E2) not being statistically significant [p = 0.365].  
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 3  
H0 – Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE NOT more likely 
to be high performing than those without a streamlined process. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without a streamlined process.   
• Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  The streamlined selection index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.834].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 4  
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H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house 
training programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
• Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The training index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.471].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 7    
H0 – Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those without these programs. 
 HA  - Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those without these programs. 
• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The pay for performance index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.845].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 9 
 
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE 
NOT more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices. 
HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE             
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
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• Hypothesis 9 is supported with the flexible work practices index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.006].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 10  
H0 – Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those with centralized HRM practices.  
 HA  - Municipalities decentralized HRM practices ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
• Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  The HRM decentralization index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.415].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 11  
H0 – Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those with 
fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities with a greater number of established communication 
processes for employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
• Hypothesis 11 is supported with the communication processes index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.002].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those that do not  
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 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely 
to be high performing than those that do not. 
• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.631].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
NOT REJECTED. 
 
Model 6 Results 
 
Overall, Model 6 shows support for two performance dimensions of HRM.  The 
most important results are: 
 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM.  Using a number of methods as part 
of a recruitment strategy in order to increase the qualified applicant pool 
appears to be strongly associated with high performance in Model 6. This 
index, relative to other independent variables, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional recruitment practice added to this index, 
the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high 
performing group increases by about 18 percent.  
 
2. The Commitment Dimension of HRM.  Model 6 does not support this 
HRM performance dimension. 
3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM. 
a. There appears to be a strong relationship between the job 
flexibility index (job sharing, telecommuting, and flexible work hours) 
and high performance.  Relative to other independent variables in Model 
6, for each additional work practice added to this index the estimated odds 
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for a municipality to be a member of the high performing group increases 
by nearly 50 percent.  
b. Communication processes also seem strongly associated with 
high performance. The communication index, relative to other 
independent variables in Model 6, is a strong predictor of high 
performance.  For each additional process added to this index, the 
estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the high performing 
group increases by nearly 45 percent. 
 
Model 7 (Guest) 
 The logistic regression equation for Model 7 is: 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T + β8PP + β11J + β12D + β13G + β14C 
 
Table 35: Model 7 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
137 47 74.5
74 108 59.3
66.9
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts performance in 
approximately 66.9 percent of the cases overall, 74.5 percent of the low performing and 
59.3 percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 16.6 percent over 
the 50.3 percent predicted performance of the baseline model).  
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Table 36: Goodness of Fit – Model 7 
 
 
The addition of the 11 variables in this model reduces the –2LL to 443.914 from the –2LL of 507.373 in the initial baseline 
model.  The model chi-square is 63.459, which is significant at the 95 percent confidence level (0.000). 
 
 
 
Table 37: Logistic Regression Test Summary – Model 7 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
443.914 63.459 11 0.000 
Per =   β0 + β1P +   β2F +  β4E1 + β5E2 + β6S + β7T      +  β9PP    + β11J + β12D + β13G + β14C 
 
 β -1.051    .000  -.293  -.082   .003  -.003    .144  -.001   .422    .055  -.045    .351 
 Expβ   .350  1.000    .746    .922  1.003    .997  1.154   .999   1.525  1.057   .956  1.420 
 S.E.   .508    .000    .271    .057   .066    .257    .102   .150    .142    .053   .327    .119 
 Wald 4.287  4.581  1.169  2.085   .002    .000  1.996   .000  8.789  1.090   .019  8.691 
 Sig. 0.038  0.032  0.280  0.149  0.965  0.990  0.158  0.994  0.003  0.296  0.891  0.003 
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The summary for Model 7 indicates that the job flexibility index (J), with an odds ratio of 
1.525, is statistically significant [p = 0.003] and for each additional practice added to the job 
flexibility index the estimated odds for achieving high performance increases by nearly 53 
percent.  The communication index (C), with an odds ratio of 1.420, is also statistically 
significant [p = 0.003], indicating that for each communication practice added to this index, the 
estimated odds for high performance increases by 42 percent.  All remaining indices in Model 7 
are not statistically significant. 
Model 7 tests 8 hypotheses.  Two of the 8 hypotheses are supported.   
Hypothesis 2  
 H0 – Municipalities using a greater number of selection criteria ARE NOT more likely to 
be high performing than those using fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a greater number of selection criteria ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those using fewer. 
• Hypothesis 2 is not supported. The selection tests index (E1) is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.149] and the selection criteria index (E2) is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.965].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 3  
H0 – Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE NOT more likely to be 
high performing than those without a streamlined process. 
 HA  - Municipalities using a streamlined selection process ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those without a streamlined process.   
• Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  The streamlined selection index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.990].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
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Hypothesis 4  
H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house training 
programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house training 
programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
• Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The training index is not statistically significant [p 
= 0.158].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0)  is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 7    
H0 – Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE NOT more likely to be high 
performing than those without these programs. 
 HA  - Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those without these programs. 
• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The pay for performance index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.994].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 9 
 
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE NOT more 
likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices. 
HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices ARE             
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
• Hypothesis 9 is supported with the flexible work practices index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.003].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 10  
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H0 – Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices ARE NOT more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices.  
 HA  - Municipalities decentralized HRM practices ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those with centralized HRM practices. 
• Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  The HRM decentralization index is not 
statistically significant [p = 0.296].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT 
REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 11  
H0 – Municipalities with a greater number of established communication processes for 
employees ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities with a greater number of established communication processes for 
employees ARE more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
• Hypothesis 11 is supported with the communication processes index being 
statistically significant [p = 0.003].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
REJECTED in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more likely 
to be high performing than those that do not  
 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those that do not. 
• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.891].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
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Model 7 Results 
 
Overall, Model 7 shows support for one performance dimensions of HRM.  The most 
important results are: 
 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM.  Model 7 does not support this HRM 
performance dimension. 
2. The Commitment Dimension of HRM.  Model 7 does not support this HRM 
performance dimension. 
3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM. 
a. There appears to be a strong relationship between the job flexibility 
index (job sharing, telecommuting, and flexible work hours) and high 
performance.  Relative to other independent variables in Model 7, for each 
additional work practice added to this index, the estimated odds for a municipality 
to be a member of the high performing group increases by about nearly 53 
percent.  
b. Communication processes also seem strongly associated with high 
performance. The communication index, relative to other independent variables in 
Model 7, is a strong predictor of high performance.  For each additional process 
added to this index, the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the 
high performing group increases by 42 percent. 
 
 Model 8 (Kling) 
The logistic regression equation for Model 8 is: 
Per = β0 + β1P + β2F + β7T + β9Fw + β10PP + β13G  
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Table 38: Model 8 Classification Table 
Classification Tablea
129 55 70.1
74 108 59.3
64.8
Observed
Low
High
perf
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Low High
perf Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
The classification table above shows this model correctly predicts performance in 
approximately 64.8 percent of the cases overall, 70.1 percent of the low performing and 59.3 
percent of the high performing municipalities (an improvement of 14.5 percent over the 50.3 
percent predicted performance of the baseline model).  
Table 39: Goodness of Fit – Model 8 
-2 Log likelihood Chi-square df Sig. 
449.115 58.258 6 0.000 
 
The addition of the six variables in this model reduces the –2LL to 449.115 from the –
2LL of 507.373 in the initial baseline model.  The model chi-square is 58.258, which is 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level (p = 0.000). 
Table 40: Logistic Regression Test Summary – Model 8 
 
Per 
 
= 
 
  β0 
 
+ 
 
 β1P 
 
+ 
 
 β2F 
 
+ 
 
β6T 
 
+ 
 
β9Fw   + 
  
β8PP 
 
+ 
 
β12G 
β  -1.239    .000  -.417    .237     .319   .020    .061 
Expβ     .290  1.000   .659  1.267   1.375  1.021  1.063 
S.E.     .328    .000   .265    .097      .081    .148    .322 
Wald 14.303    4.916  2.479  6.016  15.662    .019    .036 
 
Sig.   0.000  0.027  0.115  0.014    0.000  0.890  0.849 
 
The summary for Model 8 indicates the training index (T), with an odds ratio of 1.267 is 
statistically significant [p = 0.014] and for each additional practice added to this index the 
estimated odds for achieving high performance increases by about 27 percent.  The family-work 
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index (Fw) with an odds ratio of 1.375 is also statistically significant in this model [p=0.000] and 
for each practice added to this index the estimated odds for high performance increase by 
approximately 38 percent.  The remaining indices, the pay for performance index (PP) and the 
group participation index (G), are not statistically significant in Model 8. 
Model 8 tests four hypotheses.  Two of the four hypotheses are supported.  
Hypothesis 4  
H0 – Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house training 
programs ARE NOT more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house training 
programs ARE more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer. 
• Hypothesis 4 is supported with the training index being statistically significant [p 
= 0.014]. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is REJECTED in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 6  
H0 – Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits to employees ARE 
NOT more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer. 
 HA  - Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits to employees ARE 
more likely to be high performing than those offering fewer. 
• Hypothesis 6 is supported with the family-work benefits index being  statistically 
significant [p = 0.000].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is REJECTED in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA). 
Hypothesis 7    
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H0 – Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE NOT more likely to be high 
performing than those without these programs. 
 HA  - Municipalities with pay for performance programs ARE more likely to be high 
performing than those without these programs. 
• Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The pay for performance index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.890].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
Hypothesis 12  
H0 – Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE NOT more likely 
to be high performing than those that do not.  
 HA - Municipalities providing incentives for group participation ARE more likely to be 
high performing than those that do not. 
• Hypothesis 12 is not supported.  The group participation index is not statistically 
significant [p = 0.849].  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is NOT REJECTED. 
  Model 8 Results 
 
Overall, Model 8 shows support for two performance dimensions of HRM.  The most 
important results are: 
 
1.  The Quality Dimension of HRM.  Training (mandatory and in house training, 
training in diversity & ethics) relative to other independent variables is a strong 
predictor of high performance in Model 8.  For each additional practice added to 
the training index, the estimated odds for a municipality to be a member of the 
high performing group increases by nearly 27 percent.  
2. The Commitment Dimension of HRM.  Offering employees family- work 
benefits appears to be strongly associated with high performance in Model 8 (see 
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also results for Model 1).  The family work index, relative to other independent 
variables in Model 8, is a strong predictor of high performance.  For each 
additional benefit added to this index, the estimated odds for a municipality to be 
a member of the high performing group increases by about 38 percent.  
3.  The Flexibility Dimension of HRM.  This model only shows support for 
flexibility of HRM in the sense that job flexibility practices, which are included in 
the family-work index, can also be applied to this performance dimension. 
 
Discussion 
The results of hypotheses testing establish a number of HRM practices, which appear to 
be strong predictors of high performance.  This discussion will first address the major differences 
between private and public organizations in terms of their influence on personnel practices.  This 
context is important because the selection and composition of the indices used for this analysis 
were derived primarily from private sector empirical studies.  Second, the findings for each 
hypothesis will be addressed.   
While there are differences between private and public sectors the question becomes 
…do these differences really matter when implementing seemingly “proven” methods to reform 
the public sector?  The findings in this study need to be tempered by recognizing some of the 
basic distinctions between the private and public organizations and how the implementation of 
personnel reforms or initiatives may differ in each.   
Daley (2002) points out that the public sector introduces legal, economic and political 
distinctions into personnel management (p. 12).  Where the private sector may be concerned 
about these three distinctions, it is not defined by them as the public sector is.  From a legal point 
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of view, in the public sector responsibilities are mandated and public organizations are charged 
with administering the law.  Private organizations only need to be concerned with following the 
law and can choose what business they are in.  Also, democratic government is concerned 
primarily with protecting individuals, as opposed to achieving efficiency, which is the primary 
goal of private enterprise.  As a result, the public sector constrains managerial discretion more 
then the private sector does.   
An economic perspective can illustrate another distinction between public and private.  
The US views the role of government narrowly and relegates it to provide only that which the 
market economy cannot or fails to deliver.  Because government resources are allocated through 
a political market rather than an economic one, productivity is difficult to measure.  This adds to 
the difficulties inherent in measuring public sector performance.  Performance in the private 
sector is more clear and measured in terms of profit, market share and/or shareholder value.   
Politics provides another significant distinction between public and private.  Goals for 
public organizations are set externally through elected officials and citizens, rather than by 
internal experts as in private organizations.  The political arena of public agencies is ambiguous 
and goals are unclear.  This also presents problems for performance measurement.  Finally, 
public decision-making is transparent with the involvement of not only organizational members, 
but also special interests and citizens.  Few private sector organizations allow this kind of 
involvement in their decision-making and internal operations (p. 12).   
These differences do not necessarily mean that the techniques and practices successful in 
one sector cannot be transferred effectively to the other.  However, these inherent differences 
between the sectors need to be taken into account when determining the methods of 
implementation.  A technique from the private sector may not “fit” the public sector without 
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modification, and vice versa.  In the discussion that follows these differences are pointed out, 
where appropriate, as possible explanations for contradictory findings between this study and 
those in private sector research.   
 
Table 41 summarizes the findings of the analysis in terms of those predictors found to be 
statistically significant: 
Table 41: Significant Performance Predictors that Support the Hypotheses 
 Quality Commitment Flexibility 
  
Recruitment 
 
Training 
Family-work 
Benefits 
 
Job Flexibility 
 
Communication 
Model 1 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
1.166 
0.004 
 
a 
 
1.323 
0.003 
 
b 
 
1.445 
0.003 
Model 2 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
1.173 
0.003 
 
a 
 
b 
 
1.492 
0.008 
 
1.478 
0.002 
Model 3 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
b 
 
 
1.174 
  0.110* 
 
b 
 
1.436 
0.010 
 
1.358 
0.009 
Model 4 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
1.109 
0.022 
 
a 
 
b 
 
1.414 
0.014 
 
1.372 
0.007 
Model 5 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
1.186 
0.001 
 
a 
 
b 
 
1.527 
0.004 
 
1.506 
0.001 
Model 6 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
1.181 
0.001 
 
a 
 
b 
 
1.498 
0.006 
 
1.447 
0.002 
Model 7 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
b 
 
 
a 
 
b 
 
1.525 
0.003 
 
1.420 
0.003 
Model 8 
    Expβ 
    Sig 
 
b 
 
1.267 
0.014 
 
1.375 
0.000 
 
b 
 
b 
* - Approaching statistical significance [p< 0.10] 
a – Not statistically significant 
b – Not tested 
 
The indices found to be statistically significant are consistent across models.  A profile of 
a high performing municipality in this sample is one that emphasizes intensive recruitment 
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procedures, offers family-work benefits, places emphasis on flexible job practices and provides 
avenues for employee and employer communication.  Using the concept of HRM dimensions, 
high performers pay attention to the quality of the workforce, are highly flexible and to a lesser 
extent provide practices designed to contribute to a more committed workforce.  Findings for 
each hypothesis are discussed below.  
 
Quality 
 There are four practices included in this HRM performance dimension: recruitment 
intensity, selection tests/criteria, streamlined selection and training.  Of these four practices there 
is evidence that recruitment intensity is a predictor of high performance.  Also, training is 
significant in Model 8 and approaching significance in Model 3.  Although it shows some 
promise in this sample, training was not statistically significant in seven of the models it was 
tested and is, therefore, not considered a strong predictor of high performance in this sample.   
 
H1:  Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the applicant 
pool are more likely to be high performing than those using fewer methods.   
The data analysis supports the rejection of the null hypothesis for recruitment methods.   
Seventeen recruitment practices are included in the recruitment index including categories of 
targeted recruitment (e.g. professional groups, special interest organizations) and other less 
traditional recruitment methods.   
Research in the private sector (Huselid, 1995; McDuffie, 1995; Becker & Huselid, 
1998a) suggests that comprehensive recruitment procedures are viewed as high performance 
work practices that contribute to lower employee turnover, greater productivity and increased 
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firm financial performance.  It seems evident high performing municipalities in this sample are 
emphasizing methods to increase the size of the applicant pool with qualified candidates in order 
to improve/maintain the professional quality of their workforce.  Of particular interest is the 
inclusion of local government internships.  This method is often considered a selection process 
with the highest reliability and validity for predicting successful job performance (Klingner & 
Nalbandian, 1998).  The recruitment index was statistically significant in all models where it was 
included as an independent variable.  
 
H2: Municipalities using a greater number of selection criteria are more likely to be high 
performing than those using fewer. 
  The data analysis does not support the rejection of the null hypothesis for selection.  The 
selection function was divided into two indices – (E1) selection tests and (E2) selection criteria 
and screening methods.  The selection tests index was statistically significant in a negative 
direction in all models where it was included as an independent variable except for Model 7 
where it was not statistically significant.     
Private sector research suggests careful selection with a reliable and valid regimen helps 
acquire and maintain a high quality staff (Huselid, 1995; McDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997).  The 
literature also demonstrates that certain selection tests may be useful in predicting successful job 
performance (Ryan et al., 2004; O’Leary et al., 2002; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; McDaniel et al., 
2001).   
The apparent contradiction between the research and the findings in this study for the use 
of selection tests may be related to their expense and the differences found in the public sector 
with respect to HR and manager discretion.  While one would expect private sector managers to 
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be concerned with conserving scarce resources, there are fewer constraints on them than found in 
the public sector.  Nutt (1999) points out that in the private sector, law and the need for internal 
consensus are the only limits to management autonomy and flexibility.  In the public sector, 
additional administrative mandates often limit the fiscal autonomy and discretion of a public 
manager.  If testing is desired, expense can be less of an issue in the private sector.  In the public 
sector the expenses involved in testing, the time involved and, in some cases, the limited validity 
of a test, have all led to a reduced usage (Berman, 2006).   
Arguments against aptitude and performance tests challenge their lengthy testing 
protocols, costly designs and expense to administer.  Also, the possibilities that qualified job 
seekers may be discouraged from applying and the employment process could slow down, 
particularly with a large applicant pool (e.g. waiting for test dates and scores), have led to more 
emphasis on selection flexibility and less emphasis on testing in public organizations (Gore, 
1993).   
The use of standardized tests can be problematic with the contemporary nature of work, 
where jobs are becoming broader, change frequently, rely more on interpersonal skills and team 
working, and require creativity and self-initiative (Berman et al., 2006).  This suggests a more 
abstract view beyond what standardized testing can provide.  Further, tests that measure 
cognitive skills and abilities, thought to be the most useful in predicting successful performance, 
are often controversial because of the potential adverse impact on protected class members 
(Pynes, 2004).   
In many ways the negatives associated with testing appear to outweigh the positives.  The 
additional constraints inherent in the public sector often result in a slower hiring process without 
testing.  The potential of further delays due to testing, the possible need to expend additional 
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funds to hire or contract out for additional testing services and the mixed reviews of whether 
testing actually predicts job success, may discourage their widespread use.  In view of a 
questionable return on what could be an expensive investment, the complexity of administering 
tests and the potential delays in putting a new hire to work, it seems reasonable to suspect that 
testing could be negatively correlated with high performance.    
The second selection index was not statistically significant in any model where it was 
included as an independent variable.  Unlike the private sector, this seems to be a reasonable 
finding in view of the emphasis on merit in the public sector and the requirement to ensure all 
selection decisions are thoroughly documented and legally defensible.  One could expect that 
most municipalities in this sample use similar criteria when making selection decisions. 
 
H3: Municipalities using a streamlined selection process are more likely to be high 
performing than those without a streamlined process. 
   The data analysis does not support the rejection of the null hypothesis for a streamlined 
selection process.  This index was not statistically significant in the two models it was included.   
This variable is related to the decentralization of HRM decision authority and the 
simplification of bureaucratic procedures as proposed by public choice theory.  In the private 
sector it is thought to contribute to better performance (MacDuffie, 1995; Guest 1997) as delays 
in hiring people are minimized and the hiring decisions are made at the point of contact with the 
job requirements.  Jackson and Huber (1993) recognized the trend in private industry was toward 
greater decentralization and delegation of HRM responsibilities to operating units and managers.  
This was thought to allow for greater flexibility in coping with a changing environment.   
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In this study, the presence or absence of the “rule of n” is used as a representation of the 
degree of bureaucratic simplification (as prescribed by public choice theory) in a municipality 
through a streamlined selection process. This rule refers to the practice whereby personnel 
offices determine eligibility of all applicants for a position and provide the line department with 
a smaller number of referrals (normally “n” equals three) determined to meet the minimum 
requirements and be the most qualified.  It is thought that this restrictive practice unnecessarily 
usurps line manager (supervisor) authority in determining which applicants are most qualified for 
a job opening.    
The contradiction between private sector literature and this study may relate to mandates 
in public sector personnel policies when compared to the private sector.  Berman et al. (2006) 
point out that while this practice is less restrictive today than in the past, it is still promulgated by 
many civil service systems to restrict consideration to the top qualified candidates whether this 
number is three or six.  While a criticized practice, there are practical reasons for limiting 
consideration to the most qualified candidates in terms of time involved in the unproductive 
review of less qualified applicants.   This seems to suggest that the presence or absence of a “rule 
of n” may be more related to civil service rules, and perhaps preferences, at these localities than 
to performance.  In fact, depending on the degree of centralized restriction imposed, a “rule of n” 
may be a more efficient approach to screening and selecting applicants, than delegating this to 
line managers.   
 
H4: Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house training 
programs are more likely to be high performing than those reporting fewer.  
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The data analysis only supports the rejection of the null hypothesis in Model 8.  The 
training index includes workplace diversity training, ethics training, and whether training is 
mandatory and offered by an in-house training department.  The training index was tested in all 
eight models and found to be not statistically significant in seven models. Although training 
shows some promise by being statistically significant in one model and approaching significance 
in Model 3 [p = 0.110] at the 90 percent confidence level, it cannot be considered a strong 
performance predictor in this sample.   
Training is a practice thought to consistently contribute to high performance in the 
private sector literature.  There are a number of training aspects that are typically thought to be of 
value for contributing to higher performance such as training for new and existing employees to 
enhance physical skills, convey information, improve managerial skills, provide a venue for 
ongoing values/socialization training and to reinforce policies and procedures (Wood, 1999).  
Training represents an investment in employees by employers to ensure quality in the workforce 
and resultant performance oucomes.   
The contradiction between the results of this study and the private sector may be due to 
several possibilities.  First, the rather narrow focus of this study’s training index, which primarily 
represents policies and procedures training, may not be broad enough to adequately reflect 
differences in training functions among municipalities.  However, one could argue that the 
presence of an in-house mandatory training program in ethics and diversity could be 
representative of a municipality’s commitment to training, and additional queries could reveal a 
stronger training variable in terms of predicting high performance. Secondly, public managers 
often recognize and support training as valuable and critical to performance.  However, those in 
positions with political influence often view employees as costs rather than assets when more 
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distant from the first-hand management of the organization.  This distance, often coupled with 
political solutions to reduce the size of government, interferes with management discretion.   In 
these instances, training funds frequently become the target for reduction when seeking cost 
savings.  Paradoxically, actions to address reduced resources (or hiring freezes/reductions in 
force) actually create a critical need to invest significantly in the current workforce to replace 
new or different knowledge, skills and abilities normally sought by recruiting new employees.   
 Given the changing demographics of the workforce and rapid technological advances, 
training is an increasingly important challenge for public organizations.   A commitment to 
training represents a long-term investment in the workforce requiring both employers and 
citizens to view public employees as assets, as opposed to costs, where investments in human 
capital will help to ensure quality in government (Klingner & Nalbandian 1998; Berman et al., 
2006).     
 
Commitment 
 There are four practices included in this HRM performance dimension: benefits, family-
work benefits, pay for performance and employee involvement.  Of these four practices there 
appears to be evidence providing family-work benefits predicts high performance.   
 
H5: Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees are more likely to be 
high performing than those offering fewer benefits. 
The data analysis does not support rejecting the null hypothesis for benefits.  The benefit 
index (B) contains what could be described as more traditional employee benefits in the public 
sector.  This index was not statistically significant in Models 1, 2 or 3.  This is not surprising as 
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unlike the private sector, government agencies at all levels - federal, state and local – have a 
tradition of offering benefits at levels generally higher than the private sector (Roberts, 2004). 
Therefore, offering a greater number of benefits, while seen as more significant in the private 
sector, has long been the case in municipalities.  Roberts (2004) found that the majority of 
municipalities with populations over 10,000 included in his National League of Cities sample 
offered traditional benefits (over 90 percent offered health insurance, prescription drug coverage, 
paid vacation benefits, paid vacation and life insurance).  He concludes that in terms of 
traditional benefits municipalities are more than competitive with the private sector in terms of 
coverage levels (p. 5) but lag behind the private sector in offering key family-friendly benefits 
(p. 6).   
 
H6: Municipalities offering a greater number of family-work benefits to employees are more 
likely to be high performing than those offering fewer. 
  The data analysis supports the rejection of the null hypothesis for family-work benefits.    
The family-work index is statistically significant in both models tested; in the full model (Model 
1) and in Model 8.  In this study, ten benefits were identified as appropriate for inclusion in the 
family-work index as they can be viewed as being more oriented toward balancing family 
demands and work demands, than more traditional benefits (sick leave, annual leave, insurance 
etc.).  These practices include: paid maternity leave and paternity leave (both distinct from other 
leave), funeral leave, relocation expenses, spending account for medical/child care, on site 
daycare, subsidized daycare, flexible work hours, job sharing and telecommuting.  The last three 
practices also comprise a job flexibility index used to determine if they independently predict 
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performance in the last HRM performance dimension of flexibility.  These two indices are not 
mutually exclusive and are used independent of each other.   
 The findings in this study parallel private sector literature suggesting family-friendly 
work practices provide certain benefits for employers (Gray, 2002; Kling, 1995).  The changing 
characteristics of the American workforce have been widely discussed (US Department of Labor, 
Hudson Institute).  Projections indicate the near future will bring more women, older workers, 
temporary employees, minorities, and immigrants into the workforce in both private and public 
sectors (Berman et al., 2006).  It is generally agreed that the needs of the workforce are changing 
dramatically.  How organizations respond to this will have a potentially significant effect on 
performance.  
The finding in this study that family-work practices are significantly related to 
performance agrees with Gray (2002) who found the performance of work places offering a 
range of “family-friendly” policies is superior to those work places without these practices.  It 
also fits with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) research findings that 
adopting programs designed to address family-work issues can improve productivity and 
recruitment, reduce attrition and absenteeism, reduce costs and improve customer service 
(NAPA, 1998).  For example, according to NAPA (1998), research shows that high performing 
organizations offer employees a variety of work schedules designed to meet their work and 
personal needs (p. 23).  These organizations have also found that offering support for childcare 
needs can be an excellent recruitment tool, lowers rates of unexpected absenteeism and improves 
productivity (p. 26).  In addition, they found telecommuting can improve hiring capability, 
decrease attrition, improve productivity and decrease costs (pp. 28 – 29). 
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H7: Municipalities with pay for performance programs are more likely to be high      
performing than those without these programs.   
The data analysis does not support rejecting the null hypothesis for pay for performance 
programs.  Pay for performance and merit pay increases based on contributions to an 
organization are key features associated with high performance in the private sector.  The pay for 
performance index (PP) was tested in seven of eight models and found to be not statistically 
significant.   
There is ample evidence in the private sector research suggesting pay for performance 
programs are integral to achieving high performance in an organization (Self, 1993; Pfeffer, 
1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997; Kling, 1995).  In applying this to 
government, public choice theory suggests it addresses one of the important performance 
problems in government, namely a lack of competition (Tullock, 1979; Self, 1993; Lovrich & 
Neiman, 1984; Shughart & Razzolini, 2001). Bonuses and financial rewards based on the 
quantity and quality of a person’s work output are also a reflection of motivation in the sense that 
extrinsic financial reward (assuming it is valued by the person) based on achievable performance 
objectives can be motivating (e.g. expectancy theory) and result in high performance.   
Possible reasons for the contradictory findings in this study appear to center around 
differences between public and private sectors.  The political dimension of the public sector, the 
impetus to guard against big government and expenditures of public tax revenue have led, in 
most cases to compensation systems not conducive to workable pay for performance plans 
comparable to the private sector (Ingraham, 1993).  Many of the compensation systems in place 
are representative of a culture of “entitlement” (Risher, 1999) often accompanying seniority.  
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Being part of an organization’s culture and mandated by law, compensation systems are often 
difficult to change. 
The implementation of performance pay schemes in the public sector has been fraught 
with problems and has generally fallen short of expectations (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2006; 
Risher, 1999; Coggburn, 2003; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Ingraham, 1993; Perry, 2003; Cooper, 
1992).  A number of reasons have been offered attempting to explain this phenomenon.  
Kellough & Lu (1993) point out that tying pay to performance requires: (1) good performance 
measures; (2) the ability to control the amount of pay a person receives; and (3) the performance 
outcome link to be visible and trustworthy (p. 47).  In the public sector there have been 
significant difficulties with performance evaluation and appraisal.  Goals and performance 
criteria are diverse and difficult to measure, much of a performance evaluation is subjective, 
leniency and conflict avoidance often result in inflated ratings, there is often a lack of standard 
criteria for distributing performance awards, a lack of confidence among employees in the 
system for separating good from poor performers and there is generally significant paperwork 
and documentation required (p. 49-50).   
Risher (1999) points out that pay for performance represents a symbolic break from the 
“entitlement” culture and can come to be viewed as a method to deny increases to poor 
performers versus a focus on rewarding good performers.  Further, due to the difficulties with 
performance evaluation and a lack of sufficient resources to implement pay for performance, pay 
systems in the public sector have had little positive impact on employee motivation and 
organization performance.  Linkages between performance and outcomes have been difficult to 
achieve (p. 48).  Pay for performance programs in the private sector have found that sufficiently 
large pay increases are needed to be effective.  This is less likely to occur in the public sector due 
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to the political environment, fiscal stress and budget reductions (p. 52).  Some even challenge the 
notion that pay is a significant enough motivator in the public sector to improve productivity 
where goals are sometimes unclear (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2006; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Perry, 
2003). 
  Ingraham (1993) points out that pay for performance programs are not “add on’s” to 
existing compensation systems rather they challenge the standardized compensation rules of 
entire civil service systems.  In order to be effective pay for performance schemes need to be an 
integral part of the overall management system.  Also, the common practice of adopting these 
programs without broader reforms to support them is viewed as an “adjustment” rather than a 
fundamental revision to existing management systems (p. 351).  While pay for performance and 
merit pay systems are found in the public sector their effectiveness in contributing to improved 
performance is certainly questionable possibly for one or more of the reasons mentioned above.  
The results in this study seem to fit the general consensus in the literature that implementing pay 
for performance programs in the public sector has failed to achieve desired results. 
 
H8: Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance standards are 
more likely to be high performing than those where employees are not involved.  
The data analysis does not support rejecting the null hypothesis for employee 
involvement in developing performance standards.  This index (I) was tested in only Model 5 
and was not statistically significant as a predictor of high performance.  In the private sector 
Huselid, (1995) found that this sort of involvement contributed to a higher level of commitment 
on the part of both employee and employer, thus reinforcing the reciprocal nature of the 
 194
employment contract.  This dynamic, in relation to other variables, is thought to contribute to 
higher performance.   
While appraisal and joint involvement in agreeing on performance objectives may be an 
innovative method in the private sector, it may be more common in the public sector given a 
likely greater number of regulatory requirements for documenting performance to justify 
promotions, awards and protection during periods of downsizing.  Berman, et al. (2006) points 
out that the most common results oriented appraisal approach is management by objectives 
(MBO).  This approach requires a mutual agreement on goals and objectives (p. 252) and 
generally requires the involvement of both employer and employee.  Although there are 
drawbacks associated with implementing an MBO approach in terms of effectiveness, it is a 
popular technique to provide a measure of accomplishment against predetermined objectives (p. 
253).  This being the case, its common use diminishes the likelihood it is more common among 
either high or low performing groups.    
 
Flexibility 
 There are four practices included in this HRM performance dimension: job flexibility, 
decentralized HRM practices, communication and group participation.  Of these four practices 
there appears to be evidence to support job flexibility and communication as predictors of high 
performance. 
 
H9: Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices are more likely to be high performing 
than those with centralized HRM practices. 
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The data analysis does not support rejecting the null hypothesis for decentralized HRM 
practices.  The decentralized HRM practices index (D) consists of 12 questionnaire responses 
interpreted to indicate HRM decisions are either centralized (made by HRM professionals) or 
decentralized (delegated to line managers).  This index was not statistically significant in the 
models it was tested.   
Decentralized HRM decision-making is a key feature of public choice theory and found 
in the private sector literature to be associated with high performance.  This approach involves 
delegating personnel policy decision making to line managers.  Decisions such as establishing 
qualifications for jobs, developing job descriptions, recruiting and selecting applicants (for initial 
hire or for promotion, training etc.) are seen by many as being more appropriate for 
supervisors/line managers, who are closer to the actual work required, than for HRM 
professionals who are normally more distant from the actual work performance (Pfeffer, 1994; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997; Wood, 1999).  
The contradiction found between this study and the private sector literature may stem 
from more limited autonomy and flexibility in the public sector due to legislative mandates 
associated with the management of civil service systems (Nutt, 1993).  Equating deregulation 
and decentralization with increased efficiency partly stems from popular political positions of 
public officials who promise to deregulate in order to achieve “better government” and the belief 
that centralized personnel operations are less efficient and often impede line managers. Some of 
the literature does suggest a streamlined or “decentralized” approach would be more effective.  
However, a decentralized system, while seeming to fit a “common sense” approach to HRM 
requires a number of conditions to be met if it is to be successful.  A centralized system relieves 
managers of handling HR issues and their related burdens.    
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If there is to be a shift to a more decentralized system the HRM professional must have 
the capacity and skills to act as a consultant, and line managers need the capacity and skills to 
handle HRM problems.  Coggburn (2003) points out some experiments to decentralize have 
resulted in eliminating HR regulations only to resurrect regulations at operational levels and line 
managers become more risk averse as it becomes apparent that missteps in the personnel arena 
can negatively affect careers.  Paradoxically the centralized HRM system, perceived to be slow 
and cumbersome, also can make HR decisions more consistent, predictable and equitable.  In one 
study, both HR professionals and line managers viewed centrally prescribed personnel 
regulations as being the key to insuring fair treatment of employees (pp. 83-84).  The sample in 
this study seems more centralized in HRM functions than not, and decentralization of these 
functions is not associated with high performance. 
 
H10: Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices are more likely to 
be high performing than those offering fewer of these practices.   
The data analysis supports rejecting the null hypothesis for flexible work practices.  The 
job flexibility index (J) consists of flexible work hours, job sharing and telecommuting.  This 
index was statistically significant in all six models tested suggesting it is a strong predictor of 
high performance in this sample.  Flexible work hours, or providing employees with control over 
balancing work-life by selecting their work hours (within limits set by management), is viewed 
by many organizations implementing such programs as a low-cost employee benefit that raises 
morale, while enabling the organization to improve coverage, extend service hours, reduce or 
eliminate tardiness, and improve recruitment and retention of valued employees (Schmidt & 
Duenas, 2002).   
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There is strong support in the private sector suggesting flexible work practices are 
associated with higher performance (Guest, 1997; Pfeffer, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 
1995; Arthur, 1992; Kling, 1995).3  Drawing from (and competing for) much of the same 
population, both private and public sectors are likely adjusting to demographic changes that are 
defining the nature of the workforce.  Research in both sectors appears to reinforce the idea of a 
flexible approach to job design and work scheduling contributing to higher performance.  
NAPA (1998) research shows that high performing organizations offer employees a 
variety of non-standard work schedules to allow them to better balance work and family needs.  
A wide range of employers reported the following benefits of flexible work scheduling: (1) it 
provides a powerful recruiting tool; (2) attrition rates and absenteeism rates less than half that of 
employees engaged in similar work using standard scheduling; (3) twice the productivity; and (4) 
reduced expenditures (p. 23).   
Job sharing enables two employees to split responsibilities, hours and salaries of a full-
time position.  Surveys have shown that job sharing is more common at the federal and state 
levels than the local levels (Berman et al., 2006).  Job sharing allows employees to earn 
professional wages and maintain a career while working fewer hours and balancing home and 
work responsibilities.   
Telecommuting refers to employees, full and part time, being allowed to work at home, 
or at a location near home, for all or part of their work schedule.  This arrangement has become 
increasingly popular given the growth of personal computer use, and arrangements often include 
professionals, managers, clerical workers and in some cases production workers (Schmidt & 
Duenas, 2002).  NAPA (1998) found in their research that employers associated telecommuting 
                                                 
3 For job sharing see Pfeffer (1994), Huselid, (1995); MacDuffie (1995), and for telecommuting see Arthur, (1992) 
and Kling (1995). 
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with increased hiring capability, decreased attrition, improved productivity and reduced costs (p. 
28).  The findings in this analysis are consistent with the private sector literature linking these 
flexible work practices with high performance. 
   
H11: Municipalities with a greater number of established communication processes for 
employees are more likely to be high performing than those with fewer. 
The data analysis supports rejecting the null hypothesis for communication processes.  
The communication index (C) was statistically significant in all models it was tested.  It contains 
four questionnaire response items intended to obtain a measure of organizational communication 
and involvement of employees.  These include whether municipalities: (1) formally evaluate 
their performance appraisal systems; (2) conduct employee attitude surveys; (3) have a 
suggestion program; and (4) have a labor/management committee.   
Private sector research supports a relationship exists between high performance and 
opportunities offered for expanding employee roles in the workplace through high levels of 
communication, information sharing and involvement (Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Arthur, 
1992; MacDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997).  This is an important aspect of expectancy theory whereby 
the employer is flexible enough to give their employees a role in problem solving to test their 
skills, and contribute effectively to the organization (Lawler, 1970).   
This study reinforces private sector research where the communication index (C) appears 
to be a strong predictor of performance in the seven models it was tested.  In the public sector, 
communication is critical to an organization’s ability to encourage employees to perform 
effectively in support of the government goals.  This can be partly accomplished through 
maintaining or improving the performance appraisal system by way of formal feedback 
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mechanisms, conducting employee attitude surveys and soliciting employee feedback through a 
suggestion program, (Donahue et al., 2000).  Another important feature of communication 
relating to performance is the relationship between organized labor and management.  Donahue 
et al. (2004) indicate the literature supports the theory that unions constrain managerial 
autonomy and likely performance.  Therefore, a “partnership” approach and ongoing 
communication between unions and management are essential to goal achievement and high 
performance.   
Internal communication arrangements are a critical part of any comprehensive HRM 
policy and the quality of direct communication between management and employees is important 
in conveying organization goals in terms of performance expectations (Beaumont, 1993).  Goss 
(1994), writing from the private sector, ties suggestion programs, attitude surveys and attention 
paid to communication flow (vertical/horizontal) to employee involvement.  He outlines the 
advantages of suggestion programs for soliciting good ideas and rewarding them; encouraging a 
climate of change; identifying creative employees; and providing a possible measure of 
employee morale (p. 114).  Attitude surveys can be useful in gauging and measuring employee 
commitment (p. 115).  Suggestion program concerns may be more focused on specific technical 
problems and solutions while changes emanating from attitude surveys may result in more 
general and overarching policy changes.   
Communication patterns permeate any organization.  The organization paying attention 
to the quality of internal communication, making an effort to directly communicate with 
employees and using methods for conveying and receiving feedback on performance 
expectations is acknowledging a reciprocal employment relationship, and is more likely to 
generate a higher level of organizational trust and commitment among its members.  Based on 
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the theoretical framework for this study, to engage the workforce and respond to their concerns 
requires flexibility, creates conditions for high motivation and contributes to high performance.   
Consistent with findings in the private sector, the results in this study show a strong relationship 
between the communication index and high performance. 
 
H12: Municipalities providing incentives for group participation are more likely to be high 
performing than those that do not. 
The data analysis does not support rejecting the null hypothesis for group participation. 
The group participation index (G) was not statistically significant in any of the eight models 
tested.  It contains three response items in the questionnaire intended to obtain a measure of 
group participation.  These include whether municipalities: (1) provide rewards for group 
participation; (2) have introduced gainsharing; and (3) have introduced any group incentive plans 
in any department.   
Research in the private sector suggests that an emphasis on group participation and 
providing incentives for working in groups (e.g. teams) results in higher performance (Arthur, 
1992; Pfeffer, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Guest, 1997; Ichniowski, 1997; Becker & 
Huselid, 1998a).  In the public sector there is less empirical evidence of this relationship in terms 
of predicting organization level outcomes.4   
The finding in this study that incentives for group participation were not predictors of 
high performance contradicts findings in the private sector.  A possible reason for this may be 
the differences in samples and nature of work common to these private sector studies when 
comparing them to municipalities.  Many of these studies used samples from manufacturing 
                                                 
4 Popovich, (1998) suggests there is a relationship in theory.   West et al. (2003) offers empirical evidence of a 
relationship, however, studies relating this to the public sector are few. 
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plants (Becker & Huselid, 1998a) focusing on productivity outcomes: steel manufacturing 
(Arthur, 1992 & Ichniowski et al., 1997); automobile assembly plants (MacDuffie, 1995); and 
Greenfield site manufacturing in the UK (Guest, 1997).  Organizing groups or teams 
competitively around units of production provide concrete measures to determine performance 
improvements and rewards (e.g. gainsharing).  Difficulties with measuring group outcomes in 
the government absent concrete measures like production units and financial profit may make 
groups and team working less attractive than individual efforts.  Also, the nature of the work 
may not lend itself to competition or group activity.   
Gainsharing is a monetary award or recognition for a group based on savings the group 
generates (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2006; Risher, 1999).  It is based on the assumption that 
performance will improve if workers are rewarded for increases in productivity (Cooper, et al., 
1992).  In the public sector, funding constraints often limit gainsharing savings to non-monetary 
group recognition as opposed to a financial share of the savings realized in the private sector.  
According to Cooper et al. (1992) and Risher (1999) gainsharing, as well as other group 
incentive programs are thought to bring certain problems to the forefront.  Group incentive 
programs are thought to only work if the culture of an organization truly allows employees to be 
empowered to solve problems.  Otherwise, empowering the group to develop better ways of 
operating can threaten managers as it may highlight problems they should have recognized and 
solved.  Therefore, managers can nullify any benefits group participation may be able to 
produce.   
Group incentives also can conflict with individual pay for performance.  This dilemma 
emphasizes that compensation has been increasingly detached from individual worker 
productivity, as individual and group incentives diverge.  Also individual rewards are based on 
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group performance and individuals only get a fraction of the benefit.  This can encourage 
individuals to “free ride” as they don’t get a full benefit for any additional effort and regardless 
of their own contribution, they can profit from improvement due to others’ effort (Cooper, et al., 
1993).  In addition, group incentive programs, being promoted as a primary ingredient for high 
performance creates a paradox, as the need for individual performance appraisal and pay for 
performance, also promoted as important for contributing to high performance, are eventually 
eliminated (Kellough & Lu, 1993).  Interestingly, neither group participation nor pay for 
performance was statistically significant in this analysis in terms of predicting high performance.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Overview 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore relationships between human resource 
management (HRM) practices and government level outcomes of selected municipalities nation-
wide to address the following research question:  
  
Are there differences in HRM practices among municipalities that contribute to high 
performance as measured by local government outcomes? 
  
Four of 12 hypotheses were supported in the analysis and found to be associated with 
high performance.  These results are depicted in the following table: 
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Table 42: Summary of Hypotheses Supported/Not Supported 
 
 
Hypotheses Supported 
 
1.     Municipalities using a greater number of recruitment methods to increase the applicant pool are more likely to 
be high performing than those using fewer methods.  
6.     Municipalities offering a greater number of work-family benefits are more likely to be high performing than 
those offering fewer.  
9.     Municipalities offering a greater number of flexible work practices are more likely to be high   performing 
than those offering fewer of these practices. 
11. Municipalities with a greater number of established communication processes for employees are more likely 
to be high performing than those with fewer. 
 
Hypotheses Not Supported 
 
2.    Municipalities using a greater number of selection tests/ criteria are more likely to be   high performing than 
those using fewer. 
3.    Municipalities using a streamlined selection process are more likely to be high   performing than those without 
a streamlined process. 
4.    Municipalities reporting a greater number of mandatory and in-house   training   programs are more likely to 
be high performing than those reporting fewer.   
5.    Municipalities offering a greater number of benefits to employees are more likely to be high performing than 
those offering fewer benefits. 
7.    Municipalities with pay for performance programs are more likely to be high performing than those without 
these programs.   
8.    Municipalities where employees are involved in developing performance standards are more likely to be high 
performing than those where employees are not involved.  
10.   Municipalities with decentralized HRM practices are more likely to be high performing than those with 
centralized HRM practices. 
12.  Municipalities providing incentives for group participation are more likely to be high performing than those      
       that do not. 
 
Summary 
The distinction between this study and other public sector studies attempting to measure 
management effectiveness is the focus on an organizational or government level outcome instead 
of HRM level outcomes.  For example, there are a number of public sector studies that examine 
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the effect of management practices on HRM outcomes such as employee turnover, job stress, job 
satisfaction etc.  This study makes the case that a linkage needs to be established between HRM 
practices and organization level outcomes in order to validate the effects of using private sector 
techniques to reform the public sector.  In short, unless there is evidence reforms make a 
difference and improve organization performance, they may not matter.   
Unlike financial profit or market share in the private sector, comparable measurable 
outcomes for which the government itself can be held accountable are more difficult to isolate.  
A search of the literature revealed little work done in the public sector trying to relate 
management practices to organization-level outcomes, but uncovered a number of studies in the 
private sector with compelling empirical evidence of a linkage between HRM practices and firm 
level outcomes.   
There are usually a large number of confounding variables associated with trying to link 
management practices directly with government outcomes.  However, an argument was 
developed in this study that an uninsured general obligation municipal bond rating can be 
reasonably linked to the management practices of a municipality, and be used as a proxy 
measurement of performance.   A database of HRM practices was obtained from the ICMA 
containing the results of an HRM survey of all U.S. municipalities with a population over 
10,000.  The municipal bond rating found in rating agency publications provided the dependent 
variable and the ICMA survey results provided the independent variables needed for this study.  
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Theoretical Framework  
The resource based theory of the firm (RBT) and expectancy theory form the theoretical 
foundation used in many private sector studies, and were borrowed, along with public choice 
theory, to frame the theoretical approach for this study. 
Public choice theory is an economic theory applied to government and provides the 
theoretical underpinnings for reinvention and NPM.  Government inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness are attributed to three basic problems: (1) the size of government; (2) complex 
bureaucracy; and (3) a lack of competition.  The solutions offered to improve government 
performance are then reduced size, de-regulation and decentralization of government services, 
and the introduction of competition.    HRM practices reflecting these solutions would include 
decentralizing HRM decisions and theoretically reducing the need for HRM professionals and 
their number, streamlining HRM procedures, introducing pay for performance programs and 
incentives for group activities (e.g. rewards for group participation such as gainsharing).  
RBT argues that the source of competitive advantage can be found internal to the 
organization in its physical, financial and human resources.  How these resources are developed 
and nurtured determines organizational performance.  A stream of thought within RBT stresses 
the importance for management to invest in its human capital, and recognize the reciprocal 
nature of the employment contract, in order to reach the level of commitment necessary for 
achieving high organization performance. The concept of a “human capital pool” represents the 
collective human capital available at any time in an organization.  Because individual employees 
--not the firm -- own human capital, management practices must be developed to “tap” this pool 
in such a way as to elicit the desired individual and collective work behavior.  This thinking 
argues that of all resources available to the firm, its human resources are the most important as 
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they consume all other resources, leading to a body of research focused on linking human 
resource practices with organization performance.   This emphasis is termed “human capitalism” 
and was recognized by the Winter Commission (Thompson, 1993) in its study for improving 
local government performance.  A universal application of RBT suggests there are a number of 
HRM practices considered “best practices” and they can be generalized among organizations.  
Much of the private sector research reviewed takes this approach and develops a set of HRM 
practices supported empirically as “superior” in terms of contributing to high performance.  
Many of these practices were used in this study as possible predictors of high performance. 
Expectancy theory proposes at the individual level, high performance depends on a high 
level of motivation, the possession of the necessary skills and abilities for achievement and an 
appropriate role, and understanding of that role, in the workplace (Guest, 1997).  Therefore, 
HRM practices encouraging high skill and ability levels, high motivation and an appropriate role 
structure, reinforced by extensive communication and feedback can provide the potential linkage 
with processes that facilitate high performance.  Three dimensions of HRM are suggested by 
expectancy theory as linked to high performance: 
1.  Quality – achieving a high level of skills and abilities derived from HRM practices 
such as intensive and targeted recruitment, careful selection, and training. 
2.  Commitment – achieving a high level of effort and motivation by recognizing 
reciprocal employer – employee commitment derived from offering basic benefits, 
tailoring benefits to balance work and family life and pay for performance programs. 
3.  Flexibility – achieving an actual and perceived role structure for problem solving 
through flexible work practices, communication, decentralization and group 
incentives. 
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A normative expectancy theory model provided the theoretical linkage between HRM 
practices, motivation and performance outcomes. Here it was argued HRM practices should be 
designed and carried out to achieve the outcomes of quality (capabilities, knowledge and skills of 
the staff), commitment (identification with the organization, desire to belong to the 
organization), and flexibility (functional flexibility). Behavioral change and higher performance 
can be expected when all three of these HRM outcomes are achieved (Guest, 1997).   
 
Municipal Bond Ratings 
 Municipal bond ratings are issued by rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Fitch 
and Moody’s Investor Services on the request of the municipality.  Obtaining a rating from one 
or more of these agencies provides information to investors as to the credit worthiness of the 
municipality.  Historically, the criteria used by these agencies to assign a rating were generally 
based on the debt, economic, financial and administration and management characteristics of the 
municipality.   Historically, rating agencies did not offer much information on how these factors 
were weighted in their assessment.  Since the 1980’s reduced federal funding yet increasing 
federal mandates underscored the importance of bond ratings for attracting investors and 
securing lower interest rates for borrowing by municipalities.  The lack of a transparent 
methodology on the part of the rating agencies led to controversy, speculation and criticism in 
the 1990’s as to how these ratings were derived.  Complicating the matter further, were the 
ratings assigned to insured municipal bonds. Rating agencies assign ratings to insured bonds 
based on the rating of the insurance company.  Many of the large insurance firms are rated AAA 
and this is the rating assigned these municipal bonds.   
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Insuring municipal bonds became more prevalent following some high visibility defaults 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and by 2000 nearly 50 percent of all bond issues were insured.  One 
result of the popularity of bond insurance was the creation of an information problem in the bond 
market, namely that a bond from a poorly managed municipality could be rated AAA and in 
reality be a “lemon.”  A market correction to this information problem was the issuance by 
Standard and Poor’s of an “un-enhanced” or “underlying” rating – a “SPUR” – to give investors 
an estimation of a municipality’s credit worthiness without insurance.   Municipalities request 
the SPUR rating and its publication. 
 For this study, in order to use a municipal bond rating as a proxy for performance, the 
bond needed to be a general obligation bond as opposed to a revenue bond; and the rating needed 
to reflect the credit quality of the municipality, and its related administration and management 
quality.  To meet these criteria, the general obligation bond ratings used were either listed by 
rating agencies as uninsured, or as an un-enhanced rating (SPUR).   
Today, partly as a result of pressure for transparency, rating agencies are more 
forthcoming on what factors are used and how they are weighted in determining bond ratings.   
To link the bond rating to administration and management quality, the strongest justification 
would come from the rating agencies themselves.  Publications by Moody’s Investor Services, 
Fitch and Standard and Poor’s presented compelling arguments that the quality of management 
was perhaps the most important determinant of the un-enhanced or uninsured municipal bond 
rating.     
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Principal Findings 
 A binary logistic regression was the methodology used to determine the HRM practices 
which were strong predictors of performance.  Initially a sample of 420 municipalities 
responding to the ICMA survey had bond ratings within the same time period of the survey.  
Fifty-four of these municipalities were listed with insured ratings only.   
 
Differences Between Insured and Un-enhanced Bond Ratings 
To discern whether there were differences between municipalities with uninsured and 
SPUR ratings, and those with insured only ratings was viewed as a necessary step in the analysis 
for two reasons.  First, differences between these groups addressed the possibility, as explained 
by Peng (2002), that municipalities requesting and authorizing release of a SPUR rating for an 
insured bond are more willing to inform investors of the true credit quality of the municipality.  
Second, because the benefits of insurance increase as the underlying credit quality of a bond 
issue decreases (Justice & Simon, 2002) those not requesting and releasing a SPUR may be of a 
lower credit quality than the insured rating reflects, introducing a possible “lemons” problem 
with insured bonds. 
To address this lemons possibility, two independent samples t-tests were conducted 
comparing insured and uninsured/SPUR bond ratings against a global index of all 94 HRM 
practices available and included in this study.  The hypotheses in this study proposed that the 
greater number of selected HRM practices implemented by a municipality, the higher the 
performance.  In these t-tests, differences between these groups were statistically significant, 
where municipalities with the insured bonds reported significantly fewer HRM practices than 
municipalities with uninsured/SPUR bonds.  This seemed to confirm a lemons possibility and 
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because their AAA ratings were likely inflated they did not meet the definition of high 
performance established in this study.  This provided justification for dropping insured only 
ratings leaving a sample of 366 uninsured/SPUR municipal bond ratings available for analysis.  
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 The ICMA survey instrument response data were organized into 13 indices of HRM 
practices to be used as independent variables to test 12 hypotheses derived from the literature. 
Two of the indices, the family-work index and the job flexibility index were not mutually 
exclusive and could not be included in the same test.  The purpose of this additional job 
flexibility index was to determine whether work practices such as job sharing, telecommuting 
and flexible work hours were predictors of high performance independent from other family-
work practices.   
Municipal bond ratings for 366 municipalities were divided into two groups based on 
whether ratings were considered high investment quality or medium investment quality 
according to Fabozzi (2002).5  High investment bond quality represented the high performance 
group (N = 182).   Medium investment quality represented the lower performance group (N = 
184).   
 To determine differences in HRM practices between these groups, eight models were 
tested using binary logistic regression.  Model 1 was constructed as a full model containing 12 
indices (with the family-work index containing the job flexibility practices).  Model 2 substituted 
the family-work index with the job flexibility index.  Models 3 through 8 were derived from the 
                                                 
5 No municipalities in this sample were rated below medium investment quality. 
 212
private sector literature and represented different combinations of high performing HRM 
practices supported by empirical research. 
 The findings were generally consistent across models with the recruitment intensity index 
(quality), family-work index (commitment) job flexibility index and communication index 
(flexibility) statistically significant and likely strong predictors of high performance.  In one 
model training was statistically significant and approaching significance in another model, 
however, because it was not statistically significant in six other models tested it was not 
considered a strong predictor in this sample.   
 Among the hypotheses not supported in this study were nearly all those practices 
associated with public choice theory designed to address bureaucratic complexity and a lack of 
competition in government.  Although there is common agreement in much of the literature and 
in actual practice that public sector reforms need to be based on private sector techniques, those 
practices associated with high performance in the private sector literature such as 
decentralization, streamlining selection procedures, pay-for-performance and group incentives 
were not associated with high performance in this data.    
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 It is important to reiterate that all municipalities in this study had un-enhanced bond 
ratings of investment quality.  An important conclusion to be drawn from this study is that it 
appears “management does matter” in the sense that the HRM practices examined in this study 
may predict the un-enhanced bond rating.  While all municipalities reflected bond ratings of 
investment quality, those focused on more high performing HRM practices in four areas were of 
a “high” to “highest” investment category when compared to those of a “medium” investment 
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quality.  This suggests that well managed municipalities could move from “good” to “better” in 
terms of management by paying attention to implementing HRM practices within a systems view 
and considering the unique attributes of public organizations.   Simply implementing an 
attractive new practice will not necessary result in higher performance.  Specific conclusions and 
recommendations evolving from this study center around (1) the emphasis high performing 
municipalities place on HRM practices to obtain a quality, committed and flexible workforce; (2) 
the importance of developing a systems understanding of HRM; (3) the possible need for 
fundamental changes to public personnel systems if reforms are deemed important enough to 
implement and; (4) the use of the municipal general obligation bond rating as a measure of a 
local government performance outcome.   
 
Quality, Commitment and Flexibility Emphasis for Practice   
The findings in this study show strong relationships between the three dimensions of 
HRM and high performance, namely, intensive recruitment efforts targeted to increase the 
applicant pool (Quality), offering benefits to balance family-work needs (Commitment), flexible 
work arrangements and maintaining formal and open channels of communication (Flexibility).   
Recommendation 1.  Municipalities may want to increase emphasis on these HRM practices 
based on their strength in predicting high performance.  Specifically, take action to: 
•  Ensure recruitment techniques and practices are in sufficient number and designed to 
target candidates and provide the largest, diversified and highest qualified applicant pool 
possible. 
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•  Following an employee needs assessment, design and offer benefits that address the 
unique needs of the workforce in terms of balancing family and work responsibilities.  Support 
can range from low-cost information, referral and support services to fully funded programs. 
•  Following an employee and organizational needs assessment, develop flexible work 
practices believed to be appropriate and mutually beneficial such as flexible work hours, job 
sharing and telecommuting. 
•  Review existing formal communication avenues to ensure employees in all capacities 
have the opportunities to become involved in providing suggestions for improvement, input and 
feedback to policy and program evaluations and opportunities to participate in attitude surveys. 
•  Take action to ensure communication and involvement exists between formal labor 
unions and management by, at a minimum, establishing and supporting a labor/management 
committee.    
As a caveat to these recommendations, however, full consideration of the following 
conclusions and recommendations should precede implementing new practices in these areas. 
 
Importance of a Systemic View of HRM 
A systems or macro view provides opportunities to avoid and minimize the unanticipated 
consequences of a reform, by looking beyond the implementation of a single HRM practice in 
isolation, to see its potential interrelationships within the larger organizational context.  This 
approach helps to address what Becker, et al. (1997) call “deadly combinations” and “powerful 
connections.”  Deadly combinations occur when a practice in isolation makes sense, but when 
implemented combines with other contradictory practices or values in the environment to 
produce an unexpected outcome.  A powerful connection occurs when interrelationships and the 
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importance of complementarities among HRM practices are recognized, and there are positive 
returns realized by the organization and its members.    
Pay for performance programs provide an example of potential deadly combinations.  
The success of these programs often relies on achieving a balance among potentially problematic 
or competitive factors. This balance is needed if a powerful connection is to be realized.  
Contradictions between pay for performance programs (associated with individual rewards), and 
group incentives (associated with collective rewards) may partially explain why neither were 
associated with high performance in this study.  Only a systems understanding considers the 
interrelated factors associated with pay for performance such as (1) the need for designing 
reliable and valid performance evaluation systems, (2) finding ways to complement the values of 
individualism with collectivism in rewards programs, (3) resolving differences between a 
competitive reward system in an entitlement culture where seniority is valued and (4) having 
sufficient funding to allow for appreciable pay differentials between high and low performers. 
Finding a balance among these competing factors, and possibly others, needs to be considered in 
the design of pay for performance or group incentive programs, in order to make a “powerful 
connection” and realize the positive return of higher performance.   
This approach assumes the underlying theory is sound.  In the case of pay incentives, 
there are those who question the basic assumptions of expectancy theory altogether (Kellough & 
Lu, 1993).  Critics question whether people are rational actors and will attach high importance to 
financial rewards, suggesting that much of human behavior is subconscious and habitual rather 
than rational.  This is particularly pertinent to the public managers who may be drawn to 
government work for more intrinsic reasons.  If the basic assumptions of expectancy theory are 
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flawed in terms of applicability to the public sector, then pay for performance, an extrinsically 
oriented reward program, may also be flawed.   
Emphasizing open communication or developing new channels of communication found 
to be a significant predictor of high performance in this study, while seemingly uncomplicated 
also has deadly combinations.  For example, the purposes for implementing a formal suggestion 
program and conducting attitude surveys need to be non-threatening, non-judgmental and clearly 
related to organizational development and improvement.  Otherwise managers and supervisors 
can be intimidated in terms of problems being identified they should have known about and 
taken action to resolve.   
Finally, family-work benefits and job flexibility initiatives should match the needs of 
employees and be within the means of the municipality.  Schmidt & Duenas, (2002) identify a 
number of considerations to be taken into account in designing these benefits such as the 
presence or absence of need, philosophical acceptance or opposition and resource scarcity.   
Recommendation 2.  Reformers need to develop a broad and systemic understanding of HRM 
within the context of its organization environment in order to minimize “deadly combinations” 
and maximize “powerful connections”.   
 
Incremental or Fundamental Change?   
Attractive private sector techniques might not be easily transferred incrementally, or 
superimposed on public sector organizational personnel structures, which are often governed by 
law and imbued with a cultural atmosphere resistant to change.  More basic structural and legal 
changes may be needed for many techniques to work as intended.  Important differences between 
public and private sectors such as more limited discretion of the public manager, less 
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discretionary funding for bonuses and awards, an emphasis on effectiveness and equity over 
efficiency and other differences are unlikely to change readily.  In many cases changing many 
common characteristics of public management such as these would require legislative action.  
Reforms borrowed from the private sector with promise for improved governmental performance 
may need to be hybrids rather than exact duplications; or other major reforms to the structure of 
personnel systems may need to precede their implementation.  Following from earlier 
discussions of failures in pay for performance programs, one problem may be the incremental 
approach of super-imposing a private sector model on a traditional public personnel system, 
when what may be needed are fundamental changes to the underlying foundation of the 
personnel system itself.   
Following developments in Georgia, Florida and Texas may be instructive in this regard 
(see Walters, 2002).  In 1996, the Georgia legislature abolished its state civil service system.  
Every employee hired after 1 July 1996 serves “at will” and outside the protections of the merit 
system.  Florida, only slightly less dramatic, adopted the Service First reform in 2001 
implementing three major changes to bring the civil service closer to a private sector model.   
This reform eliminated the concept of seniority for all employees excluding police, fire and 
nursing due to potential political intrusion in law enforcement and strong unions for fire and 
nurses.  This change made all supervisory and management positions “at will” and collapsed its 
job classifications into pay bands.  In 1985, Texas eliminated its form of merit system and 
returned control of most personnel management to local agencies.  These represent fundamental 
changes at varying degrees and provide fertile ground for experimental civil service reforms 
particularly if these state reforms have diffused to municipal governments.     
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Recommendation 3.  Reformers fully consider whether a change being contemplated fits the 
fundamental structure of the existing personnel system. 
 
Municipal Bond Rating as a Performance Indicator  
 In theory, a rating agency controls for the economic outlook and debt factors of a 
municipality in the rating of a general obligation municipal bond.  These controls make a 
municipal bond rating an attractive measurable performance outcome when combined with the 
ready admission by the rating agencies themselves that the management of a municipality is the 
primary ingredient in determining the ultimate un-enhanced bond rating. Because of the political 
versus business nature of public management, a single measure of performance is problematic 
and controversial.  The use of any government outcome as a measure of performance must be 
qualified as in this study where police, fire, education and the courts were excluded from the 
survey population.  Each of these areas of municipal management may carry implications for 
selecting significantly different performance outcomes.   
 In this study, rating agency arguments and methodology convincingly supported linking 
management practices to municipal general obligation bond rating. In addition, the importance of 
distinguishing between insured only and un-enhanced ratings strengthens the use of municipal 
bond rating as a government level outcome measure.  There are few government level outcomes 
that can be reduced to link directly to administration and management of a local government.  I is 
concluded that municipal bond ratings can be used as a government/organizational level 
performance measure. 
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Future Research 
 There are a number of areas suggested by this study for future research using the 
municipal bond rating as a measure of effective administration and management:   
• Following the Ingraham & Donahoe (2000) challenge regarding untested assumptions, 
studies to determine if other management practices, the degree of functional integration 
of management practices, and leadership characteristics can be tied to municipal bond 
rating could contribute useful empirical evidence to the literature.    
• A modified replication of this study with a more narrow focus on a smaller number of 
HRM practices combined with designing an instrument as a primary method rather than 
secondary for gathering data, may help minimize some of the error in this study.  Using a 
web-based survey in collaboration with ICMA may help keep costs low and provide 
updated information on performance related reforms in municipalities.   
• Another modified replication of this study could involve selecting a sample of 
municipalities based on the political structure of the municipality (e.g. strong mayor, 
council-manager) and the structure of their personnel systems (merit or “at will”) to 
determine which best predicts municipal bond rating.  Both the type of political structure 
and personnel system can imply an emphasis on a professional civil service or one based 
more on political patronage.  Critics of the most recent reforms in Georgia and Florida 
suggest the changes were motivated more by opportunities for political advantage than by 
business-oriented improvements in efficiency and effectiveness among the state 
workforce.  If these changes have diffused to municipalities in these states there may be 
opportunities for original research in determining their effects. 
• Design research studies to further develop municipal bond ratings as measure of 
government performance. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Listing of Municipal Bond Ratings Published by Mergent’s and Standard & 
Poor’s 
 
1997 - 2001 
 
Ordered by bond ranking 1 through 10 (See Tables 3 – 8) 
 
Column Heading Definitions for Appendix B 
 
 Municipality – Name of municipality listed in ICMA Survey. 
 State – Abbreviation 
 S&P –  Year municipal bond rated by Standard & Poor’s. 
 Year Rated – 1997 – 2001  
 NL – Municipality not listed. 
 NR – Municipality listed but general obligation bonds were not rated. 
 I – Insured  
 Rating – S&P rating issued. 
 Mo – Year rated as listed in Mergents. 
 Year Rated – 1997 – 2001  
 NL – Municipality not listed. 
 NR – Municipality listed but general obligation bonds were not rated. 
 I – Insured 
 Rating – Rating as listed in Mergents 
 
Coding used for entry into SPSS: 
 
 Categ - Rating Category: 
  1 = S&P Insured*  
  2 = Mergent Insured* 
  3 = SPUR 
  4 = S&P Uninsured 
5 = Mergent Uninsured 
 *In bold type 
 Year: 
1 = 97 
  2 = 98 
3 = 99 
  4 = 00 
  5 = 01 
 Performance: 
1 = High 
0 = Low 
 Bond Rank: (See Table 7 p. 112) 
  1-4   = High Performing 
  5-10 = Low Performing 
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Sample – Municipal Bond Rankings & Ratings 
Municipality State S&P Rating Mo Rating Categ Yr Perf Bond 
Rank 
 
City of Novato CA 0 AA- I  4 4 1 1  
Town of Berlin CT 97/I  97 Aaa 5 1 1 1  
Town of Avon CT 98 AAA 98 Aaa 5 2 1 1  
Town of Wilton CT NL  99 Aaa 5 3 1 1  
Town of West Hartford CT 98 AAA 98/99/
00/01 
Aaa 5 4 1 1  
Town of Fairfield CT 0 AAA 98/00 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
City of Boca Raton FL 0 AAA 0 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
City of Naples FL NL  0 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
Village of Northbrook IL 0 AAA 98 Aaa 4 4 1 1  
City of Lake Forest IL NL  99 Aaa 5 3 1 1  
City of Evanston IL NR  0 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
City of Highland Park IL NL  98/99/
00 
Aaa 5 4 1 1  
Village of Wilmette IL NR  99/00/
01 
Aaa 5 4 1 1  
City of Overland Park KS 0 AAA 98 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
Town of Wayland MA NL  97 Aaa 5 1 1 1  
Town of Wellesley MA 98 AAA 98I  4 2 1 1  
Town of Lexington MA NL  98 Aaa 5 2 1 1  
Town of Belmont MA NL  98 Aaa 5 2 1 1  
City of Cambridge MA 99 AAA 98/99/
00 
Aaa 5 3 1 1  
City of Newton MA NL  98/99/
00 
Aaa 5 4 1 1  
Town of Brookline MA NL  98/00 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
City of Charlotte NC 0 AAA 98 Aaa 4 4 1 1  
Town of Chapel Hill NC 0 AA+ 98/00 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
Village of Scarsdale NY NL  97 Aaa 5 1 1 1  
Town of New Castle NY NL  99 Aaa 5 3 1 1  
City of Irving TX 0 AAA 98 Aaa 4 4 1 1  
City of Alexandria VA 99/0 AAA 99 Aaa 5 3 1 1  
City of Brookfield WI NR  99/00 Aaa 5 4 1 1  
City of Norwalk CT 0 AAA 98 Aa1 4 4 1 1  
City of Lincoln Park MI 98 I NL  1 2 1   
City of Cadillac MI 99 I NL  1 3 1   
City of Minneapolis MN 99 AAA 98 Aaa 4 3 1 1  
City of Durham NC 99 AAA 98 Aa1 4 3 1 1  
City of Santa Monica CA 99 AAA 98 Aaa 3 3 1 1  
City of Menasha WI 0 I 97 A1 1 4 1   
City of Marysville WA 98 AAA 98I  3 2 1 1  
City of Greensboro NC 98 AAA NR  4 2 1 1  
Village of Ridgewood NJ 99 AAA NL  4 3 1 1  
City of Tempe AZ 99 AA+ 98 Aa1 4 3 1 2  
City of Scottsdale AZ 99 AA+ 99 Aa1 5 3 1 2  
City of Phoenix AZ 99/0 AA+ 0 Aa1 5 4 1 2  
City of Boulder CO 99/0 AA+ 99/00 Aa1 5 3 1 2  
Town of Glastonbury CT NR  98 Aa1 5 2 1 2  
Town of Farmington CT NL  99 Aa1 5 3 1 2  
Village of Schaumburg IL 0 AA+ 98 Aa1 4 4 1 2  
City of Peabody MA NR  98/01 Aa1 5 5 1 2  
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City of Rockville MD 1 AA+ 98 Aa1 4 5 1 2  
City of Edina MN 0 AA+ 99 Aa1 5 3 1 2  
City of Lincoln NE 99 AAA 99 Aa1 4 3 1 1  
City of Franklin TN NL  98 Aa1 5 2 1 2  
City of Brentwood TN 99 I 99 Aa1 5 3 1 2  
City of Bellevue WA 98 AA+ 98 Aa1 5 2 1 2  
City of Seattle WA 99 AA+ 98 Aa1 3 3 1 2  
City of Appleton WI NL  98 Aa1 5 2 1 2  
City of Milwaukee WI 99 AA+ 98/01 Aa1 4 3 1 2  
City and County of Denver CO 99/0 AA+ 98/99/
00 
Aa2 3 3 1 2  
Village of Hoffman Estates IL 97 AA+ 97 Aa2 4 1 1 2  
Village of Buffalo Grove IL 1 AA+ 98 Aa2 4 5 1 2  
Town of Needham MA 0 AA+ 97 Aa3 4 4 1 2  
Town of Bedford MA 0 AA+ 98/00 Aa2 4 4 1 2  
City of Nashua NH 99 AA+ 99 Aa2 4 3 1 2  
City of Austin TX 0 AA+ 98 Aa2 4 4 1 2  
City of San Antonio TX 0 AA+ 0 Aa2 4 4 1 2  
City of Richardson TX 0 AA+ 98/99/
00 
Aa2 4 4 1 2  
City of Saratoga CA 1 AA+ NL  3 5 1 2  
City of Glendale CA 0 AA+ NR  4 4 1 2  
City of Worthington OH 1 AA+ NL  4 5 1 2  
City of Portland ME 99 AA 98 Aa1 4 3 1 3  
City of Virginia Beach VA 99/0 AA 98 Aa1 4 3 1 3  
City of Huntsville AL 0 AA 98 Aa2 4 4 1 3  
City of Glendale AZ 99/0/1 AA 98 Aa2 4 3 1 3  
City of Tucson AZ 99/0/1 AA 99 Aa2 5 3 1 3  
City of Los Altos CA 99 AA NL  3 3 1 3  
Town of Branford CT 97 AA NL  3 1 1 3  
Town of South Windsor CT 98 AA 98 Aa3 3 2 1 3  
Town of Windsor CT NR  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
Town of Orange CT NL  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
Town of Manchester CT NR  98/00 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Alpharetta GA NL  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
City of Rome GA NL  99 Aa2 5 3 1 3  
City of Davenport IA 0 AA 98 Aa2 3 4 1 3  
City of Sioux City IA 98 AA-* 98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
City of West Des Moines IA NR  99/00 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
Village of Arlington Heights IL NR  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
City of Des Plaines IL NL  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
Village of Wheeling IL 99 AA NL  3 3 1 3  
City of Indianapolis-Marion IN 1 AAA 0 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Lenexa KS 99/0 AA 98 Aa2 4 3 1 3  
City of Wichita KS 99/0 AA 99 Aa2 4 3 1 3  
City of Lawrence KS NL  0 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
Town of Falmouth MA 99/0 AA 97 Aa3 4 3 1 3  
Town of Acton MA NR  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
Town of Medfield MA NL  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
Town of Danvers MA 99 AA I  3 3 1 3  
Town of Canton MA 99 AA* 97 Aa3 4 3 1 3  
City of Birmingham MI 99/0 AA NL  3 3 1 3  
City of Maple Grove MN NL  99 Aa2 5 3 1 3  
City of Eagan MN 0 AA 0 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Burnsville MN NL  99/00 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Ballwin MO NL  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
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City of Asheville NC 0 AA 0 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Bismarck ND NL  97 Aa2 5 1 1 3  
City of Fargo ND 99/0 AA 0 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Newark NJ 98 AA NL  4 2 1 3  
Township of Montville NJ 0 AA NL  3 4 1 3  
Township of South Brunswick NJ 99/0 AA 98 Aa2 4 4 1 3  
Township of Montclair NJ 0 AA 0 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Westerville OH 1 AA- 99 Aa2 5 3 1 3  
City of Oklahoma City OK 99/0/1 AA 98/99/
00 
Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Tulsa OK 99/1 AA 99/01 Aa2 5 3 1 3  
City of Portland OR 0 AA 98 Aa2 3 4 1 3  
Borough of Norristown PA 98 AA NL  3 2 1 3  
Township of Radnor PA NR  0 Aa2 5 4 1 3  
City of Chattanooga TN 0 AA 98 Aa3 3 4 1 3  
City of Nashville-Davidson TN 99 AA NL  3 3 1 3  
City of Fort Worth TX 0 AA 99 Aa2 5 3 1 3  
City of Lubbock TX 0 Aas 99 Aa2 5 3 1 3  
City of Newport News VA 99/0 AA 98 Aa2 4 3 1 3  
City of Norfolk VA 99 AA I  3 3 1 3  
City of West Allis WI 0 AA 98 A1 4 4 1 3  
Village of Whitefish Bay WI NL  98 Aa2 5 2 1 3  
Village of Orland Park IL 1 AA 98 Aa3 3 5 1 3  
City of Kansas City MO 0 AA 98 Aa3 4 3 1 3  
City of Kirkwood MO 1 AA 98 Aa3 4 5 1 3  
City of Hickory NC 0 AA 97 Aa3 4 4 1 3  
City of Knoxville TN 0 AA 97 Aa3 4 4 1 3  
Town of Bartlett TN 1 AA 98 Aa3 4 5 1 3  
City of El Paso TX 0 AA I  3 4 1 3  
City of Arlington TX 0 AA 98 Aa3 3 4 1 3  
City of Farmers Branch TX 99 AA 99 Aa3 4 3 1 3  
City of Orem UT 0 AA 98 Aa3 4 4 1 3  
City of Chesapeake VA 1 AA 98 Aa3 4 5 1 3  
City of Lynchburg VA 99/0/1 AA 98 Aa3 4 3 1 3  
Town of Harwich MA 0 AA 98 A1 4 4 1 3  
City of Midland MI 0 AA NR  3 4 1 3  
City of Racine WI 99 AA 98 A1 4 3 1 3  
City of Wichita Falls TX 1 AA 97I  3 5 1 3  
City of Homewood AL 1 AA  NL  4 5 1 3  
City of Marietta GA 1 AA NR  4 5 1 3  
City of Rock Island IL 0 AA NL  3 4 1 3  
City of St. Charles IL 0 AA NL  4 4 1 3  
City of Cheyenne WY 98 AA  NL  4 2 1 3  
Town of Los Gatos CA 1 AA- NL  3 5 1 4  
City of San Diego CA 99 AA- NR  3 3 1 4  
City of West University Place TX 0 AA- 98 Aa2 3 4 1 4  
City of Hoover AL 99 AA- 99 Aa3 5 3 1 4  
City of Birmingham AL 99 AA 98/99/
00 
Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Decatur AL 0 AA- 0 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Mesa AZ 99/0/1 AA- 98/I  3 3 1 4  
City of Chandler AZ 99/0 AA- 99 Aa3 5 3 1 4  
City of Carlsbad CA 0 AA- NL  3 4 1 4  
City of Santa Cruz CA 99 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
City of Cupertino CA 99 AA- NR  3 3 1 4  
City of Brea CA 99 AA- NR  3 3 1 4  
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City of South Pasadena CA 99 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
Town of Cheshire CT NR  98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
Town of Wethersfield CT NL  98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
City of Norwich CT NL  99 Aa3 5 3 1 4  
Town of New Milford CT NL  99/00 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
Town of Newtown CT NR  0 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Sarasota FL 98 AA- 98/I  4 2 1 4  
City of Fort Lauderdale FL NR  98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
City of West Palm Beach FL 0 AA- 0 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Atlanta GA 99/0s AA  98/00 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Honolulu HI 99 AA- I  3 3 1 4  
Village of Addison IL 0 AA NL  3 4 1 4  
Village of Mount Prospect IL NL  98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
City of Champaign IL 99 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
Village of Niles IL 97 I 99 Aa3 5 3 1 4  
Village of Palatine IL 98 AA u 99/00 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
Town of Westborough MA NL  98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
Town of Yarmouth MA 99 AA- NR  4 3 1 4  
Town of Barnstable MA 99 AA u 0 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Bangor ME 1 AA- 0 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Sterling Heights MI 99 AA- NR  3 3 1 4  
City of Grand Rapids MI 99 AA- NR  4 3 1 4  
City of Ann Arbor MI 99/0 AA- 98 Aa3 4 3 1 4  
City of Farmington Hills MI 99 AA- 98 Aa3 3 3 1 4  
Township of Waterford MI 99 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
Township of Canton MI 99/0 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
City of Portage MI 99 AA- I  3 3 1 4  
City of Novi MI 99 AA- NR  3 3 1 4  
City of Walker MI 99 AA- NL  4 3 1 4  
City of St. Cloud MN 99 AA- 98 A1 4 3 1 4  
City of New Ulm MN NR  98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
City of Coon Rapids MN NR  0 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Owatonna MN NL  98/00 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Grand Forks ND NL  99/01 Aa3 5 5 1 4  
Town of Londonderry NH NR  98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
City of Keene NH NL  99 Aa3 5 3 1 4  
City of Concord NH 99/0 AA 99/00/
01 
Aa3 5 5 1 4  
City of Hackensack NJ 98 AA- 98 Aa3 5 2 1 4  
City of Las Vegas NV 0 AA- 0 Aa3 4 4 1 4  
City of Henderson NV 0 AA- 0 Aa3 5 4 1 4  
City of Gresham OR 99 AA- 97 Aa3 4 3 1 4  
City of Beaverton OR 99 AA NR  4 3 1 4  
City of Baytown TX 0 AA- 98 Aa3 3 4 1 4  
City of Temple TX 0 AA- 98 Aa3 3 4 1 4  
City of Mesquite TX 99/0 AA- I  3 3 1 4  
City of San Angelo TX 99 AA- NR  3 3 1 4  
City of Round Rock TX 99 AA- I  3 3 1 4  
City of Waco TX 0 AA- 99 Aa3 3 4 1 4  
City of Portsmouth VA 0/1 AA- I  3 4 1 4  
City of Salem VA NR  99 Aa3 5 3 1 4  
City of Lynnwood WA 1 AA- NL  3 5 1 4  
City of Kent WA 99/0 AA- I  3 3 1 4  
City of Bellingham WA 0 I 1 Aa3 5 5 1 4  
City of Janesville WI 0 AA- 97 A1 3 4 1 4  
City of Sheboygan WI 99/0 AA- 98 Aa3 4 3 1 4  
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City of Waukesha WI NR  98 Aa2 5 2 1 4  
City of Berkeley CA 99 AA- I  3 3 1 4  
City of Bloomington IN 0 AA- 98 A1 3 4 1 4  
Town of Mount Pleasant SC 99 AA- 99 A1 4 3 1 4  
City of Killeen TX 0 AA- NR  3 4 1 4  
City of North Charleston SC 99/00 AA- 98 A2 3 3 1 4  
City of Willoughby OH 99 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
City of Eureka CA 97 AA- NL  3 1 1 4  
City of San Clemente CA 0 AA- NL  4 4 1 4  
Town of Suffield CT 1 AA- NL  3 5 1 4  
City of Fort Wayne IN 99 AA- NL  4 3 1 4  
City of East Grand Rapids MI 1 AA- NL  4 5 1 4  
City of Independence MO 0 AA- NL  4 4 1 4  
City of Concord NC 98 AA- NR  4 2 1 4  
Township of Franklin NJ 97 AA- NL  4 1 1 4  
City of Englewood NJ 99 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
City of Findlay OH 98 AA- NR  4 2 1 4  
City of Greenwood SC 99 AA- NR  4 3 1 4  
Town of Herndon VA 99 AA- NL  3 3 1 4  
Town of Vienna VA 99 AA- NL  4 3 1 4  
City of Anniston AL 98/i AAA NL  1 2 1   
City of Opelika AL 0 AAA 98/I Aaa 1 4 1   
City of Enterprise AL 98I  NR  1 2 1   
City of Alabaster AL 98/I AAA NR  1 2 1   
City of Flagstaff AZ 97/I  97/I  1 1 1   
City of Avondale AZ 97/I  97/I  1 1 1   
City of Redwood City CA 97/I  NR  1 1 1   
City of San Leandro CA 97I  NI  1 1 1   
City of Clovis CA 97/I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Lafayette CA 97/I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Ukiah CA 97/I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Soledad CA 97/I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Benicia CA NR  97I  2 1 1   
City of Oakland CA 98/I  98/I  1 2 1   
City of San Jacinto CA 98/I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Lemoore CA 98/I  NL  1 2 1   
City of San Juan Capistrano CA NL  98I  2 2 1   
City of Colorado Springs CO 99I  NR  1 3 1   
City of Cartersville GA 98/i  NR  1 2 1   
City of Marion IA 98/i  NL  1 2 1   
City of Boone IA 98/i  NL  1 2 1   
City of Indianola IA 98/I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Moscow ID 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Springfield IL 97I  NR  1 1 1   
City of Joliet IL 97I  97I  1 1 1   
City of Blue Island IL 97I  NL  1 1 1   
Village of Westmont IL 98I  NL  1 2 1   
Village of Homewood IL NR  98I  2 2 1   
Village of Round Lake Beach IL 99I  NL  1 3 1   
City of Rockford IL NR  0  2 4 1   
Village of Lake Zurich IL NL  00I  2 4 1   
City of Mishawaka IN 97I  NR  1 1 1   
City of Junction City KS 98I  97I  1 2 1   
City of Mc Pherson KS 98I  98I  1 2 1   
City of Hays KS 99I  NR  1 3 1   
City of Ashland KY 99I  NR  1 3 1   
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Lafayette Consolidated Government LA NL  97I  2 1 1   
Town of Agawam MA NR  98I  2 2 1   
City of Woburn MA 97I  99I  2 3 1   
City of Marlborough MA NR  99I  2 3 1   
City of Northampton MA NL  00I  2 4 1   
Town of Greenfield MA NR  00I  2 4 1   
City of Flint MI 97I  NL  1 1 1   
City of East Lansing MI 94 AA 00I  2 4 1   
City of Gulfport MS 97I  98I  2 2 1   
City of Helena MT 01I  NL  1 5 1   
City of Gastonia NC 97I  97I  1 1 1   
City of Rochester NH NR  00I  2 4 1   
Township of Aberdeen NJ 98I  NR  1 2 1   
Township of Sparta NJ 97I  NR  1 1 1   
Township of Woodbridge NJ NL  98I  2 2 1   
Township of Hamilton NJ 98I  98I  2 2 1   
Township of Freehold NJ NR  98I  2 2 1   
City of Elizabeth NJ 98I  99I  2 3 1   
Township of Old Bridge NJ NR  00I  2 4 1   
Township of Roxbury NJ 98I  98I  2 2 1   
City of Alamogordo NM 97I  NR  1 1 1   
City of Roswell NM NL  97I  2 1 1   
City of Plattsburgh NY 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of New Rochelle NY 98I  98I  2 2 1   
Town of Union NY NL  98I  2 2 1   
Village of Port Chester NY NR  99I  2 3 1   
Village of Ossining NY NL  99I  2 3 1   
City of Geneva NY 97I  99I  2 3 1   
City of Corning NY NR  99I  2 3 1   
City of Canandaigua NY NR  99I  2 3 1   
City of Auburn NY NR  00I  2 4 1   
City of Glens Falls NY NR  00I  2 4 1   
City of Batavia NY NR  01I  2 5 1   
City of Perrysburg OH 99I  NL  1 3 1   
City of Fairfield OH 00I  NL  1 4 1   
City of Defiance OH 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Tallmadge OH 98I  NL  1 2 1   
Township of Union OH 99I  NL  1 3 1   
City of Springfield OH 98I  99  2 3 1   
City of Middletown OH 97I  99I  2 3 1   
City of Moore OK 99I  I  1 3 1   
City of York PA 99 I NR  1 3 1   
Township of Manheim PA 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Penn Hills PA 99i  97I  1 3 1   
Township of Penn PA 99I  NL  1 3 1   
City of Allentown PA 97I  00I  2 4 1   
Town of South Kingstown RI NR  98I  2 2 1   
City of Jackson TN NL  97I  2 1 1   
City of Shelbyville TN 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Kingsport TN 97I  98I  2 2 1   
City of Brownwood TX NR  97I  2 1 1   
City of Bedford TX NL  98I  2 2 1   
City of Alvin TX NR  98I  2 2 1   
City of Mount Pleasant TX NR  98I  2 2 1   
City of Port Neches TX NR  99I  2 3 1   
City of Kingsville TX NL  00I  2 4 1   
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City of Humble TX NR  00I  2 4 1   
City of Provo UT NR  99I  2 3 1   
City of Bristol VA 98I  98I  1 2 1   
City of Danville VA 97 I 98 I 2 2 1   
City of Kennewick WA 97I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Federal Way WA NL  97I  2 1 1   
City of Everett WA 98I  98I  1 2 1   
City of Mount Vernon WA 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Moses Lake WA 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Tumwater WA NR  98I  2 2 1   
Town of Grand Chute WI NR  97I  2 1 1   
City of Sun Prairie WI NR  98I  2 2 1   
City of Onalaska WI NR  98I  2 2 1   
City of Wheaton IL 0 I NL  1 4 1   
City of Quincy IL 0 I NL  1 4 1   
Village of Lombard IL 0 I NL  1 4 1   
City of De Kalb IL 97 I NL  1 1 1   
City of Marion IL 1 I NL  1 5 1   
City of Kokomo IN 1 I NL  1 5 1   
City of Michigan City IN 97 I NL  1 1 1   
Town of Highland IN 97 I NL  1 1 1   
City of El Dorado KS 1 I NL  1 5 1   
Town of Braintree MA 0 I NL  1 4 1   
City of Laurel MD 97 I NL  1 1 1   
City of Albion MI 97 I NL  1 1 1   
City of Cape Girardeau MO 98 I NR  1 2 1   
City of Mandan ND 97I  NR  1 1 1   
City of Clovis NM 97I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Beacon NY 97I  NR  1 1 1   
Village of East Rockaway NY 97I  NR  1 1 1   
City of Cuyahoga Falls OH 97I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Beavercreek OH 98I  NL  1 2 1   
City of Fairborn OH 00I  NL  1 4 1   
City of Piqua OH 98 I NL  1 2 1   
City of Rocky River OH 97I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Tiffin OH 1 I NL  1 5 1   
City of Avon Lake OH 99 I NL  1 2 1   
City of Bend OR 97 I NL  1 1 1   
Borough of Chambersburg PA 97 I NL  1 1 1   
City of Goose Creek SC 97 I NL  1 1 1   
City of Groves TX 97I  NL  1 1 1   
City of Vernon TX 0 I NL  1 4 1   
City of Henderson TX 97 I NR  1 1 1   
City of Ogden City UT 97 I NL  1 1 1   
City of Harrisonburg VA 0 I NR  1 4 1   
Town of Menasha WI 0 I NL  1 4 1   
City of Kenosha WI 98 A+ 99 Aa2 5 3 0 3  
City of Ames IA 0 A+ 98/00 Aaa 3 4 0 5  
City of Walnut CA 0 A+ NL  3 4 0 5  
City of Jackson MS 1 A+ I  3 5 0 5  
City of Athens AL NR  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of Madison AL 99 A+ 98/I  3 3 0 5  
City of Auburn AL 1 A+ 99 A1 5 3 0 5  
City of Folsom CA 99 A+ 97/I  3 3 0 5  
City of Petaluma CA 99 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
City of Culver City CA 99 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
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City of Pueblo CO 1 A+ 98I  3 5 0 5  
City of Lafayette CO 99 A+ NL  3 3 0 5  
Town of East Hartford CT NR  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
Town of East Hampton CT NR  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of New London CT 99 A+ 95 A2 3 3 0 5  
City of Mason City IA NL  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Bettendorf IA NR  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Ankeny IA NR  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Newton IA NR  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
Village of Glendale Heights IL NR  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of West Chicago IL 98/1 A+ NL  3 5 0 5  
City of Waukegan IL NR  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Fairview Heights IL 99 A+ NL  3 3 0 5  
City of Woodstock IL 0 A+ NL  3 4 0 5  
City of Columbus IN NL  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of Leavenworth KS 98 I 98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Shawnee KS 98 I 98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Salina KS NR  99 A1 5 3 0 5  
Town of North Attleborough MA NL  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
Town of Ipswich MA NL  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
Town of Easton MA 97I  99 A1 5 3 0 5  
Town of Scarborough ME NR  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Livonia MI 0 A+ NR  3 4 0 5  
City of Warren MI 99 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
City of Blaine MN NL  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of Brooklyn Center MN NR  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of Woodbury MN NL  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Anoka MN NR  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Hopkins MN 99 A+ NL  3 3 0 5  
City of Austin MN NR  98/99 A1 5 3 0 5  
City of Wilmington NC 99 A+ I  3 3 0 5  
City of Rocky Mount NC 99 A+ I  3 3 0 5  
City of Henderson NC 98/1 A+ NL  3 5 0 5  
City of Goldsboro NC 99 A+ 98 A1 4 3 0 5  
City of Salisbury NC 98 A+ 98 A1 5 2 0 5  
Township of Nutley NJ 0 A+ NL  4 4 0 5  
Carson City NV 99 A+ I  3 3 0 5  
City of Broken Arrow OK 99/0 A+ 98/00 A1 5 4 0 5  
City of Myrtle Beach SC 99/0 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
Town of Hilton Head Island SC 99 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
City of Longview TX 98 A+ I  3 2 0 5  
City of Duncanville TX 99 A+ NL  3 3 0 5  
City of La Porte TX 98/00 A+ I  3 4 0 5  
City of College Station TX 99 A+ I  3 3 0 5  
City of Lewisville TX 99 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
Town of Flower Mound TX 99 A+ I  3 3 0 5  
City of Sugar Land TX 99 A+ 98 A1 3 3 0 5  
City of De Soto TX 99 A+ I  3 3 0 5  
City of Grapevine TX 99/0 A+ 98 A1 3 3 0 5  
City of San Marcos TX 99/0 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
City of Lake Jackson TX 99 A+ NL  3 3 0 5  
City of Angleton TX 99/01 A+ NL  3 3 0 5  
City of St. George UT 99 A+ NR  3 3 0 5  
City of Suffolk VA 99 A+ I  3 3 0 5  
City of Vancouver WA 00/01 A+ I  3 4 0 5  
City of Cudahy WI 1 A+ 97 A2 3 5 0 5  
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Town of Caledonia WI NR  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of Muskego WI NR  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of Watertown WI NL  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of Fitchburg WI NL  98 A1 5 2 0 5  
City of West Bend WI NL  0 A1 5 4 0 5  
Town of Smithfield RI 98 A+ I  3 2 0 5  
City of Oconomowoc WI NL  97 A1 5 1 0 5  
City of Monrovia CA 0 A+ NR  3 4 0 5  
City of San Bruno CA 0 A+ NL  3 4 0 5  
City of Royal Oak MI 1 A+ NL  3 5 0 5  
City of Texarkana TX 0 A+ NR  3 4 0 5  
City of Portsmouth NH 0 A+ 97I  3 4 0 5  
City of Warwick RI 1 A+ I  3 5 0 5  
Town of North Kingstown RI 0 A+ 98I  3 4 0 5  
City of Deer Park TX 1 A+ 97I  3 5 0 5  
City of Schertz TX 1 A+ I  3 5 0 5  
City of Odessa TX 0 A+ 00I  3 4 0 5  
City of Victoria TX 0 A+ 00I  3 4 0 5  
City of Pearland TX 0 A+ 00I  3 4 0 5  
City of Corpus Christi TX 0 A+ 01I  3 4 0 5  
City of Renton WA 1 A+ NR  3 5 0 5  
City of Mobile AL 0 A+ NL  3 4 0 5  
City of Dothan AL 99 A+ NL  3 3 0 5  
City of La Habra CA 98 A+ NL  4 2 0 5  
City of Palm Bay FL 1 A+ NR  2 5 0 5  
Township of Genoa MI 0 A+ NL  3 4 0 5  
City of Liberty MO 1 A+ NL  3 5 0 5  
City of Creve Coeur MO 99 A+ NL  4 3 0 5  
City of Burlington NC 0 A+ NR  3 4 0 5  
City of Lexington NC 98 A+ NR  4 2 0 5  
City of Wadsworth OH 1 A+ NL  3 5 0 5  
City of Mauldin SC 1 A+ NL  4 5 0 5  
City of Greenville TX 1 A+ I  3 5 0 5  
City of Georgetown TX 1 A+ NR  3 5 0 5  
Town of Blacksburg VA 1 A+ NL  4 5 0 5  
City of Stephenville TX 99 A 97 Aaa 4 3 0 6  
City of Wyoming MI 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Jackson MI 1 A NL  3 5 0 6  
City of Long Beach CA 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Dearborn Heights MI 1 A NR  3 5 0 6  
City of Peoria AZ 99/00 A 98/I  3 3 0 6  
City of Newark CA 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Corona CA 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Chico CA 1 A NL  3 4 0 6  
City of Martinez CA 1 A NR  3 5 0 6  
City of Oxnard CA 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Chula Vista CA 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Pomona CA 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Visalia CA 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Montebello CA 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Merced CA 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Turlock CA 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Hollister CA 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of El Paso De Robles CA 99 A 99 A 3 3 0 6  
Town of Hamden CT 98 A 98/I  3 2 0 6  
Town of East Haven CT 98/01 A I  3 5 0 6  
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City of Ansonia CT 98/1 A 98/I  3 5 0 6  
City of Miami Springs FL 98 A NL  3 2 0 6  
City of Clinton IA 98 A NR  3 2 0 6  
City of Burlington IA NR  98 A2 5 2 0 6  
City of Marshalltown IA 97 AAA 99 A2 5 3 0 6  
City of Darien IL 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Garden City KS NL  98 A2 5 2 0 6  
City of Quincy MA 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Fitchburg MA 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Gloucester MA 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Revere MA NL  0 A2 5 4 0 6  
City of Westbrook ME 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Garden City MI 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Ypsilanti MI 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Champlin MN 0 A NL  3 4 0 6  
City of Inver Grove Heights MN NR  98 A2 5 2 0 6  
City of Hastings MN NL  98 A2 5 2 0 6  
City of Stillwater MN NR  98 A2 5 2 0 6  
City of Andover MN 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Poughkeepsie NY 97 I 97 A2 5 1 0 6  
City of Kingston NY I  99 A2 5 3 0 6  
Village of Hamburg NY NL  0 A2 5 4 0 6  
City of Mc Minnville OR NL  97 A 5 1 0 6  
City of Roseburg OR 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
Township of Lower Allen PA 98 A   3 2 0 6  
City of Laredo TX 99 A I  3 3 0 6  
City of Benbrook TX 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Edinburg TX 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Rowlett TX 99 A I  3 3 0 6  
City of Kerrville TX 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Belton TX 99 A NR  3 3 0 6  
City of Clearfield UT 98/01 A NL  3 5 0 6  
City of Midvale UT 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
Town of Front Royal VA NL  98 A3 4 2 0 6  
City of Lacey WA 98 A NL  3 2 0 6  
City of Meridian MS 99 A 98 A3 4 3 0 6  
City of Lumberton NC 0 A 97 A3 4 4 0 6  
City of Keller TX 0 A I  3 4 0 6  
Town of Bristol RI 1 A 97I  3 5 0 6  
City of Aiken SC 98 A NL  4 2 0 6  
City of Ennis TX 0 A NL  3 4 0 6  
City of Missouri City TX 1 A 98I  3 5 0 6  
City of Kilgore TX 99 A 99I  3 3 0 6  
City of Sherman TX 0 A 00I  3 4 0 6  
City of Conroe TX 0 A 00I  3 4 0 6  
City of Englewood CO 1 A NL  3 5 0 6  
City of Shelton CT 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Wilson NC 0 A NL  3 4 0 6  
City of South Euclid OH 0 A NL  3 4 0 6  
City of Lawton OK 0 A NR  4 4 0 6  
City of Bartlesville OK 1 A NL  4 5 0 6  
City of Beaumont TX 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Rosenberg TX 0 A NR  3 4 0 6  
City of Orange TX 99 A NL  3 3 0 6  
City of Nederland TX 0 A NL  3 4 0 6  
City of Burleson TX 1 A NR  3 5 0 6  
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City of Saginaw MI 1 A- NL  4 5 0 7  
City of Fontana CA 1 A- NR  4 5 0 7  
City of St. Louis MO 99 A- NR  3 3 0 7  
City of Galveston TX 1 A- NR  3 5 0 7  
City of Whittier CA 0 A- NL  3 4 0 7  
City of Bossier City LA 0 A- NR  3 4 0 7  
City of Murrieta CA 0 A- NL  3 4 0 7  
City of Selma CA 99 A- NL  3 3 0 7  
City of Vallejo CA 99 A- NR  3 3 0 7  
City of Alhambra CA 99 A- NR  3 3 0 7  
City of Pittsburg CA 99 A- NL  3 3 0 7  
City of Temecula CA 99 A- NR  3 3 0 7  
City of Lawndale CA 99 A- NL  3 3 0 7  
City of Arcata CA 99 A- NL  3 3 0 7  
Town of Stratford CT 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of Attleboro MA 0 A- NL  3 4 0 7  
City of Hagerstown MD NL  97 A3 5 1 0 7  
City of Auburn ME NR  98 A3 5 2 0 7  
City of Detroit MI 99 A- NR  3 3 0 7  
City of Moorhead MN NR  97 A3 5 1 0 7  
City of Brainerd MN NL  97 A3 5 1 0 7  
City of Chanhassen MN 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of Elk River MN NR  98 A3 5 2 0 7  
City of Rolla MO 99 A- NL  3 3 0 7  
City of Columbus MS NR  0 A3 5 4 0 7  
Town of Kearny NJ 97 A- 97I  4 1 0 7  
City of Elko NV 99 A- NL  3 3 0 7  
City of Brunswick OH 99 A- NL  3 3 0 7  
City of Bethlehem PA 00/01 A- I  3 4 0 7  
City of Lufkin TX 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of Allen TX 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of Mansfield TX 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of Rockwall TX 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of Superior WI 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of Beloit WI 99 A- I  3 3 0 7  
City of White Settlement TX 1 A- 97 Baa1 4 5 0 7  
City of Laurel MS 99 A- NR  4 3 0 7  
City of Watauga TX 99 A- 98I  3 3 0 7  
Town of Plainfield IN 98 A- NL  3 2 0 7  
City of Klamath Falls OR 0 A- NR  3 4 0 7  
City of Seguin TX 0 A- I  3 4 0 7  
City of Terrell TX 99 A- NR  3 3 0 7  
City of Portland TX 97 A- NL  4 1 0 7  
City of Brenham TX 1 A- NR  3 5 0 7  
City of Burkburnett TX 1 A- NL  3 5 0 7  
City of Centralia WA 1 A- NL  3 5 0 7  
City of Orangeburg SC 99/0 BBB+ NL  3 3 0 8  
Town of Derry NH NR  98 Baa1 5 2 0 8  
City of Pittsburgh PA 98 BBB 99I  3 2 0 8  
City of Cranston RI 99 BBB+ I  3 3 0 8  
City of Gainesville TX 0 BBB+ I  3 4 0 8  
City of Mission TX 99 BBB- 98 Baa1 4 3 0 8  
City of Bridgeport CT 0 BBB+ 00I  3 4 0 8  
City of Sweetwater TX 99/0 BBB+ 00I  3 3 0 8  
District of Columbia DC 99 BBB  98 Ba1 3 3 0 9  
City of Mercedes TX 99 BBB  I  3 3 0 9  
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City of Uvalde TX 0 BBB NL  3 4 0 9  
City of Alexander City AL 98/I  98 Baa3 5 2 0 10  
City of Waterbury CT 98 BBB- 0 Baa3 5 4 0 10  
City of Amsterdam NY NR  99 Baa3 5 3 0 10  
City of San Juan TX NR  97 Baa3 5 1 0 10  
Town of Johnston RI 1 BBB- NL  3 5 0 10  
Village of BridgeView IL 0 A- NL  4 4 0 7  
City of Roseville MI NR  NL       
City of Ferndale MI NR  NR       
City of Muskegon Heights MI NL  NL       
City of St. Charles MO NR  NL       
City of Jefferson City MO NR  NL       
City of Kirksville MO NR  NL       
City of Hazelwood MO NR  NL       
City of Excelsior Springs MO NR  NL       
City of Manhattan Beach CA NR  NL       
Township of Wall NJ NL  NR       
Township of Evesham NJ NR  NR       
City of Santa Clara CA NR  NR       
Columbus/Muscogee Consolidated Government GA NR  NR       
City of Dublin GA NR  NL       
City of Monroe MI NR  NL       
City of Rio Rancho NM NL  NR       
Township of Ridley PA NL  NL       
City of Deerfield Beach FL NR  NR       
City of Chelsea MA NR  NR       
City of Monroe NC NR  I       
City of Elmira NY NR  I       
Village of Massena NY NR  NR       
City of Murrysville PA NR  NL       
Township of Shaler PA NR  NL       
City of Sharon PA NR  NL       
City of Martinsville VA Nl  NL       
City of Inglewood CA NR  NR       
Township of Towamencin PA NL  NL       
City of Durango CO NL  NL       
City of Louisville CO NL  NL       
City of Americus GA NR  NL       
City of Sturgis MI NR  NL       
Township of Meridian MI NR  NL       
City of Port Huron MI NR  NL       
City of Hibbing MN NL  NL       
City of North St. Paul MN NR  NL       
Township of Lawrence NJ NR  NL       
City of Solon OH NR  NL       
City of Englewood OH NR  NL       
Village of Fayette OH NL  NL       
City of Mount Lebanon PA NR  NL       
Borough of West Chester PA NR  NR       
City of Spartanburg SC NR  NR       
City of Florence SC NR  NR       
City of Robstown TX NR  NR       
City of Fairbanks AK NL  NL       
City of Gadsden AL NL  NL       
City of Mountain Brook AL NL  NL       
City of Northport AL NL  NL       
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City of Hueytown AL NR  NR       
City of Ozark AL NL  NL       
City of Tuskegee AL NL  NL       
City of Daphne AL NR  NL       
City of Little Rock AR NL  NR       
City of North Little Rock AR NL  NL       
City of Jonesboro AR NL  NL       
City of Fayetteville AR NL  NL       
City of Hot Springs AR NL  NL       
City of West Memphis AR NL  NL       
City of Rogers AR NR  NL       
City of El Dorado AR NL  NL       
City of Russellville AR NR  NL       
City of Benton AR NR  NL       
City of Searcy AR NL  NL       
City of Bentonville AR NR  NL       
City of Sierra Vista AZ NR  NR       
City of Lake Havasu City AZ NR  NR       
City of Bullhead City AZ NR  NL       
City of Casa Grande AZ NL  NL       
City of Douglas AZ NL  NL       
City of Kingman AZ NR  NL       
Town of Payson AZ NR  NL       
Town of Fountain Hills AZ NR  NR       
City of Arcadia CA NR  NL       
City of Baldwin Park CA NR  NR       
City of Richmond CA NR  NR       
City of Anaheim CA NR  NL       
City of Riverside CA NR  NL       
City of Stockton CA NR  NL       
City of Garden Grove CA NR  NL       
City of Ontario CA NR  NL       
City of Fullerton CA NR  NL       
City of Santa Clarita CA NR  NL       
City of Moreno Valley CA NL  NL       
City of Hayward CA NR  NL       
City of Escondido CA NR  NR       
City of El Monte CA NR  NL       
City of Simi Valley CA NR  NR       
City of Costa Mesa CA NL  NR       
City of West Covina CA NR  NR       
City of Norwalk CA NR  NL       
City of San Buenaventura CA NR  NL       
City of El Cajon CA NL  NL       
City of Santa Barbara CA NR  NR       
City of Carson CA NL  NL       
City of Citrus Heights CA NL  NL       
City of Alameda CA NL  NR       
City of Antioch CA NL  NR       
City of Lake Forest CA NL  NL       
City of Mission Viejo CA NR  NL       
City of Vista CA NL  NL       
City of Palmdale CA NL  NR       
City of Newport Beach CA NL  NL       
City of Upland CA NL  NL       
City of Bellflower CA NL  NL       
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City of Santa Maria CA NR  NR       
City of Monterey Park CA NR  NR       
City of Redondo Beach CA NR  NR       
City of Chino CA NR  NR       
City of Pico Rivera CA NL  NR       
City of Livermore CA NL  NL       
City of Huntington Park CA NL  NL       
City of Encinitas CA NR  NL       
City of La Mesa CA NL  NL       
City of Lodi CA NL  NL       
City of South San Francisco CA NR  NR       
City of National City CA NR  NL       
City of Diamond Bar CA NL  NL       
Town of Apple Valley CA NR  NR       
City of Tustin CA NL  NL       
City of San Rafael CA NR  NL       
City of Glendora CA NR  NL       
City of Roseville CA NR  NR       
City of Laguna Niguel CA NL  NL       
City of Poway CA NR  NR       
City of Covina CA NL  NL       
City of Bell Gardens CA NL  NL       
City of Rancho Palos Verdes CA NL  NL       
City of Placentia CA NL  NR       
City of Manteca CA NL  NL       
City of Colton CA NL  NR       
City of San Marcos CA NR  NR       
City of Pacifica CA NL  NL       
City of Lompoc CA NL  NL       
City of La Puente CA NL  NL       
City of Indio CA NL  NL       
City of Rohnert Park CA NL  NR       
City of West Hollywood CA NL  NR       
City of Tracy CA NR  NR       
City of San Dimas CA NL  NL       
City of Beverly Hills CA NR  NR       
City of Monterey CA NL  NR       
City of Dana Point CA NL  NL       
City of Gilroy CA NL  NL       
City of Watsonville CA NL  NR       
City of Porterville CA NL  NR       
City of Madera CA NL  NL       
City of West Sacramento CA NL  NR       
City of Montclair CA NR  NL       
City of Yucaipa CA NL  NR       
City of Yuba City CA NL  NR       
City of Marina CA NR  NL       
City of Ceres CA NR  NL       
City of Seal Beach CA NL  NL       
City of Lemon Grove CA NL  NL       
City of Morgan Hill CA NL  NL       
City of Norco CA NL  NL       
City of Dublin CA NR  NL       
City of Atascadero CA NR  NR       
City of El Cerrito CA NL  NR       
City of Delano CA NR  NL       
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City of Laguna Hills CA NL  NL       
City of Suisun City CA NR  NL       
City of Atwater CA NR  NL       
City of South Lake Tahoe CA NL  NL       
City of Port Hueneme CA NR  NL       
City of Lake Elsinore CA NL  NR       
City of Hermosa Beach CA NL  NL       
City of Calabasas CA NL  NL       
Town of Yucca Valley CA NR  NL       
Town of Moraga CA NL  NL       
City of Reedley CA NL  NL       
City of Santa Fe Springs CA NR  NR       
City of Artesia CA NL  NL       
City of Los Banos CA NR  NR       
City of Arroyo Grande CA NR  NL       
City of Palos Verdes Estates CA NL  NL       
City of Corcoran CA NL  NL       
City of Twentynine Palms CA NL  NL       
City of Mill Valley CA NL  NL       
City of Solana Beach CA NL  NL       
City of Red Bluff CA NL  NL       
City of Commerce CA NL  NL       
City of Oakdale CA NR  NL       
City of Los Alamitos CA NR  NL       
City of Desert Hot Springs CA NL  NL       
City of Grover Beach CA NL  NL       
City of Larkspur CA NR  NL       
City of Sierra Madre CA NL  NL       
City of Auburn CA NL  NL       
City of Lakewood CO NL  NR       
City of Arvada CO NR  NR       
City of Fort Collins CO NR  NL       
City of Westminster CO NR  NR       
City of Loveland CO NR  NR       
City of Littleton CO NR  NL       
City of Grand Junction CO NR  NL       
City of Northglenn CO NR  NR       
City of Brighton CO NR  NL       
City of Canon City CO NL  NL       
City of Meriden CT NR  NL       
Town of Greenwich CT NR  NL       
Town of Enfield CT NR  NL       
Town of Vernon CT NL  NR       
Town of Mansfield CT NR  NL       
Town of Waterford CT NL  NL       
Town of Killingly CT NL  NL       
Town of Ledyard CT NR  NL       
Town of Coventry CT NR  NL       
City of Dover DE NR  NR       
City of Newark DE NL  NL       
City of Miami FL NR  NR       
City of St. Petersburg FL NR  NL       
City of Hollywood FL NR  NL       
City of Gainesville FL NR  NL       
City of Cape Coral FL NR  NR       
City of Pompano Beach FL NR  NR       
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City of Lakeland FL NR  NR       
City of Largo FL NL  NL       
City of Pembroke Pines FL NL  NR       
City of Daytona Beach FL NL  NR       
City of Melbourne FL NL  NL       
City of Pensacola FL NL  NR       
City of Port St. Lucie FL NR  NR       
City of North Miami FL NL  NR       
City of Lauderhill FL NR  NR       
City of Delray Beach FL NR  NR       
City of Boynton Beach FL NR  NR       
City of Pinellas Park FL NL  NR       
City of Ocala FL NL  NR       
City of Miramar FL NL  NR       
City of Port Orange FL NR  NR       
City of Altamonte Springs FL NL  NL       
City of Panama City FL NR  NR       
City of Dunedin FL NL  NL       
City of Sanford FL NL  NR       
City of Hallandale FL NL  NL       
City of Kissimmee FL NL  NL       
City of Ormond Beach FL NL  NR       
City of Lauderdale Lakes FL NL  NL       
City of North Lauderdale FL NL  NL       
City of Winter Haven FL NL  NR       
City of Weston FL NR  NL       
City of Cooper City FL NL  NL       
City of Casselberry FL NL  NL       
City of Greenacres FL NL  NL       
Village of Pinecrest FL NL  NL       
City of Tarpon Springs FL NL  NL       
City of Jacksonville Beach FL NL  NR       
City of Cocoa FL NR  NR       
City of Vero Beach FL NL  NR       
City of Dania FL NL  NL       
City of Venice FL NR  NR       
City of De Land FL NL  NL       
City of Belle Glade FL NL  NL       
City of Safety Harbor FL NR  NL       
City of Bartow FL NL  NL       
Village of Royal Palm Beach FL NL  NL       
City of Apopka FL NL  NL       
City of Longwood FL NL  NL       
City of Eustis FL NL  NL       
City of Ocoee FL NL  NR       
City of South Daytona FL NL  NL       
City of Callaway FL NL  NL       
City of Cocoa Beach FL NL  NL       
City of Wilton Manors FL NL  NL       
City of Haines City FL NL  NL       
City of Atlantic Beach FL NL  NL       
City of Holly Hill FL NL  NL       
City of Oviedo FL NL  NL       
City of Lighthouse Point FL NL  NL       
City of Sebastian FL NL  NL       
City of Palatka FL NL  NL       
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City of Lake City FL NL  NL       
City of Savannah GA NL  NR       
Augusta-Richmond County GA NL  NR       
Athens-Clarke County GA NL  NR       
City of Albany GA NL  NR       
City of Warner Robins GA NL  NL       
City of Valdosta GA NL  NL       
City of East Point GA NR  NR       
City of Dalton GA NL  NR       
City of Hinesville GA NL  NL       
City of Statesboro GA NL  NL       
City of Peachtree City GA NR  NR       
City of Thomasville GA NL  NL       
City of Decatur GA NL  NL       
City of Forest Park GA NL  NL       
City of Moultrie GA NL  NL       
City of Tifton GA NL  NL       
City of Newnan GA NL  NL       
City of Bainbridge GA NL  NL       
City of Douglas GA NR  NL       
City of Cordele GA NL  NL       
City of Hilo HI NL  NL       
City of Dubuque IA NR  NR       
City of Ottumwa IA NL  NL       
City of Urbandale IA NR  NL       
City of Keokuk IA NR  NL       
City of Fort Madison IA NR  NL       
City of Spencer IA NL  NL       
City of Oskaloosa IA NR  NL       
City of Idaho Falls ID NR  NL       
City of Nampa ID NL  NL       
City of Lewiston ID NL  NL       
City of Decatur IL NR  NR       
City of Bloomington IL NR  NR       
Village of Downers Grove IL NR  NL       
Town of Normal IL NR  NL       
City of Urbana IL NL  NL       
City of Galesburg IL NL  NL       
Village of Elk Grove Village IL NL  NL       
Village of Hanover Park IL NR  NL       
City of Carbondale IL NR  NL       
City of Oak Forest IL NR  NL       
City of Freeport IL NR  NL       
Village of Carpentersville IL NR  NL       
Village of Morton Grove IL NL  NL       
City of East Peoria IL NR  NL       
Village of Mundelein IL NR  NL       
Village of Roselle IL NL  NL       
Village of Bartlett IL NR  NL       
Village of Machesney Park IL NL  NL       
Village of Franklin Park IL NR  NL       
Village of Bensenville IL NR  NL       
Village of Deerfield IL NL  NR       
Village of Rantoul IL NR  NL       
City of Mount Vernon IL NR  NL       
City of O'Fallon IL NR  NL       
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Village of Hinsdale IL NR  NL       
Village of Godfrey IL NL  NL       
City of Loves Park IL NL  NL       
City of Prospect Heights IL NR  NL       
Village of Bourbonnais IL NR  NL       
Village of Gurnee IL NR  NL       
Village of Hazel Crest IL NR  NL       
City of Kewanee IL NL  NL       
City of Geneva IL NR  NL       
City of Wood Dale IL NL  NL       
Village of Western Springs IL NL  NL       
Village of Algonquin IL NR  NL       
City of Palos Heights IL NR  NL       
Village of Lincolnwood IL NR  NL       
City of Warrenville IL NL  NL       
Village of Worth IL NL  NL       
Village of Cary IL NL  NL       
City of Gary IN NR  NL       
City of Elkhart IN NR  NL       
City of Hobart IN NR  NL       
City of Jeffersonville IN NR  NL       
Town of Griffith IN NR  NL       
City of Logansport IN NL  NL       
City of Shelbyville IN NR  NL       
City of Frankfort IN NL  NL       
City of Lake Station IN NR  NL       
City of Beech Grove IN NR  NL       
City of Peru IN NL  NL       
City of Martinsville IN NL  NL       
City of Greenfield IN NL  NL       
City of Prairie Village KS NL  NR       
City of Dodge City KS NR  NR       
City of Pittsburg KS NL  NR       
City of Newton KS NR  NL       
City of Arkansas City KS NL  NL       
City of Atchison KS NR  NL       
City of Owensboro KY NL  NL       
City of Paducah KY NL  NL       
City of Henderson KY NL  NL       
City of Madisonville KY NL  NL       
City of Elizabethtown KY NL  NL       
City of Glasgow KY NL  NL       
City of Georgetown KY NL  NR       
Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish LA NR  NR       
City of Houma LA NL  NL       
City of Slidell LA NL:  NR       
City of Hammond LA NL  NR       
City of Pineville LA NL  NL       
City of Thibodaux LA NL  NL       
Town of Mansfield MA NL  NL       
Town of Ashland MA NL  NL       
Town of Northborough MA NR  NL       
Town of Spencer MA NL  NL       
Town of Athol MA NL  NL       
Town of Leicester MA NL  NL       
City of Gaithersburg MD NL  NR       
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City of Cumberland MD NL  NR       
City of College Park MD NL  NL       
City of Greenbelt MD NR  NL       
City of Salisbury MD NL  NL       
City of Takoma Park MD NL  NL       
City of Aberdeen MD NL  NL       
City of New Carrollton MD NL  NL       
City of Waterville ME NR  NL       
City of Saco ME NR  NR       
Town of Windham ME NR  NL       
Town of Gorham ME NL  NL       
Town of Orono ME NL  NL       
City of Presque Isle ME NL  NL       
City of Southfield MI NR  NL       
City of Troy MI NL  NL       
City of Bay City MI NL  NL       
City of Madison Heights MI NR  NL       
City of Oak Park MI NR  NL       
City of Burton MI NR  NL       
Township of Delta Charter MI NR  NL       
Township of Plainfield MI NL  NL       
City of Mount Pleasant MI NR  NL       
City of Adrian MI NR  NL       
City of Marquette MI NL  NR       
City of Norton Shores MI NL  NL       
City of Hazel Park MI NL  NL       
City of Auburn Hills MI NL  NL       
City of Riverview MI NR  NL       
City of Escanaba MI NL  NL       
City of Grosse Pointe Park MI NL  NL       
City of Benton Harbor MI NL  NL       
Village of Beverly Hills MI NL  NL       
City of Farmington MI NR  NL       
City of Minnetonka MN NL  NL       
City of Plymouth MN NL  NL       
City of Richfield MN NR  NL       
City of Cottage Grove MN NL  NL       
City of Fridley MN NR  NL       
City of White Bear Lake MN NR  NL       
City of Shoreview MN NL  NL       
City of Crystal MN NL  NL       
City of New Hope MN NL  NL       
City of Columbia Heights MN NL  NL       
City of Red Wing MN NL  NL       
City of Robbinsdale MN NR  NL       
City of Fergus Falls MN NL  NR       
City of Fairmont MN NR  NL       
City of Bemidji MN NR  NL       
City of Springfield MO NL  NR       
City of St. Joseph MO NR  NL       
City of Columbia MO NL  NR       
City of Joplin MO NR  NL       
City of Blue Springs MO NR  NL       
City of University City MO NR  NL       
City of Maryland Heights MO NL  NL       
City of Grandview MO NL  NL       
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City of Wildwood MO NL  NL       
City of Ferguson MO NL  NL       
City of Bridgeton MO NL  NL       
City of Sikeston MO NL  NL       
City of Warrensburg MO NL  NL       
City of Moberly MO NL  NL       
City of Mexico MO NL  NL       
City of Bellefontaine Neighbrs MO NL  NL       
City of Fulton MO NL  NL       
City of Greenwood MS NL  NL       
City of Long Beach MS NL  NL       
City of Mc Comb MS NL  NL       
City of Picayune MS NR  NL       
City of Gautier MS NL  NL       
City of Billings MT NL  NR       
City of Kalispell MT NR  NL       
City of Raleigh NC NR  NL       
City of New Bern NC NR  NL       
City of Statesville NC NR  NL       
City of Sanford NC NR  NR       
City of Asheboro NC NR  NR       
City of Lenoir NC NR  NL       
City of Elizabeth City NC NL  NL       
City of Roanoke Rapids NC NR  NL       
City of Shelby NC NR  NL       
City of Morganton NC NR  NL       
Town of Mint Hill NC NR  NL       
Town of Kernersville NC NR  NL       
City of Laurinburg NC NR  NL       
Town of Tarboro NC NL  NL       
City of Dickinson ND NL  NL       
City of Williston ND NL  NL       
City of Hastings NE NL  NL       
City of North Platte NE NR  NL       
City of Norfolk NE NR  NR       
City of Scottsbluff NE NL  NL       
City of Papillion NE NR  NR       
City of Manchester NH NR  NR       
City of Dover NH NR  NR       
City of Berlin NH NL  NL       
Town of Milford NH NL  NL       
City of Somersworth NH NL  NL       
Township of Edison NJ NR  NL       
Township of Lakewood NJ NR  NL       
Township of Howell NJ NL  NL       
Township of Willingboro NJ NR  NL       
Township of Belleville NJ NR  NL       
Township of Jackson NJ NR  NL       
Township of West Milford NJ NR  NL       
Township of Maplewood NJ NL  NL       
Township of Vernon NJ NL  NL       
Township of Hillside NJ NR  NL       
Township of Lower NJ NR  NL       
Township of Medford NJ NR  NL       
Township of Millburn NJ NR  NL       
Township of Lyndhurst NJ NR  NL       
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Borough of Hawthorne NJ NL  NL       
City of Pleasantville NJ NR  NL       
Township of Franklin NJ NL  NL       
Township of Raritan NJ NR  NL       
Township of Clark NJ NL  NL       
Township of Cinnaminson NJ NL  NL       
Township of Plainsboro NJ NL  NL       
Borough of Tinton Falls NJ NL  NL       
Borough of Glen Rock NJ NR  NL       
Township of Mount Holly NJ NR  NL       
Borough of Manville NJ NR  NL       
City of Portales NM NL  NL       
Town of Silver City NM NL  NL       
City of Artesia NM NR  NR       
City of Boulder City NV NR  NL       
City of Troy NY NL  NR       
Town of Gates NY NR  NL       
City of Newburgh NY NL  NR       
Village of Garden City NY NL  NL       
City of Ogdensburg NY NL  NR       
Village of Potsdam NY NR  NL       
Colerain Township OH NL  NL       
City of Kettering OH NR  NL       
City of Lancaster OH NR  NL       
Township of Plain OH NR  NL       
City of Upper Arlington OH NR  NL       
City of Trotwood OH NL  NL       
City of Bowling Green OH NL  NL       
City of Gahanna OH NR  NL       
City of Zanesville OH NR  NL       
City of Reynoldsburg OH NR  NL       
City of Xenia OH NL  NL       
City of Alliance OH NR  NL       
City of Portsmouth OH NL  NL       
City of Eastlake OH NR  NL       
City of Centerville OH NR  NL       
City of Troy OH NL  NL       
City of Green OH NR  NL       
City of Berea OH NL  NL       
City of Oxford OH NL  NL       
City of Sidney OH NR  NL       
City of Forest Park OH NL  NL       
City of Oregon OH NL  NL       
City of Painesville OH NR  NL       
City of Marietta OH NR  NL       
City of University Heights OH NR  NL       
City of North Canton OH NL  NL       
City of Middleburg Heights OH NL  NL       
City of West Carrollton OH NR  NL       
Township of Springfield OH NL  NL       
City of Washington OH NR  NL       
City of Salem OH NR  NL       
City of Broadview Heights OH NR  NL       
City of Reading OH NL  NL       
City of Blue Ash OH NL  NL       
City of Brecksville OH NL  NL       
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City of Norton OH NR  NL       
City of Mason OH NR  NL       
City of North College Hill OH NL  NL       
City of Beachwood OH NL  NL       
City of Norman OK NR  NL       
City of Edmond OK NL  NL       
City of Midwest City OK NR  NL       
City of Ponca City OK NL  NL       
City of Del City OK NL  NL       
City of Ardmore OK NL  NL       
City of Altus OK NL  NL       
City of Duncan OK NL  NL       
City of Yukon OK NL  NL       
City of Sapulpa OK NR  NL       
City of Mc Alester OK NL  NL       
City of El Reno OK NL  NL       
City of Sand Springs OK NR  NL       
City of Claremore OK NL  NL       
City of Woodward OK NL  NL       
City of Owasso OK NL  NL       
City of Guthrie OK NL  NL       
City of Medford OR NR  NL       
City of Corvallis OR NL  NL       
City of Springfield OR NR  NL       
City of Grants Pass OR NL  NL       
City of Ashland OR NL  NL       
City of Coos Bay OR NR  NL       
City of Tualatin OR NL  NL       
City of Woodburn OR NL  NL       
City of Newberg OR NR  NL       
City of La Grande OR NR  NL       
City of Lebanon OR NR  NL       
City of Harrisburg PA NR  NR       
Township of Middletown PA NR  NL       
Borough of State College PA NL  NL       
Township of Falls PA NR  NL       
Town of Mc Candless PA NL  NL       
Township of Tredyffrin PA NL  NL       
Township of Upper Merion PA NL  NL       
Township of Upper Moreland PA NR  NL       
Township of Lower Makefield PA NR  NL       
Township of Whitehall PA NR  NL       
Township of Horsham PA NL  NL       
Township of Springettsbury PA NR  NL       
Township of Hampden PA NL  NL       
Borough of Carlisle PA NR  NL       
Township of Derry PA NR  NL       
Township of Exeter PA NR  NL       
Township of Bethlehem PA NR  NL       
Township of Plymouth PA NL  NL       
Township of Aston PA NR  NL       
Borough of Phoenixville PA NR  NL       
Township of West Manchester PA NL  NL       
Newtown Township PA NL  NL       
Township of Upper Allen PA NR  NL       
Township of West Whiteland PA NL  NL       
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City of Lower Burrell PA NR  NL       
Township of Caln PA NL  NL       
Township of Harrison PA NR  NL       
City of Coatesville PA NR  NL       
City of East Providence RI NR  NL       
City of Newport RI NL  NR       
Town of Lincoln RI NR  NR       
Town of Portsmouth RI NR  NL       
Town of Summerville SC NL  NL       
City of North Augusta SC NL  NL       
City of Gaffney SC NL  NL       
City of Cayce SC NL  NL       
City of Sioux Falls SD NR  NR       
City of Watertown SD NL  NL       
City of Brookings SD NR  NL       
City of Mitchell SD NR  NL       
City of Pierre SD NL  NL       
City of Vermillion SD NL  NL       
City of Murfreesboro TN NL  NR       
City of Hendersonville TN NL  NL       
City of Columbia TN NL  NR       
City of Bristol TN NL  NL       
City of Morristown TN NL  NL       
City of Maryville TN NL  NL       
City of Elizabethton TN NL  NL       
Town of Farragut TN NL  NL       
City of Red Bank TN NL  NL       
City of Athens TN NL  NL       
City of Springfield TN NR  NL       
City of Mc Minnville TN NR  NL       
City of Big Spring TX NL  NR       
City of Friendswood TX NR  NR       
City of University Park TX NL  NL       
City of Plainview TX NL  NR       
City of Eagle Pass TX NL  NR       
City of Bay City TX NL  NR       
City of Palestine TX NR  NR       
City of Borger TX NR  NR       
City of Hereford TX NL  NR       
City of Jacksonville TX NR  NR       
City of Freeport TX NL  NR       
City of Canyon TX NR  NL       
City of Lamesa TX NL  NL       
City of Galena Park TX NL  NL       
City of Sandy City UT NR  NR       
City of Layton UT NL  NL       
City of Bountiful UT NL  NL       
City of Logan UT NR  NR       
City of Murray UT NL  NL       
City of Roy UT NL  NL       
City of Tooele UT NR  NL       
City of North Ogden UT NR  NL       
City of Centerville UT NL  NL       
City of Spanish Fork UT NL  NL       
City of South Salt Lake UT NL  NL       
City of Staunton VA NR  NL       
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Town of Christiansburg VA NL  NL       
City of Williamsburg VA NL  NL       
City of Poquoson VA NL  NL       
City of Lakewood WA NL  NL       
City of Shoreline WA NL  NL       
City of Olympia WA NR  NR       
City of University Place WA NL  NL       
City of Longview WA NR  NL       
City of Burien WA NL  NL       
City of Pullman WA NL  NL       
City of Mercer Island WA NL  NL       
City of Pasco WA NR  NL       
City of Port Angeles WA NR  NR       
City of Des Moines WA NL  NL       
City of Oak Harbor WA NL  NR       
City of Tukwila WA NR  NL       
City of Ellensburg WA NR  NL       
City of Franklin WI NL  NR       
City of Oak Creek WI NL  NL       
City of Mequon WI NR  NR       
City of Wisconsin Rapids WI NL  NL       
Village of Greendale WI NR  NL       
Village of Shorewood WI NL  NL       
Village of Brown Deer WI NL  NL       
City of Charleston WV NL  NR       
City of Huntington WV NL  NL       
City of Wheeling WV NL  NL       
City of Parkersburg WV NL  NR       
City of Morgantown WV NL  NL       
City of Weirton WV NL  NL       
City of Fairmont WV NL  NR       
City of Vienna WV NL  NL       
City of Moundsville WV NL  NL       
City of Casper WY NR  NL       
City of Laramie WY NR  NL       
City of Gillette WY NR  NL       
City of Sheridan WY NL  NL       
City of Green River WY NR  NL       
Town of Evanston WY NL  NL       
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Independent Variable Correlations 
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Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
 
While there are significant correlations among the indices used as independent variables, Tabachnick & Fidell (2001, p. 84) suggest the 
correlation between two variables should not exceed .7.  Since none of the correlations exceeded this threshold and did not violate the 
multi-collinearity assumption all the variables were retained for analysis. 
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List of HRM Practices in Independent Variable Indices 
Reported as in Place by Municipalities 
 
 
Number of Municipalities Reporting and Percentage of Total 
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HRM Practice In Place 
 
 Municipalities Reporting 
 
Percentage of Total 
Recruitment Index (17)  
• Public announcement of exams 254 69.4 
• Advertisements in local papers/professional or 
technical publications. 
 
356 
 
97.3 
• Requests to minority, female and other special 
interest organizations. 
 
225 
 
61.5 
• Requests to unions, trade, and professional 
associations. 
 
161 
 
44.0 
• Requests to state or private employment/referral 
agencies. 
 
170 
 
46.4 
• On-line job vacancy information. 297 81.1 
• Job vacancy telephone recordings. 193 52.7 
• Participation in inter-jurisdictional recruitment.  
58 
 
15.8 
• Internship/co-op in local government. 115 31.4 
• Internal recruitment. 311 85.0 
• Referrals from current employees. 203 55.5 
• Job announcements on local cable channels 159 43.4 
• Kiosks in public places 27 7.4 
• Placement agencies/search firms. 86 23.5 
• College/university career placement center. 223 60.9 
• Other 13 3.6 
• Job/employment fairs. 11 3.0 
Selection Tests Index (10)  
• Job knowledge 255 69.7 
• Intelligence 80 21.9 
• Aptitude 141 38.5 
• Performance skill(s) 300 82.0 
• Job-related physical agility/strength 274 74.9 
• General health 149 40.7 
• Job-related English language proficiency 52 14.2 
• Writing ability 172 47.0 
• Computer skills 209 57.1 
• Cognitive thinking skills 119 32.5 
Selection Criteria Index (10)  
• Training & experience 351 95.9 
• Specific local government experience 249 68.0 
• Level of education 335 91.5 
• Assessment center 160 43.7 
• Height/weight requirements 24 6.6 
• Minimum scores on administered tests 245 66.9 
• Background investigation 321 87.7 
• Polygraph 125 34.2 
• Psychiatric/psychological screening 198 54.1 
• Finger printing 125 34.2 
Selection/streamlining Index (1)  
• Do not use the rule of “n” 200 54.6 
Training Index (4)  
• Have a workplace diversity training program 142 38.8 
• Participation in diversity training is required for 
all employees 
 
83 
 
22.7 
• Have a workplace ethics training program 89 24.3 
• Have an in-house training department 112 30.6 
Benefits Index (19)  
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• Pay for unused sick leave 242 66.0 
• Conversion of sick leave to vacation leave 68 18.6 
• Other sick leave incentive plans 127 34.7 
• Administrative leave 199 54.4 
• Educational leave 111 30.3 
• Tuition assistance 303 82.8 
• Credit union availability 314 85.8 
• Deferred compensation (e.g. 457 or 401 plan) 338 92.3 
• Difference between pay for jury duty & regular 
pay 
 
228 
 
62.3 
• Dental plan 335 91.5 
• Health care plan 355 97.0 
• Vision plan 216 59.0 
• Periodic medical exams not covered by health 
care plan 
 
109 
 
29.8 
• Employee Assistance Program (EAP) 293 80.1 
• Short term disability plan 158 43.2 
• Long term disability plan 232 63.4 
• Cafeteria selection of fringe benefits 124 33.9 
• Life Insurance 340 92.9 
• Commuting subsidies 29 7.9 
Family/Work Index (10)  
• Paid maternity leave (distinct from other leave) 53 14.5 
• Paid paternity leave (distinct from other leave) 36 9.8 
• Funeral leave 330 90.2 
• Relocation expenses 143 39.1 
• Flex spending account for medical/child care 
expenses 
 
224 
 
61.2 
• On-site day care 5 1.4 
• Subsidized day care 11 3.0 
• Flexible work hours 195 53.3 
• Job sharing 81 22.1 
• Telecommuting 60 16.4 
Pay for Performance Index (3)  
• Have a formal performance appraisal system 320 87.4 
• Pay increases are tied to performance 248 67.8 
• Offer one-time bonuses/cash awards for superior 
performance  
 
92 
 
25.1 
Employee Involvement Index (1)  
• Include both employees & supervisors in the 
development of performance standards. 
 
236 
 
64.5 
Job Flexibility Index (3)  
• Flexible work hours 195 53.3 
• Job sharing 81 22.1 
• Telecommuting 60 16.4 
Decentralized HRM Index (12)  
• Human resource functions decentralized among 
individual line departments 
 
15 
 
4.1 
• Department heads perform duties of human 
resources director 
 
15 
 
4.1 
• Qualification and examination specifications 
established by individual line departments 
 
62 
 
16.9 
• Job descriptions developed by individual line 
departments 
 
54 
 
14.8 
• Applicants recruited by individual line 
departments 
 
22 
 
6.0 
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• Individual line departments determine eligibility 
of applicants and/or make referrals for hiring 
 
72 
 
19.7 
• Individual line departments hire for open 
positions 
 
198 
 
54.1 
• Individual line departments negotiate starting 
salary/compensation packages 
 
108 
 
29.5 
• Individual line departments develop position 
classification plans 
 
4 
 
1.1 
• Individual line departments plan, conduct and/or 
coordinate training 
 
60 
 
16.4 
• Individual line departments plan, conduct and/or 
coordinate safety programs 
 
104 
 
28.4 
• Individual line departments develop standards 
for promotion 
 
91 
 
24.9 
Communication Index (4)  
• Formally evaluates the effectiveness of the 
performance appraisal system 
 
131 
 
35.8 
• Conduct employee attitude surveys 113 30.9 
• Have a suggestion program 155 42.3 
• Have a labor-management committee 128 35.0 
Group Participation Index (3)  
• Offer one-time bonuses/cash awards for serving 
on in-house committees/task forces 
 
14 
 
3.8 
• Have introduced gain sharing 17 4.6 
• Have introduced any group incentive plan in any 
department 
 
30 
 
8.2 
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students on curriculum, coordinate awarding fellowships and scholarships, and help 
recruit and orient prospective students.    
• Faculty, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs, VCU (Fall 
2002 to Present).  Instructor in the Master's of Public Administration Program.  Teach 
Principles of Public Administration, Public Human Resource Management, 
Governmental Decision Making and Advanced Public Personnel Management. 
• Teaching and Research Assistant, VCU Health Systems School of Nursing (Fall 
2002, Spring 2003).  Assisted with grant writing, instructor evaluation analysis and 
administrative operations.  As a member of a grant writing team, contributed to the 
approval of a three-year, $1 million grant from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services to support the implementation of a new master's curriculum in Nursing 
Administration and Leadership. 
• Teaching Assistant, School of Government and Public Affairs, VCU (Fall 2001 and 
Spring 2002).  Team-taught Public Human Resource Management for two semesters. 
• Research Assistant, Center for Public Policy, VCU (Fall 1999 - Spring 2003).  
Assisted Senior Research Associate.  Conducted research and provided consultative 
services to the Virginia Department of Social Services.  Completed projects include an 
evaluation of the statewide Information and Referral Program, youth development 
programs and welfare to work program implementation.  Also, worked for the Director of 
the Center for Public Policy researching and evaluating statewide media treatment of 
environmental issues and identifying trends in the receipt of federal grants for universities 
nationwide.   
• Presenter at the June 2001 Public Administration Theory Network Conference, 
Leiden University, The Netherlands.  Presented a paper entitled: Creating the future 
through relationships: A Native American view of modern administration at this 
international conference.   
• Sociology Instructor, University of Maryland Extension Program, Heidelberg, 
Germany.  Taught undergraduate courses in Introductory Sociology, Social Problems 
and Social Welfare. 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
• Social Worker, Lutheran Family Services, Richmond, Virginia (1999 - 2001).  
Employed part-time as crisis-intervention worker and a Lead Social Worker for home-
based services.  
• Consultant to the Defense Logistics Agency, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania (2000).  
Evaluated the effectiveness of family support programs.  Proposals to re-design programs 
to meet resource reductions and retain their effectiveness were accepted.   
• Loaned Executive, United Way Services, Richmond, Virginia (September 1998 - 
December 1998).  Assisted with the Combined Federal Campaign.  Made presentations 
to state and federal agencies on behalf of the Campaign to include Virginia Air and Army 
National Guard units, Navy Recruitment and the Marine Reserves in the Richmond area.   
• Director of Community Activities, Ft. Lee, Virginia (1991 - 1998), GM-14.  Directed 
the provision of support programs to soldiers and families.  Supervised a workforce of 
400.  Programs managed: family social service programs (child development services, 
domestic violence programs), recreational programs and business programs for the 
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installation.  Managed a $10 million annual budget.  Served as the management labor 
negotiator for the Non-Appropriated Fund Government Workers Union. 
• Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQ V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany 
(1990 - 1991), GM-14.  Regional director for providing personnel and community 
support services to the military and civilian workforce and their families located in two-
thirds of then Western Germany.  Provided oversight for local programs in ten American 
communities, designed policy for staff development of professional social workers and 
educators, planned for program development and resource management across the region.  
Supervised and conducted program evaluations and site visits with 70 professional staff.  
Provided administrative oversight for the acquisition and management of military 
personnel resources.  As part of the US Army European reduction in force, re-engineered 
the staffing and design of functional areas for providing and maintaining service levels.  
Member of European Task Force for Family Support Programs during Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm. 
• Assistant Director of Community Activities, Giessen, Germany (1986 - 1990), GM-
13.  Directed the provision of family support, recreational and business programs in 
support of 40,000 soldiers, civilians and family members spread over a large 
geographical area in central Germany.  Managed an operational budget of $20 million 
and a workforce of 600. 
• Executive Assistant to the Community Commander, Giessen, Germany (1985 - 
1986), (GS-12).  Acted in an advisory capacity for the delivery of community services; 
developed plans for the privatization of the Community Newspaper and the 
implementation of travel and tour programs.  Served as the Commander's speechwriter 
and authored weekly newspaper editorials for the Command Information Program. 
• Human Services Program Manager, 21st Support Command, Kaiserslautern, 
Germany (1974 - 1985), Captain, GS-11, GS-12.  Worked as a staff planner and 
program development specialist.  Provided support and consultative services for a region 
encompassing ten American military communities located in Germany, The Netherlands, 
Belgium and the United Kingdom.  Supervised the provision of social services, 
professional training for social workers and educators, military Equal Opportunity (EO) 
programs and Organizational Effectiveness support throughout the region.  Developed 
and implemented a region-wide child development services program and coordinated 
support to the Department of Defense school system. 
• Correctional Social Work Officer, Ft. Riley, Kansas (1972 - 1974), 1st Lieutenant.  
Provided casework and group work social work services within a minimum-security 
military rehabilitation center for youthful offenders.   
 
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT HIGHLIGHTS 
 
• Executive Development Training Seminar, Denver, Colorado, 1995. 
• Office of Personnel Management Equal Employment Opportunity, Labor Relations and 
Labor Negotiations Training, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1992. 
• Executive Development Training, Bad Kissingen, Germany (two courses), 1986 and 
1989. 
• Resource Management for Executives Course, Munich, Germany, 1984.  
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SELECTED HONORS AND RECOGNITION 
 
• Member, Pi Alpha Alpha, the National Honor Society for Public Affairs and 
Administration since 2001. 
• Leigh Grosenick Award recipient for a paper entitled: Creating the future through 
relationships: A Native-American view of modern administration, VCU, 2002. 
• General Resident Scholar, University of Arizona. 
• U.S. Army Commendation Medal 
• U.S. Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service 
• U.S. Army Superior Civilian Service Award (two awards) 
• U.S. Army Meritorious Award for Civilian Service 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND SPECIAL REPORTS: 
 
• Huff, Richard F.  (2006).  Transnationalism, Human Capital, Governmentality and 
Organization Culture.  In Mark Bevir (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Governance.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.   
• Huff, Richard F.   (2004).  Book review.   The postnational self: Belonging & Identity.  
By Ulf Hedetoft and Mette Hjort (Eds.), 2002.  Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, Politics & Policy Journal, Vol 32, No.2, June 2004, pp 385-387. 
• Huff, Richard F.  (2003).  Creating the future through relationships: A Native American 
view of modern administration.  Global Virtue Ethics Review Journal, 4, 1, 2003, 
pp. 4-28. 
• Barrett, K; Brubaker, S.J.; Daniels, S.E.; Holsworth, R.; Huff, R.; Safford, L.; S. Daniels; 
Sanderson, H.  (2002).  A preliminary report on studies assessing potential 
implications of the reauthorization of The Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families Block Grant (TANFII) for Virginia.  Prepared by The Center for Public 
Policy, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA and submitted to the 
Virginia Department of Social Services June 30, 2002.   
• Research assistant for an evaluation of Virginia's Information and Referral Program, and 
co-author of a report entitled A Proposed Plan for Restructuring the 
Commonwealth's Information and Referral Services.  The Secretary of Health and 
Human Resources presented this report to the Virginia House Appropriation and 
Senate Finance Committees on December 20, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
